B. PORSHNEV

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND HISTORY

B.PORSHNEV

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND HISTORY

Contents

3

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, problems of social psychology have again, after a long interval, attracted the attention of Soviet scientists. This renewed interest is prompted by fundamentally cognitive considerations and the practical tasks of communist education.

Initial discussions of the subject matter and the purposes of Soviet Marxist-Leninist social psychology have somewhat abated.[1] However, it should not be construed that this young and promising branch of scientific knowledge lacks different trends and orientations. These are as inevitable as in any other scientific field; they will be judged by their merits, not their claims.

And one more point needs immediate clarification.

It is sometimes said that social psychology is not psychology, but a branch of the theory of historical materialism studying methodological problems or concrete facts of "everyday consciousness" and "public opinion", and that as such it should not be referred to psychologists, because it deals with sociological rather than psychological laws. But why do the proponents of this view cling to "psychology"? Chemistry has many branches, each defined by a corresponding epithet (physical chemistry, colloidal chemistry, radiation chemistry, biochemistry, chemistry of high molecular compounds). Who would ever think of saying that any of them is not chemistry? In brief, the antagonists of social psychology would do well to find a more appropriate name for their particular sphere of interest.

"Public opinion", "ideological struggle" and other similar categories are related to social consciousness in the broad sense, and belong to psychology but partly. When Western authors write of "psychological warfare" they refer chiefly to ideological rather than psychological struggle.

---

[1] See *Problemy obshchestvennoi psikhologii* (Problems of Social Psychology) ed. by V. N. Kolbanovsky and B. F. Porshnev, Moscow, 1965, summarising the first stage of discussions; see also B. D. Parygin, *Sotsialnaya psikhologiya kak nauka* (Social Psychology as a Science), Leningrad, 1965.

Social psychology is part of psychology. That is the first point that should be made clear. As with chemistry, various epithets and definitions may be added to delimit the discipline, with psychology remaining generic.

Attempts to bar psychologists from social psychology are traceable to the fear of psychologising laws underlying social relations. But social laws can be psychologised only if an intention for doing so exists and no reliable knowledge is available about specific laws governing the existence and development of society. Soviet social science has the creative school of Marxism-Leninism to back it, and is today in no real danger of being biologised or psychologised, just as the post-Darwin biological science is not endangered by chemistry or physics interfering with laws specific to life and its evolution. Only the most backward biologist would turn his back on chemistry and physics, for they are contiguous with biology. Similarly, those fearing psychologisation of objective economic laws may be told: do not psychologise them, but concern yourself with psychology, just as a biochemist will not chemicalise Darwin's purely biological law of natural selection. These sciences do not exclude each other.

One should not shy away from the fact that modern psychology has a firm basis in natural science. Spiritual processes and psychics are related to the physiology of the higher nervous activity. When we say "social psychology" we say "psychology" and hence refer to a science related to the laws governing the work of the brain and the nervous system.

All concepts of psychology without physiology are unscientific and anti-scientific, being contrary to present-day knowledge, including the physiological teaching of Ivan Pavlov. A sound understanding of the mechanism of the human brain, particularly of the "second signal system", will discourage attempts to build Soviet social psychology on anything other than psychology.

Social psychology, like psychology generally, is a large field contiguous with historiology and biology.

Auguste Comte, the positivist, said flippantly that the individual is, first, a biological essence, the subject of physiology and, second, a social essence, the subject of sociology, being therefore confined to these two causal series.

The late Henri Wallon, psychologist and member of the French Communist Party, who died in 1962, complained that

6

many consider biology and sociology poles apart and psychology an appendage to biology or a vestibule to social science, or a scientific hybrid.[1] Marxist dialectics, Wallon pointed out, shows that psychology is simultaneously a biological and a social science, the study of man as one with his environment, of the constant interaction of man and his environment and of the social struggle which determines man's personality.[2]

This general definition is also valid for social psychology, a promising marginal field merging with two major modern sciences.

The relation of social psychology to so-called general psychology, or psychology of the individual, is much harder to define. But this is, so to say, an internal matter.

The term "social psychology" may be used not only in the special, but also in the broader general methodological sense. In the latter case psychics is social, being largely conditioned by the socio-historical environment[3]; in the more narrow special sense, social psychology deals with the psychical activity of men in a group, in the mass environment, as distinct from the individual's psychology in relative solitude or in relation to another individual.

It is still debatable whether we should consider Marxist social psychology (in the special sense) a psychology of the "second order", i.e., marginal to the psychology of the individual (general psychology). Is the psychical interaction of men in an environment secondary, i.e., supplementary to the psychics of each individual, or are socio-psychical phenomena primary and deeper than the individual psychics?

That the individual is himself social militates for social psychology, which may one day prove to be more basic and more "general" than "general psychology". One day, perhaps, it alone will answer to the name of psychology. But that is a matter of the remote future. Marxist social psychology is very young and it is still too early to predict its future. For the moment, the various branches of psychology are competing for pre-eminence. The debate does not concern classification of sciences as such; it is an internal rivalry.

[1] H. Wallon, "Psychologie et matérialisme dialectique", *Societa*, Giugno 1951, p. 243.
[2] Ibid., p. 246.
[3] See A. N. Leontyev, *Problemy razvitiya psikhiki* (Problems of Psychics Development), 2nd ed., Moscow, 1965.

Social psychology is essentially a historical science. The historical aspect is as much its cornerstone as the material physiological basis of psychical activity, for it studies the changing man.

Addressing the 10th International History Congress in Rome in 1955, Pope Pius XII said: "The term 'historicism' denotes a philosophical system which espies in all spiritual activity, cognition, religion, morality and law nothing but evolution, and therefore rejects everything immutable, absolute and of eternal value. This system is, of course, incompatible with the Catholic outlook and with any religion that admits of a personal God."

That historicism is incompatible with religion is absolutely true. There is nothing constant in man except his anatomy and physiology (including, of course, the brain), common to homo sapiens. But the specific nature of man is that the functioning of this constant basis varies in its higher manifestations; it varies so greatly, in fact, that the functions may even turn into their opposites to keep abreast of the changes and transformations in socio-historical relations. The brain is the same, while the content of consciousness and of the operations of the brain may differ irrespective of any organic changes. The brain can operate according to different, even opposite, functional systems. Many nervous diseases are not diseases in the narrow sense and not caused by either infection or organic or chemical disorders of the nerve tissue. The criterion distinguishing the normal from the pathological state is purely socio-historical. Some conditions now considered pathological were not classed as such in past centuries and, conversely, individuals recognised as normal now would have been put in institutions for the insane or for criminals in the past. How the brain works "normally" is determined not by the natural environment, but by the social,[1] meaning that higher nervous activity is governed by the principle of historicity.

Social psychology and historiology are therefore associated.

The causal relationship between social being and consciousness is the hub of historical materialism.

That social being determines consciousness is a key principle

---

[1] See M. Foucault. *Folie et déraison; histoire de la folie à l'âge classique (XVII-XVIII siècles)*. Paris, 1961.

opening up endless aspects of the science of social development. This should be comprehensively explained, both from the philosophical and concrete historical points of view.

What we want to know is how and in what specific ways social being determines consciousness. The fallacy of economic materialism is that it overlooks subjective factors in human history. Yet far from rejecting the subjective, the Marxist discovery of the objective requires an explanation of the former as well.

Social psychology studies the most subjective aspect of the subjective, i.e., the historically changing psychics of man.

Do historians describe and analyse psychics? Unfortunately, only few do. Yet history without psychics is history without live men. It is history "dehumanised". Treatises on the history of the labour movement describe the economic situation of the workers and contain statistical data and information concerning their numbers, the strikes, working-class organisations and parties, and the ideological struggle. Very little is seen in them of the workers. A deep-going study of the workers as such is usually lacking; what we get in lieu of historical materialism is a sort of behaviourism: a study of the external conduct of the workers and no hint as to their psychology.

Here and there, it is true, one may encounter psychological sketches of groups or of epochs. But as a rule the psychological analysis concerns only individual historical characters and amounts to a psychological portrait rather than psychology as a science.

Historians are behind in their study of the psychological and subjective aspects of mass acts. Yet only incorrigible economic materialists say that filling this gap would result in "psychologising" history. Genuine historiology should probe all the aspects of reality and study the specific laws governing different levels and sides of man's social life. Lenin's works are a perfect example of how to study both the dynamics of public sentiment and other socio-psychological facts without the fear of "psychologising" them.

The lack of this in their work has, indeed, come to the notice of historians.

The aforesaid does not mean that this book deals with concrete methods of applying social psychology to various concrete subjects of history. To work out such methods we would need a special theoretical inquiry.

9

No cut-and-dried prescriptions exist of how to employ social psychology in modern history. Unquestionably, its ultimate purpose is to assist in the moulding of the new man of the communist society, for in the final count the usefulness of social psychology will be measured by its closeness to life, its usefulness to communist construction. This does not obviate the need for a profound theoretical foundation. Its efficacy will be superficial without a scientific system, without a clear elucidation of the simple elements, of the initial ideas, and without generalisations related to the foundation itself. There is nothing more annoying than the practical workers who, eager to get ahead, brush aside the theoretical aspect. Marxist-Leninist social psychology will not cope with its tasks, unless it operates as a genuine science and does not rely on bare speculation.

However, social psychology elaborated by psychologists and historians in relation to the past is a gigantic laboratory to study and check ideas which we need in our contemporary practice. Moulding communist relations and bringing up the new man require not only current observations and recommendations, but also fundamental investigation. Our interest in the fundamentals is also prompted by the complex subjective element in the social struggle in the capitalist countries and the young national states. Those who want a truly Marxist social psychology should bear in mind that the deeper the foundation is laid, the more enduring is the edifice.

It remains for the author to add that he has by-passed the chief trends in contemporary Western social psychology. They are numerous, their ideas and methods are varied.[1] Their common trait is that they are not *social* in the full sense of the word. Their subject matter is not human societies and communities, but aggregates of individuals.

This book is an exposition of ideas about the author's attempts to find an altogether different approach.

---

[1] Recommended reading on the subject are the Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Psychologists in Moscow. An adequate idea of the chief theoretical issues may be gained from: A. Lévy, *La psychologie sociale*, Choix de textes fondamentaux, Paris, 1965. Among the recent general outlines also see: I. Maison-Neuve, *La psychologie sociale* (Coll. "Que sais-je?"), Paris, 1964; I. Stoetzel, *La psychologie sociale*, Paris, 1963.

Chapter 1

LENIN'S SCIENCE OF REVOLUTION AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY[1]

1. CLOSER TO LIFE

V. I. Lenin enjoined the revolutionary, the Communist, to display a "sober approach and fervent dedication".[2]

Marxism is a strictly scientific conception of the laws and processes of social life. It is a unity of abstract thought and concrete knowledge. It is a dream and a passion at one and the same time. "We should dream! I wrote these words and became alarmed," Lenin wrote in *What Is To Be Done?* He pictured a stern Social-Democrat asking him: "Has a Marxist any right at all to dream, knowing that according to Marx mankind always sets itself the tasks it can solve and that tactics is the process of growth of Party problems which grow together with the Party?" Lenin answered this difficult question with a quotation from Pisarev about naturalness and the necessity of a certain gap between reality and the antecedent dream, for otherwise one cannot imagine what motive would spur man to consummate his great works in art, science or practical life. "The rift between dreams and reality," Pisarev wrote, "causes no harm if only the person dreaming believes seriously in his dream, if he attentively observes life, compares his observations with his castles in the air, and if, generally speaking, he works conscientiously for the achievement of his fancies. If there is some connection between dreams and life, then all is well." And here Lenin concludes: "Of this kind of dreaming there is unfortunately too little in our movement."[3]

The millennia of human culture are a materialisation of the fancies that, given intense fervor and sobriety, led, if only by

---

[1] This chapter was written with the assistance of I. M. Lukomskaya, Cand. Hist.
[2] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 327.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 509.

11

a frail thread, to reality. The other dreams collapsed. A sculptor or architect scrutinises and ponders the natural properties of stone until he finds the thread linking his fancy with reality. Only then does his fancy find a final and clear expression. How much more formidable than all of man's other creative accomplishments was his desire to remake both social life and himself. It took precise and lucid knowledge to bring into focus abstract economic laws and all other angles approximating to the reality, including human sentiment.

Lenin was not a professional psychologist, though he reacted swiftly and accurately to Sechenov's works on psychology in his own book, *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats.*

"He, the scientific psychologist," wrote Lenin, "has discarded philosophical theories of the soul and set about making a direct study of the material substratum of psychical phenomena—the nervous process."[1] Lenin observed that everybody was talking about Sechenov's radically new approach to psychology and his successful analysis of previously inexplicable psychological processes. This shows that Lenin followed the foremost materialist trends of Russian psychology. But he *was* a psychologist in a different sense—to the extent to which the proletarian revolution, the cause of the Party required a clear and living knowledge of the soul of the people. Failing that no full appraisal was possible at every specific hour of the balance of the revolutionary forces. Of prime importance to psychologists is the fact that Lenin has sprinkled his works with a vast variety of sober, yet often enthusiastic and admiring observations bearing on the frame of mind, psychical change and state of various strata of society at different periods.

Legal Marxists and Menshevik Social-Democrats referred frequently to the psychology of various classes and social groups. But strangely enough their attention was drawn almost entirely to those points in social psychology which were indicative, in their opinion, of the lack of socio-psychological prerequisites for immediate revolutionary action. Their theoretical schemes blinded them to everything else. Important in this respect is Lenin's dispute with Struve over whether there were the aforesaid "socio-psychical conditions"[2] for a revolution in Russia.

[1] V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 144.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 550.

Struve opposed the slogan calling for an armed uprising on the grounds that only mass propaganda of the democratic programme could create the necessary socio-psychological conditions for it. Lenin explained that such an attitude at a time when the revolution had already begun meant a retreat benefiting none but the liberal bourgeoisie. "Just as in the Frankfort Parliament of 1848," he explained, "the bourgeois windbags were busy drawing up resolutions, declarations, and decisions, engaging in 'mass propaganda' and preparing the 'socio-psychological conditions', when it was a matter of repelling the government's armed forces, when the movement had 'led to the necessity' of an armed struggle."[1] Social-Revolutionary Peshekhonov demanded that substitution of a republic for the monarchy be deleted from the "platform": "We must reckon with the psychological factor.... The monarchist idea is too deeply rooted in the popular mind", "one must take into consideration the psychology of the masses", "the question of the republic calls for extreme caution". This psychologism was strongly opposed by Lenin. Rather than monarchist prejudice, he said, Peshekhonov "justifies the knout on the grounds that it has a thousand years of history behind it". Lenin explained that instead of ministering to class instincts obstructing the revolution, these instincts had to be fought.[2]

He detected even the slightest symptoms of revolutionary sentiment and the chances of merging them. He had a sharp eye for the deepest and barely perceptible social phenomena, proving that his thinking was accurately geared to reality. He was always psychologically vigilant, both at times of revolutionary upsurge and of decline, before and after the October Revolution.

What the people think and feel revealed the "people's psychology" and, therefore, had to be studied. In 1920 he wrote: "We must learn to approach the masses with particular patience and caution so as to be able to understand the distinctive features in the mentality of each stratum, calling, etc., of these masses."[3] Economic and social conditions produce in each class, stratum and profession specific psychological traits. This is why Lenin insisted on including in the definition of the

---

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 69.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 11, pp. 201-05.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 192.

proletariat the psychological aspect. The term "worker", he pointed out, should be defined "in such a way as to include only those who have acquired a proletarian mentality from their very conditions of life. But this is impossible unless the persons concerned have worked in a factory for many years—not from ulterior motives, but because of the general conditions of their economic and social life".[1]

Lenin looked into the sentiments, psychology and frame of mind of the people in each issue. In his letters we often come across the following instruction: "Please write speedily and let us know what the feeling is in this respect."[2] One more illustration: a worker's deputy, Lenin held, should learn through the more prominent and influential workers "*how matters stood*, what the workers *thought* about it, and *what the mood* of the masses was".[3] He listed the sources of information on the social psychology, a knowledge of which is indispensable in directing a mass movement. Nor did he rule out hostile sources. "Every effort must be made to collect, verify and study these objective data concerning the behaviour and moods, not of individuals or groups, but of the *masses*, data taken from different and *hostile* newspapers, data that are *verifiable* by any literate person.

"Only from such data can one learn and study the movement of one's class."[4]

Lenin's socio-psychological observations are reflected in his definition of the relationship of the Party and the people: "Live *in the thick* of things. Know the *mood* of the people. Know *everything*. Learn to understand the masses. Develop the right approach. Win their absolute confidence."[5]

That is why Marxist-Leninist social psychology should, prior to examining its own specific laws and phenomena, examine as the starting point the observations made by Lenin in the space of an entire epoch of revolutionary practice as part of his immortal "science of revolution".

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 257.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 34, p. 133.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 18, p. 425.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 20, p. 382.
[5] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Fifth Russian Edition, Vol. 44, p. 497.

2. SPONTANEITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Popularising and amplifying historical materialism, all eminent Marxists–Antonio Labriola or August Bebel, Rosa Luxemburg or G. V. Plekhanov–tried to probe in the most concrete manner the possible mechanics of the law, "social being determines consciousness". All of them observed closely the public psychology, which, though seemingly elusive, is a necessary component of this mechanics, for public consciousness consists not only of ideology, i.e., theories, outlooks and systems, but also of psychology. Neglecting its psychological aspect leads to a simplistic understanding of the basis and superstructure. It is impossible to deduce conclusively from a given economic state the philosophical, religious and aesthetic trends and systems reigning among men. Some historians of culture, among whom Pereverzev and Fritsche, have tried and produced simplified, mirror analogies. For instance, they ascribed the style of St. Basil's Cathedral in Moscow to the diversity of colours and the abundance of goods marketed in Red Square. The more thoughtful Marxists always opposed the simplistic idea of the basis being reflected in the superstructure, showing that socio-economic relations determine primarily the latent and unsystematised areas of public consciousness rather than the ideology.

Plekhanov put forward a theory that changes in human psychology brought about by socio-economic progress bridge the gap between economic advance and the history of culture in the broader sense. To the supporters of this conception, ideas and culture are the materialisation of the public psychology. In his *Essays on the History of Materialism* Plekhanov divides society into five interdependent elements: "the given stage of development of the productive forces; the relationships of men in the process of social production determined by the said stage of development; the form of society expressing these human relationships; the moods and customs corresponding to this form of society; religion, philosophy, literature and art which mirror the aptitudes, tastes and inclinations resulting from the above conditions."[1] Plekhanov insisted that the link named here "moods and customs" (and elsewhere "predominant

---

[1] G. V. Plekhanov, *Izbranniye filosofskiye proizvedeniya v 5 tomakh* (Selected Philosophical Works in 5 Volumes), Vol. 2, Moscow, 1956, p. 171.

sentiment and frame of mind") which can be broadly defined as social psychology is essential for any scientific investigation of the history of literature, art, philosophy, etc. He wrote: "Understanding the history of a country's scientific thought or that of its art requires more than knowing its economy. From the economy one must go on to a close study and understanding of social psychology, failing which no materialistic explanation of the history of ideologies is possible."[1]

Elsewhere, Plekhanov formulated this idea more succinctly: "All ideologies stem from a common root—contemporary psychology."[2]

He and the other Marxists were right: new ideology originates not from economic changes, but from the public psychology, as its ideational materialisation. Conversely, ideology exercises a strong influence on the public psychology; the two interact. If we consider ideology merely as the materialisation of the public psychology, we shall lose sight of the continuity and relative internal logic in the development of ideology from stage to stage. It is obviously more correct to assume that each of the two aspects of social consciousness—the psychic and ideational—has its own structure and specific pattern.[3] But it is the socio-psychic phenomena issuing from this or that socio-economic basis that impel or restrict the development of ideas.

Psychology is always related to the sphere of human actions (including inhibition and suppression), while ideology abstracted from psychology is but a world outlook. Ideology belongs to the realm of ideas, notions, social institutions and customs. Ideology less psychology is a bare phenomenology of culture, whereas taken together the two are the history of culture. When ideas gain a hold on the masses they penetrate their psychology, i.e., their sphere of action. Similarly, when an idea spurs an individual to action it is more than an idea; it is psychics. Ideology acquires social strength—incitement or inhibition—solely through psychology; a change in ideology, as any other process, is brought about through psychology and is conditioned psychologically. By contrast, psychology borders on action (although some actions are automatic and reflex), because there is no psychology out-

[1] G. V. Plekhanov, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 147.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 180.
[3] See M. Gak, *Uchebniye ob obshchestvennom poznanii v svete teorii poznaniya* (The Teaching on Social Consciousness in the Light of the Theory of Knowledge), Moscow, 1960.

side the sphere of action. Psychology may be either very closely or very loosely related to the world outlook; in the latter case, it is an unconscious and purely spontaneous inducement to action. Actually, social psychology is always, if only vaguely, permeated with some ideology.

Lenin stressed that feelings, moods and instincts, i.e., psychical states of different classes and the mass, stem from their economic condition and fundamental economic interest, the main source of socio-psychical phenomena. The people will turn a deaf ear to propaganda devoid of economic visions. "The masses are drawn into the movement," Lenin said, "participate vigorously in it, value it highly and display heroism, self-sacrifice, perseverance and devotion to the great cause only if it makes for improving the economic condition of those who work."[1] To neglect the economic demands is tantamount to "abandoning the economic interests which impel the masses of downtrodden, cowed, ignorant people to wage a great and unprecedentedly selfless struggle".[2] A revolution erupts not because a dozen bourgeois politicians grumble and exhort, but because millions of the "small folk" are driven to despair; deep down in the thick of the proletarian masses, democratic revolution is quietly ripening.[3] Economic conditions predetermine both the temporary political passivity and the thirst of various classes for revolution and socialism. Thus, "their very economic position makes the petty-bourgeois masses amazingly credulous . . . they are still half asleep",[4] while Social-Democrats find in the proletarian masses a natural and "instinctive urge towards socialism".[5]

Lenin does not shun such words as "class instinct", "the instinct of the revolutionary class", "revolutionary instinct", "class feeling", "feeling", etc. What he understands by instinct refers to the socio-psychological sphere rather than the biological. He has found many apt expressions to denote this most primitive and subjective area of social movement or, conversely, of inertia. He analyses the workers' suppressed hatred of oppressors, and draws the following important conclusion: "In a representative of the oppressed and exploited masses, this hatred is truly the 'beginning of all wisdom', the basis of any socialist and

---

[1] Ibid., Vol. 18, p. 85.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 11, p. 423.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 18, p. 82.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 21, p. 296.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 388.

communist movement and of its success."[1] Half-blind feeling turns into half-blind action. "The unorganised street crowds, quite spontaneously and hesitatingly, set up the first barricades."[2] The wavering of the bourgeois parties "is irritating the masses . . . is pushing them towards insurrection".[3]

It is precisely the spontaneous and instinctive sentiments and actions–generated directly by the needs and interests of life– that come under the head of social psychology.

How social psychology permeates ideology is shown in Lenin's analysis of the world outlook of the Russian revolutionary democrats or that of Lev Tolstoy.

Lenin believed that the views Belinsky voiced in his letter to Gogol originated from the feelings widespread among the serfs, while the Russian 19th-century publicists drew on the mass resentment of feudal survivals. Russian 19th-century progressive thought, Lenin noted, reflected not the frame of mind of the intelligentsia, but the peasants' antagonism to feudalism and the protest of the people against "the survivals of feudalism throughout the whole system of Russian life".[4]

Lenin ascribes the progressive elements of Tolstoyism to the same sources, while tracing the reactionary to the psychology of the post-reform peasant, his despair and confusion in face of the capitalist "freedom", which for him spelled ruin, starvation and destitution.[5]

True, Lenin does not reduce the socio-psychological roots of Tolstoyism to the peasantry alone, for he also mentions all Russian society. "The contradictions in Tolstoy's views are not contradictions inherent in his personal views alone, but are a reflection of the extremely complex, contradictory conditions, social influences and historical traditions which determined the psychology of various classes and various sections of Russian society in the *post*-Reform, but *pre*-revolutionary era."[6] Yet, from a more general standpoint, Tolstoy essentially mirrored the mood of the Russian peasant, his blindly revolutionary and just as blindly anti-revolutionary nature.

Tolstoy is great, Lenin wrote, because he expressed the sen-

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 80.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 11, p. 172.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 26, p. 60.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 16, p. 123.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 16, p. 323.
[6] Ibid.

timent of millions of Russian peasants on the eve of the 1905
bourgeois revolution. Centuries of serfdom and the decades of
post-reform ruin "piled up mountains of hatred, resentment,
and desperate determination". The ideational content of Tols-
toy's works, Lenin pointed out, conforms primarily to the peas-
ants' wish of sweeping away the old régime, all the old forms
and ways of landownership in the name of a vague ideal of a
community of free and equal small peasants.[1] Tolstoy's criticism
of the existing order was strong in its expression of sentiment,
passion, purpose, freshness, sincerity and fearlessness and in its
resolve to "go to the roots" and find the real causes of the mis-
ery, because it represented the mood of millions of peasants.[2]
Tolstoy brought home forcefully, Lenin observed, the mood of
the oppressed masses, "expressing their spontaneous feelings of
protest and anger"[3] accumulated over the centuries. He exposed
the institutions helping the ruling classes and contemporary so-
ciety to retain power: not only the state, church and landed
property, but also "the law courts, militarism, 'lawful' wedlock,
bourgeois science".[4]

On the other hand, Lenin pointed out, the peasant conceived
this cherished community in a vague and patriarchal light. His
past had instilled in him a burning hatred of the gentry and
bureaucracy, but had not shown him where to look for the
answers to the questions of social struggle. "Tolstoy's ideas,"
Lenin wrote, "are a mirror of the weakness, the shortcomings of
our peasant revolt, a reflection of the flabbiness of the patriar-
chal countryside and of the hidebound cowardice of the 'enter-
prising muzhik'."[5] Elsewhere he amplified: "Tolstoy mirrored
their [the peasants'-Ed.] sentiments so faithfully that he imported
their naïveté into his own doctrine, their alienation from polit-
ical life, their mysticism, their desire to keep aloof from the
world, 'non-resistance to evil', their impotent imprecations
against capitalism and the 'power of money'. The protest of
millions of peasants and their desperation–these were combined
in Tolstoy's doctrine."[6]

The above is illustrative of Lenin's approach to how some

[1] Ibid, Vol. 15. p. 206.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 16. p. 332.
[3] Ibid., pp. 323-24.
[4] Ibid., p. 353.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 15. p. 207.
[6] Ibid., Vol. 16. p. 352.

features of the public psychology are reflected in some specific ideological phenomenon. Ideology is considered a mirror of the public psychology, although its reflection is indirect and refracted through the specific properties and features peculiar to the ideological sphere.

The reverse process—reflection of ideology in psychology—is overlooked in the above example, notwithstanding Tolstoy and Tolstoyism having many followers among some strata of peasants. To gain an idea of the action of ideas, theories and science on the psychology of the masses and classes one has to shift to an entirely different plane.

In Lenin's works the correlation of psychology and ideology is often treated as the question of spontaneity and consciousness. These differ somewhat, but are closely related. Consciousness and spontaneity, although opposites as Lenin saw them, interacted in the revolutionary movement, the consciousness stemming from and struggling against spontaneity. According to Lenin, the difference between the diffusion of political consciousness and the growing resentment of the masses is that the former is introduced by Social-Democracy, while the latter is spontaneous.[1]

Lenin pointed to this parallel and interacting influence of thought and latent psychical changes on the workers' struggle and the revolutionary movement. In 1905, dealing with the three stages in the Social-Democratic movement, he said: "Each of these transitions was prepared, on the one hand, by socialist thought working mainly in one direction, and on the other, by the profound changes that had taken place in the conditions of life and in the whole mentality of the working class, as well as by the fact that increasingly wider strata of the working class were roused to more conscious and active struggle."[2] Attention simultaneously to the workings of the mind and to the psychical make-up, to ideas and feelings, pervades Lenin's approach to social consciousness.

This differs from Plekhanov's "tier" system in which social psychology and ideology are assigned third and fourth tiers. In direct revolutionary action, Lenin accentuates the antagonism and interdependence of opposites in the public consciousness: social psychology and ideology are somewhat contrary, but can-

---

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 22.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 211.

not exist one without the other. Properly speaking, the opposites are, on the one hand, blind, unconscious behaviour and, on the other, scientific consciousness. Lenin does not shun the term "unconscious". In *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats* he writes: never before did "the members of society conceive the sum-total of the social relations in which they live as something definite, integral, pervaded by some principle; on the contrary, the mass of people adapt themselves to these relations unconsciously, and have so little conception of them as specific historical social relations that, for instance, an explanation of the exchange relations under which people have lived for centuries was found only in very recent times".[1] But between unconscious adjustment to social life (poles apart from logical thinking and knowledge) and its theoretical explanation there is a wide area where the two antagonistic principles, variously correlated, blend to form the public psychology and ideology. Social psychology is closer to "unconscious adjustment", but is visibly influenced by consciousness. Accordingly, social psychology is opposite to ideology in a very relative way, with many a transitory stage. Sometimes Lenin links the two concepts so closely that they become almost indistinguishable. "This psychology and ideology," he wrote, "much as it may be vague, is unusually deep-rooted in every worker and peasant."[2]

Lenin used the term "spontaneity" to describe socio-psychological traits gravitating towards, though never synonymous with, unconsciousness. "Spontaneity" implies two main groups of phenomena: 1) a downcast state of men, submissiveness to poverty, lack of rights, and being accustomed to oppression; 2) protest, resentment, rebellion directed against the immediate source of misery, but not constructive or enlightened by social theory.

Lenin objects vehemently to the former group, calling on revolutionary Marxists to break down this psychological barrier in the masses; he considers slavish submission an antithesis to the revolutionary outlook and revolutionary action. In an article, "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" (1901), Lenin wrote: "Just as the peasant has grown accustomed to his wretched poverty, to living his life without

---

[1] Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 139.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 29.

pondering over the causes of his wretchedness, or the possibility of removing it, so the plain Russian subject has become accustomed to the omnipotence of the government, to living on without a thought as to whether the government can retain its arbitrary power any longer and whether, side by side with it, there are not forces undermining the outmoded political system."[1] By these forces Lenin meant, first and foremost, the progress of the working class, though he detected surviving traces of dejection and submission among the workers too.

The latter group of spontaneous phenomena attracted Lenin in his capacity as theorist and practical revolutionary. He was never doctrinaire in his view of spontaneity. On the contrary, "It is beyond all doubt," he wrote, "that the spontaneity of the movement is proof that it is deeply rooted in the masses, that its roots are firm and that it is inevitable"[2]; "the 'spontaneous element', in essence, represents nothing more nor less than consciousness in an *embryonic form*. Even the primitive revolts expressed the awakening of consciousness to a certain extent. The workers were losing their age-long faith in the permanence of the system which oppressed them and began ... I shall not say to understand, but to sense the necessity for collective resistance, definitely abandoning their slavish submission to the authorities. But this was, nevertheless, more in the nature of outbursts of desperation and vengeance than of struggle."[3]

For a revolutionary Marxist this form of spontaneity is of value not only because it can produce scientific consciousness, but because it paves the way for its propaganda and assimilation. The workers' political stand and spontaneous militancy were, as Lenin saw it, the nutrient medium for the revolutionary Social-Democracy, facilitating rapid dissemination of Marxism.[4] Revolutionary ideologists are "capable of coping with political tasks in the genuine and most practical sense of the term, for the reason and to the extent that their impassioned propaganda meets with response among the spontaneously awakening masses, and their sparkling energy is answered and supported by the energy of the revolutionary class".[5] This was Lenin's answer to educated revolutionaries when asked "What is to be done?".

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 55.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 26, p. 60.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 374.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 5, pp. 25-26.
[5] Ibid., p. 447.

The youth armed with Marxist revolutionary theory would benefit from applying this theory to the spontaneously awakening masses. A revolutionary Democrat, wrote Lenin, will first expose before the people all evils and shortcomings "to arouse *their* activity" prior to reporting to the "authorities".[1] Marxism enables the revolutionary to explain to the workers the root causes of their plight "opening for him the widest perspectives and (if one may so express it) places at his disposal the mighty force of many millions of workers 'spontaneously' rising for the struggle".[2]

Hybernation and awakening originate at one of the extremes; scientific theory, its transformation into a comprehensive socio-political ideology and propaganda originate at the other. Lenin held as insufficient merely to acquaint the Russian workers with the fundamentals of political economy (explaining the nature of capitalist exploitation) and give them a general outline of scientific communism. This is not enough to associate scientific theory with protest and resentment. The Russian worker, of peasant origin or related to peasants, lives in a peasant country and is surrounded by semi-feudal, autocratic and bureaucratic institutions. Scientific theory should explain to the worker not only his narrow class interests, but the surrounding society. It should show him that unless these pillars of reaction are overthrown and so long as the poor peasants deny their support, the working class stands no chance against the bourgeoisie. The working class "will never cease to be downtrodden and cowed, capable only of sullen desperation and not of intelligent and persistent protest and struggle",[3] unless it understands the social order and forms a wide front with the toiling masses. The workers' scientific outlook should not be limited to industry and industrial labour. The Russian Marxists did well to lift the curtain on the rural conditions, dressed up by the Narodniks, showing the proletariat the fetters binding working people everywhere, so that it could rise and throw them off "and reach out for the real flower"[4]–socialism.

"In order to become a Social-Democrat," Lenin wrote in *What Is To Be Done?*, "the worker must have a clear picture in his mind of the economic nature and the social and political

[1] Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 134.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 392.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 291.
[4] Ibid., p. 256.

features of the landlord and the priest, the high state official and the peasant, the student and the vagabond; he must know their strong and weak points; he must grasp the meaning of all the catchwords and sophisms by which each class and each stratum *camouflages* its selfish strivings and its real 'inner workings'."[1]

In short, the counter-move should consist of a theory, properly propagated, to suit the spontaneously roused desire for action, one that would direct this action, reaching through consciousness the sphere of the senses. To bear out his point, Lenin quoted Engels: without a sense of theory among the workers, this scientific socialism would never have entered their flesh and blood.[2] This counter-move answers the spontaneously roused discontent of the masses as theory takes a grip on their consciousness; much more, it enters their flesh and blood. This is best expressed as follows: theory becomes a material force once it gains possession of the masses.

In 1912 Lenin wrote: "We say that the workers and peasants who are most downtrodden by the barracks *have begun* to rise in revolt. Hence the plain and obvious conclusion: we must *explain* to them how and for what purpose they should prepare for a *successful* uprising."[3]

Lenin taught the Russian revolutionaries to fuse scientific socialism with the workers' movement.

The sphere of activity is not restricted to the working class. "There is a mass of people, because the working class and increasingly varied social strata, year after year, produce from their ranks an increasing number of discontented people who desire to protest, who are ready to render all the assistance they can in the struggle against absolutism, the intolerableness of which, though not yet recognised by all, is more and more acutely sensed by increasing masses of the people."[4] Here again Lenin speaks of a wide spectrum of sentiment, ranging from unconscious sensations to scientific consciousness. Analysing spontaneous discontent, he infers that propaganda and agitation should be directed not only at the proletariat but also at other classes. "Is there a basis for activity among all classes of population?" he asks, and adds: "Whoever doubts this lags in his conscious-

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5. p. 413.
[2] Ibid., p. 371.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 18, pp. 381-82.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 468.

ness behind the spontaneous awakening of the masses. The working-class movement has aroused and is continuing to arouse discontent in some, hopes of support for the opposition in others, and in still others the realisation that the autocracy is unbearable and must inevitably fall.... This is quite apart from the fact that the millions of the labouring peasantry, handicraftsmen, petty artisans, etc., would always listen eagerly to the speech of any Social-Democrat who is at all qualified. Indeed, is there a single social class in which there are no individuals, groups, or circles that are discontented with the lack of rights and with tyranny and, therefore, accessible to the propaganda of Social-Democrats. . .?"[1]

Lenin's idea of spontaneity and consciousness is well illustrated by his stand on fraternisation in the battle-lines in 1917. Fraternisation began and continued spontaneously, Lenin wrote, "The fraternising soldiers are actuated not by a clear-cut political idea but by the instinct of oppressed people, who are tired, exhausted and begin to lose confidence in capitalist promises.... This is a true class instinct. Without this instinct the cause of the revolution would be hopeless.... This instinct must be transformed into political awareness".[2] So long as fraternisation is spontaneous, its only implication is the breaking of the discipline of the barrack prisons, the discipline of blind obedience of soldiers to officers, generals, capitalists. But that already is a revolutionary initiative of the masses.[3] Fraternisation was spontaneous, and gradually spread from one sector of the front to all the theatres of war, thus opening the door for political consciousness, for transition to a conscious fraternisation.[4]

Lenin's profound interest in the second form of spontaneity, i.e., in that of protest, leads to the conclusion that the psychology of protest thirsts for consciousness, be it bourgeois ideology or the genuine science of proletarian socialism. However, this psychology of protest or this spontaneity does not predetermine a preference for scientific consciousness as distinct from a nonscientific ideology. On the contrary, as Lenin pointed out, spontaneous development of the working-class movement results in subjugation to bourgeois ideology. Though socialist theory is clearer and closer to the workers, bourgeois ideology is older,

[1] Ibid., p. 430.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 24, p. 268.
[3] Ibid., p. 318.
[4] Ibid., p. 268.

more thoroughly worked out and possesses immeasurably broader means of dissemination. This is why *"all worship of the spontaneity of the working-class movement, all belittling of the role of the 'conscious element', of the role of Social-Democracy, means quite independently of whether he who belittles that role desires it or not, a strengthening of the influence of bourgeois ideology upon the workers".*[1]

This, in sum, is the dialectics of Lenin's ideas about the social psychology of spontaneous discontent and protest; though he considers spontaneity a fertile soil for socialist consciousness, Lenin attacks it and refuses to worship it, because spontaneity as such is a nutrient medium for bourgeois ideology. For the revolution, spontaneity may be either an effective stepping-stone or a hindrance. Lenin wrote: "It is often said that the working class *spontaneously* gravitates towards socialism. This is perfectly true in the sense that socialist theory reveals the causes of the misery of the working class more profoundly and more correctly than any other theory, and for that reason the workers are able to assimilate it so easily, *provided,* however, this theory does not itself yield to spontaneity, *provided* it subordinates spontaneity to itself.... The working class spontaneously gravitates towards socialism; nevertheless, most widespread ... bourgeois ideology spontaneously imposes itself upon the working class to a still greater degree."[2]

This reveals the polarity and mutual penetration of social psychology and ideology, spontaneity and consciousness, unconsciousness and science. Knowledge of this sphere of unconscious, spontaneous socio-psychic phenomena, nonetheless subordinated to ideology, was required back in 1901 to answer the question "What is to be done?", and it was a knowledge that was needed by Lenin throughout his subsequent activity.

3. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VANGUARD AND THE MASSES

Lenin's remarks on social psychology are in the final analysis centred on a single task—to appraise the conditions in which the Party conducts its revolutionary activity, to appraise the socio-psychological background for the Party's slogans, and thereby

---

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works,* Vol. 5, pp. 382-83.
[2] Ibid., p. 386.

the efficacy of its efforts, Lenin never fails to note the ebb and
flow of revolutionary energy, and sometimes, as he writes, of
"dejection and apathy", depending on the general political situa-
tion, among the various strata of the proletariat and the peas-
ants.[1] He sees the range of situations pass before his eyes:
from "a period of an enormous decline in the energy of the
masses"[2] after the revolutionary upsurge of 1905-1907 to anti-
cipation of victory in 1918, "if the necessary turn in the mood
of the people takes place. This turn is developing and perhaps
much time is required, but it will come, when the great mass of
the people will not say what they are saying now".[3] And the
Party invariably suited its methods to current developments.

This is one of the aspects of Lenin's teaching on the rela-
tionship between the Party and the masses and classes. Here,
we shall deal with just this psychological aspect, although it is
interwoven with many other factors.

The relationship between the organised vanguard and the rest
of the masses is an illustration of Leninist dialectics.

To begin with, Lenin emphasised that the finest and most
revolutionary vanguard, the most hardened working-class party
is but a particle of the ocean of people. And the vanguard is
impotent when that ocean is calm. "The finest of vanguards
express the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of
tens of thousands," Lenin wrote, "whereas at moments of great
upsurge and the exertion of all human capacities, revolutions
are made by the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagina-
tion of tens of millions, spurred on by a most acute struggle of
classes."[4]

Lenin was never afraid of calling attention to the Party's trail-
ing behind spontaneous changes in the revolutionary psychology
of the masses during periods of revolutionary uplift. "January
9, 1905," he wrote, "fully revealed the vast reserve of revolu-
tionary energy possessed by the proletariat, as well as the utter
inadequacy of Social-Democratic organisation."[5] Lenin's im-
mediate practical response to the rapid growth of the proletariat
and peasants roused to political and revolutionary life after the
1905 events (when a peaceful workers' demonstration was fired

[1] Ibid., Vol. 16, p. 289.
[2] Ibid., p. 227.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 108.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 31, pp. 91-96.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 167.

on), was: "To drop a metaphor, we must considerably increase the membership of all Party and Party-connected organisations in order to be able to keep up to some extent with the stream of popular revolutionary energy which has been a hundredfold strengthened."[1] In a letter of that period, Lenin said that due to the gigantic scale of the movement, "no single C.C. in the world, under conditions where the Party is illegal, could satisfy a thousandth part of the demands made on it" and that he, for one, favoured postponing the uprising until spring, adding: "but, then, nobody asks us anyway".[2] He thought a congress necessary to prepare the uprising "on the basis of the practical experiences of the functionaries and on the basis of the mood of the working-class masses".[3] He stressed that the Party lagged behind the vigorous action of the masses: "Events have shown that we are dealing, not with an uprising of the 'uncivilised masses', but with an uprising of politically conscious masses capable of carrying on an organised struggle.... We must ascertain the mood of the proletariat–whether the workers consider themselves fit to struggle and to lead the struggle."[4] Some time later Lenin said that the Moscow events again showed "that we are still inclined to underestimate the revolutionary activity of the masses".[5] He appreciated the spontaneous activity of the working class in later periods as well; in 1919, saying that the Soviet system in the countryside existed only due to the hearty support of the majority of the people, he observed: "We have been receiving this support because the urban workers have established contact with the rural poor in thousands of ways, *of which we have not even an inkling*"[6] (my italics–*Author*).

But this is only one side of dialectics. Lenin oriented the Party not only on activity during outbreaks, but also in the periods of relative calm, when political agitation could awaken large sections of people.[7] A point to remember is that a vanguard gets its name because it can rouse the enthusiasm of the masses and then lead them. "It has frequently happened at critical moments in the life of nations that even small advanced

---

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 217.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 34, p. 360.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 369.
[4] Ibid., p. 370.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 384.
[6] Ibid., Vol. 29, p. 76.
[7] Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 514.

detachments of advanced classes carried the rest with them, have fired the masses with revolutionary enthusiasm, and have accomplished tremendous historical feats,"[1] Lenin wrote. This vanguard role implies not mere propaganda of progressive theory, but also disseminating enthusiasm and lighting revolutionary sentiment. "All great political changes," wrote Lenin, "have come about through the enthusiasm of the vanguard, whom the masses followed spontaneously, not quite consciously."[2]

When in 1905 the Party called for extra-parliamentary methods of struggle, this was a call by men, Lenin said, "who really were at the head of the masses, at the head of millions of fighting workers and peasants. The fact that these millions responded to the call proved that the slogan was *objectively correct*, and that it expressed not merely the 'convictions' of a handful of revolutionaries, but the actual situation, the temper and the initiative of the masses".[3] The masses felt instinctively that we were right, Lenin wrote in 1916.[4] In other words, the Party's slogans fell on fertile socio-psychological soil and corresponded to the objective interests of the masses. This was the source of strength of the Bolshevik Party. In 1917 Lenin stressed: "It is we, and we alone, who 'take into account' the change in the mood of the masses, as well as something besides, something far more important and more profound than moods and changes in moods, namely, the fundamental interests of the masses." The Bolsheviks, Lenin continued, repudiated chauvinism in order to express the interest of the masses and spur them to revolutionary action, using "their change of mood not to pander to the given mood in an unprincipled manner, but to wage a struggle on principle for a complete rupture with social-chauvinism".[5]

As we see, Lenin refused to be in tow of mass psychology. He made this clear: "Naturally, we shall not submit to everything the masses say, because the masses, too, sometimes–particularly in time of exceptional weariness and exhaustion resulting from excessive hardship and suffering–yield to sentiments that are in no way advanced."[6]

[1] Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 395.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 174.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 15, p. 359.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 514.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 271.
[6] Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 39.

This, in psychological terms, is the dialectics of the relation-
ship between the masses and the vanguard, or, as Lenin put it
in *What Is to Be Done?*, between the mob and the professional
revolutionaries.[1] The Party should always be with the masses,
"must go where the masses go, and try at every step to push
the consciousness of the masses in the direction of socialism".[2]
The Party gains leadership because it is always faithful to the
masses and because it inspires and guides the masses. But one
should never forget that, first and foremost, history is made by
the masses. In 1905 Lenin wrote that the working class thirsts
instinctively for overt revolutionary action, and the Party must
set the goal for the uprising, i.e., lead the proletariat and not
merely trail in the wake of events.[3] And in 1917 Lenin pointed
out that the only real force that compels change is the revolu-
tionary energy of the masses; this energy finds expression in
propaganda, agitation and organisation conducted by parties
marching at the head of the revolution, not limping along in
its trail.[4] "Socialism cannot be decreed from above. Its spirit
rejects the mechanical bureaucratic approach; living, creative
socialism is the product of the masses themselves."[5]

Lenin did not hesitate to take up the peasant aspirations to
an equitable division of land after the October Revolution put
the key economic and political positions into the hands of the
proletariat. "Experience is the best teacher. Let the peasants
solve this problem from one end and we shall solve it from
the other. Experience will oblige us to draw together in the
general stream of revolutionary creative work, in the elaboration
of new state forms. We must be guided by experience; we must
allow complete freedom to the creative faculties of the masses."[6]

Finally let us recall how Lenin argued for a political respite
in 1918: the Bolsheviks persuaded and won the people away
from the rich, but economic dislocation, hunger and the after-
math of war have "inevitably caused extreme weariness and
even exhaustion of wide sections of the working people. These
people insistently demand–and cannot but demand–a respite".[7]

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 465.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 13, p. 114.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 19.
[4] See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Fifth Russian Edition, Vol. 30,
p. 282.
[5] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 288.
[6] Ibid., p. 261.
[7] Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 143.

As we see, Lenin appraised the Party not for itself, but for its position in relation to the maker and decisive force of history—the working masses. This, indeed, is the only possible criterion from the standpoint of both political practice and history. Lenin wrote: "Any false note in the position of any party immediately lands that party where it deserves to be."[1] Proceeding from this view of the relationship between the Party and the masses, Lenin devoted much attention not only to the psychology of the masses, but to that of the Party membership, and at times censured it severely.

Criticising the Central Committee for psychological shortcomings, Lenin observes that these have a direct bearing on politics, for in political struggle a halt is fatal.[2]

In his letters of that period Lenin insists on ending all, even trifling squabbles among Party members abroad.[3] And after the Revolution he was even more exacting. In 1922 he wrote: "The economic power in the hands of the proletarian state of Russia is quite adequate to ensure the transition to communism. What is lacking? Obviously, what is lacking is culture among the stratum of the Communists who perform administrative functions."[4]

Lenin found soul-stirring words about the ideological and psychological prestige of the Party and its representatives among the people. After the split with the Mensheviks in 1907, he wrote that "it was necessary to arouse among the masses hatred, aversion and contempt for these people who had *ceased* to be members of a united party".[5] This is evidence of the importance he attached to what the masses felt about the Bolsheviks. Party agitation and propaganda was always an "appeal to the people's sentiments", as Lenin referred to the manifesto of the Third, Communist International.[6] It was this as much as their objectivity and scientific basis that made strong the appeals and slogans of the Party. This is true of the slogan to transform Soviets into the organ of the uprising, an organ of revolutionary power. "Considered apart from this task," Lenin wrote, "the Soviets are just a toy, inevitably leading to apathy, indifference

[1] Ibid., Vol. 28, p. 27.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 34, p. 324.
[3] Ibid., pp. 330-11, 312.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 288.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 12, p. 426.
[6] Ibid., Vol. 39, p. 192.

and disappointment of the masses, who, naturally, are fed up with the endless repetition of resolutions and protests."[1]

Party strength derives from comprehensible agitation and the power of its own example. "What is expected of us," wrote Lenin, "is propaganda by example; the non-Party masses have to be set an example."[2] In 1918 Lenin wanted mass agitation stepped up both among the workers and peasants in hunger-struck provinces.

Here is another example of the importance Lenin attached to psychology and the socio-psychological aspect of Party activity. Addressing a meeting in 1919 about the Red Army victories in the Don region, he noted that they were due solely to the Party increasing its cultural and educational work among the ranks: "This brought about a psychological change, and as a result our Red Army won the Don region for us."[3]

To keep track of psychological changes and, much more, to bring them about—this, from a socio-psychological viewpoint, is the Party's dual task in leading the masses, carrying through the revolutionary tasks, and building socialism.

4. SUMMATION OF REVOLUTIONARY SENTIMENTS

Lenin's interest in socio-psychological processes and phenomena differed before and after the October Socialist Revolution. Before the victory, Leninist social psychology was in no way concerned with the communist education of the masses. Lenin described this trend as deceit of the workers by the parties and leaders of the Second International. So long as the socio-economic conditions were capitalist and the working class was oppressed by the bourgeoisie (sometimes in a very refined way), the idea that the exploited majority could work out firm socialist convictions was nothing but a fraud. In reality, Lenin said, it is only after the exploiters are overthrown "and only in the actual process of an acute class struggle, that the masses of the toilers and exploited can be educated, trained and organised around the proletariat under whose influence and guidance they can get rid of the selfishness, disunity, vices and weaknesses engen-

[1] V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Fifth Russian Edition, Vol. 34, p. 343.
[2] V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 433.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 29, p. 51.

dered by private property; only then will they be converted into a free union of free workers."[1]

Lenin's views of social psychology prior to the October Revolution serve just one crucial task. Under the autocratic-capitalist system the goal was to rally and to merge in a single stream all the revolutionary sentiments and thereby to ensure a revolutionary uplift and to overcome retarding influences. "It was the task of the older generation," Lenin said in 1920, "to overthrow the bourgeoisie ... to arouse hatred of the bourgeoisie among the masses, and foster class-consciousness and the ability to unite their forces."[2]

This was no straightforward process. On the one hand, as the 1905 revolution showed, "the long and undivided rule of the autocracy has stored up revolutionary energy among the people to a degree perhaps never before known in history",[3] but, on the other, the people was a part of the capitalist society and as such was not free of its shortcomings and weaknesses. It was fighting for socialism, but at the same time also against its own shortcomings,[4] to which it sometimes succumbed. Thus, at the beginning of the First World War "everywhere the bourgeoisie vanquished the proletariat for a time, and swept them into the turbid spate of nationalism and chauvinism.[5] But in the final count the basic trend made headway.

The essence of this basic trend was the growing psychological appreciation of the fact that the existing society was divided into two antagonistic camps, into "us" and "them". Lenin explained this lucidly in the following passage: "This member of the oppressed class, however, even though one, of the well-paid and quite intellectual workers, takes the bull by the horns with that astonishing simplicity and straightforwardness, with that firm determination and amazing clarity of outlook, from which we intellectuals are as remote as the stars in the sky. The whole world is divided into two camps: 'us', the working people, and 'them', the exploiters. . . .

" 'What a painful thing is this "exceptionally complicated situation" created by the revolution,' that's how a bourgeois intellectual thinks and feels.

[1] Ibid., Vol 31, p. 187.
[2] Ibid., p. 290.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 448.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 29, p. 208.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 21, p. 418.

" 'We squeezed "them" a bit; "they" won't dare to lord it over us as they did before. We'll squeeze again–and chuck them out altogether,' that's how the worker thinks and feels."[1]

We shall further re-examine the theoretical impact for social psychology as a science of Lenin's cursory formulation of the "we and they" principle.

It is essentially a concrete indicator of the complete maturity of the workers' revolutionary spirit. As soon as this "we and they" concept emerges the showdown is inevitable. "The determination of the working class," Lenin wrote, "its inflexible adherence to the watchword 'Death rather than surrender!' is not only a historical factor, it is the decisive, the winning factor."[2] It impels the proletariat to armed struggle and military victory. "An exploited class which did not *strive* to possess arms, to know how to use them and to master the military art would be a class of lackeys."[3]

Although Lenin held the complete liberation of the spirit of the masses from the capitalist heritage possible only after the socialist revolution, he regarded the revolutionary struggle and the revolution proper as potent educators of the masses.

"The real education of the masses can never be separated from their ... revolutionary struggle. Only struggle educates the exploited class. Only struggle discloses to it the magnitude of its own power, widens its horizon, enhances its abilities, clarifies its mind, forges its will."[4] When a revolutionary war, Lenin said, attracts and interests the oppressed masses it engenders the strength and ability to perform miracles.[5] This concerns not only the proletariat, which is the foremost revolutionary class, but also the peasants. Speaking of the 1905-1907 revolution, Lenin said that "out of a mob of muzhiks repressed by feudal slavery of accursed memory, this revolution created, for the first time in Russia, a people beginning to understand its rights, beginning to realise its strength".[6]

But so long as the revolution did not exercise a reverse influence on the psychology of the masses under pre-revolutionary and "peaceful" conditions, all of Lenin's socio-psychological observations were subordinated to the one problem of apprais-

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 120.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 30, p. 454.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 35, p. 195.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 29, p. 241.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 30, p. 152.
[6] Ibid., Vol. 17, p. 89.

ing as fully as possible and uniting the potential forces that could either directly or indirectly aid in the revolution. The task was to gradually merge all streamlets, all the divided streams, all the separate drops of protest. To begin with, of course, one had to rely primarily on the objective community of interests; but the immediate concern was about the subjective, the psychological aspect. Here is how Lenin expressed it: "To gather, if one may so put it, and concentrate all these drops and streamlets of popular resentment that are brought forth to a far larger extent than we imagine by the conditions of Russian life, and that must be combined into a single gigantic torrent."[1]

Lenin's science of revolution centres on detecting every sign of unrest and even the most negligible trends that could be integrated in the revolutionary camp. As early as 1901 Lenin wrote that "public unrest is growing among the entire people in Russia ... and it is our duty as revolutionary Social-Democrats ... to teach them [the progressive working-class intellectuals–*Ed.*] how to take advantage of the flashes of social protest that break out, now in one place, now in another".[2]

The paramount task was to unite the various outbreaks of discontent and protest among the working class. With deep insight Lenin described the psychological effects of manifestations by groups of workers on other workers. "Despite all these sufferings brought on by strikes, the workers of neighbouring factories gain renewed courage when they see that their comrades have engaged themselves in struggle. ... It is often enough for one factory to strike, for strikes to begin immediately in a large number of factories. What a great moral influence strikes have, how they affect workers who see that their comrades have ceased to be slaves and, if only for the time being, have become people on an equal footing with the rich!"[3]

But such contagion is no mere diffusion of moods and actions; it is also a transition to a higher level. "When the movement is in its early stage," wrote Lenin, "the economic strike often has the effect of awakening and stirring up the backward, of making the movement a general one, of raising it to a higher level."[4]

[1] Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 420.
[2] Ibid., p. 288.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 315.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 18, p. 84.

Lenin makes the following observation about the influence of workers' strikes on the peasants: "Only the waves of mass strikes roused the broad masses of peasants from their lethargy. The word 'striker' acquired an entirely new meaning among the peasants: it signified a rebel, a revolutionary, a term previously expressed by the word 'student'. But the 'student' belonged to the middle class, to the 'learned', to the 'gentry', and was therefore alien to the people. The 'striker', on the other hand, was of the people; he belonged to the exploited class."[1] This works in with the emergence of the "we and they" complex in popular psychology. Minute bridges, such as the distinct preference for the word "striker" to the word "student", produce the psychological sense of community between peasants and workers and their common sense of opposition to the masters, although the socio-economic roots of the revolutionary sentiment of workers and peasants are essentially different.

Lenin speaks of the peasants' lethargic sleep in the political sense only, implying their being distant to the proletarian movement. The peasants treated the 1905 events with their own blind revolutionary sentiment. "The peasant needs land," Lenin wrote, "and his revolutionary feeling, his instinctive, primitive sense of democracy *cannot* express itself otherwise than by laying hands on the landlord's land."[2]

Lenin associated this psychological trait with the peculiarities of the economic *mould*. "There are in Russia," he wrote, "immeasurably more survivals of serfdom among the masses of the people, in the rural districts, in the agrarian system—hence the more primitive, more direct revolutionary sentiments among the peasantry and among the working class, which is closely connected with the peasantry." And he amplified: "This revolutionary sentiment undoubtedly expresses less proletarian class-consciousness than 'protest', common to both the peasants and the workers."[3]

The Mensheviks, like the Economists, took note of the social psychology. At least in words. But for them the psychological difference between workers and peasants was an argument in favour of their dogma that no consistent revolutionary alliance between the working class and the peasants was possible. They

[1] V. I. Lenin *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 243.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 247.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 12, p. 64.

built a Chinese wall between the proletariat and the peasants, for which reason none of their theories could accommodate in the revolutionary framework the sentiments of both the workers and the peasants.

Lenin proved that these dogmatic concepts were incompatible with Marxism. To him it was evident that the revolution in Russia, as in many other countries, could win only through an alliance of the forces of protest and discontent. To divide forces just because the armchair dogmatists had construed it to be necessary was tantamount to betraying the revolution. But an effective alliance of the proletariat and peasantry in their revolutionary effort required knowledge both of the common and specific features of their social psychology, enabling the workers to exert a psychological influence on the peasant masses. Lenin's description of the weaknesses of the peasant psychology was severe and real: "The peasants were soothed as one soothes little children. . . . How were they duped? By false promises."[1] We have already seen in Lenin's sketch of Lev Tolstoy's peasant outlook the non-revolutionary, reactionary aspect of the peasant psychology. Even when speaking of its revolutionary qualities, Lenin underscored its inferiority to the proletarian psychology. "Solidarity, organisation, and class-consciousness," he pointed out, "are naturally much less developed among the peasants than among the workers. Thus there still remains an almost untapped field of serious and rewarding work of political education."[2] This shows that Lenin did not consider the matter beyond repair. But the peasants, including the poor, "have always and in every country proved to be less persistent in their struggle for liberty and for socialism than the workers".[3]

Lenin's observations are subordinated to the one aim of discovering all factors, including the psychological, that could serve not to alienate but to unite and rally the workers and peasants in common revolutionary actions. Here, for example, is something that comforted Lenin at a time when the relations between the Soviet proletarian government and the peasants were somewhat strained (1921). Lenin remarked that a peasant reluctant to fall in with the Soviet government felt slighted when "the poor peasants of his district had called him a 'bourgeois', and

[1] Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 146.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 17, p. 382.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 11, p. 395.

he felt this to be an affront ... a disgraceful word ... this word means everything: it is the basis of our propaganda and agitation, and the influence exercised by the working class through the state".[1] Lenin saw this as one of many proofs that the working class had the support of the majority of the peasants except the kulaks and profiteers. This point, seemingly a purely psychological one, marks a definite stage in the making of a "we" group–peasants and workers together–opposed to the "they" group–the bourgeoisie.

As we see, Lenin kept a close watch on the slightest revolutionary possibilities, on spontaneous and unconscious discontent and protest, even in the years of the rudimentary forms of revolutionary struggle and at times of reaction and despondency. This, in order to merge and multiply them.

Lenin's interest in the reverse psychological phenomena–tradition, routine and custom–was always aimed at removing hindrances to the revolution.

"The force of habit in millions and tens of millions," Lenin wrote, "is a most formidable force."[2] To overcome the force of habit is difficult, and not only before but also after the revolution. The fight against habits formed over the centuries, particularly those rooted in every petty proprietor, takes years of persistent organisational work even after the complete overthrow of the exploiting classes.[3] And one can but imagine the burden that habits presented in the dark pre-revolutionary period. Speaking of the violation of Finland's Constitution by the tsarist government in 1901, Lenin said: "We are still slaves to such an extent that we are employed to reduce other peoples to slavery."[4]

But Lenin paid far less attention to these psychological trait of habit and submissiveness than he did to signs of discontent and struggle, be they ever so trifling.

The spirit of protest overpowers that of habit and submission. When strikers held out in the Obukhov Works in Petersburg in 1901, Lenin wrote: "Yes, we rejoice in these conflicts and are encouraged by them, because the working class is proving by it resistance that it is not reconciled to its position, that it refuse to remain in slavery or to submit meekly to violence and tyran

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 118.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 44.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 29, p. 523.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 310.

ny";[1] the working class, he continued, prefers to die fighting than to die slowly the death of a flogged nag.

The common people, it seems, Lenin remarked, are still asleep, but their sleep is so light that even minor occurrences rouse them to great excitement. Lenin pointed to this ambivalence in describing the events preceding the 1905 revolution: "The broad masses, however, were still too naive, their mood was too passive, too good-natured, too christian. They flared up rather quickly; any instance of injustice, excessively harsh treatment by the officers, bad food, etc., could lead to revolt."[2] This irascibility struck Lenin's eye when he observed directly the 1905 events: "Mock elections will never rouse the masses. However, a strike, a demonstration, mutiny in the armed forces, a serious students' outbreak, famine, mobilisation, or a conflict in the State Duma, etc., etc., can really *rouse* the masses, constantly, at any hour."[3]

All these were but particles which in due course merged into a broad, united attack of all the social forces of protest against the monarchy and the existing order.

Notwithstanding the lasting naive trust in the tsar and the primitive social outlook, Lenin emphasised the paramount importance of the "revolutionary instinct now asserting itself among the proletariat", the latter's "protest" and "energy" breaking down the police barriers and the immaturity and backwardness of some of the leaders.[4]

Lenin described a similar breakthrough of habits and traditions in connection with the Second World War among "millions of semi-proletarians and petty bourgeois, now deceived by chauvinism, but whom the horrors of war will not only intimidate and depress, but also enlighten, teach, arouse, organise, steel and prepare for the war against the bourgeoisie of their 'own' country and 'foreign' countries."[5] In 1917 Lenin was even more certain of this: "The Russian people–who have always shed blood without a murmur, and have done the will of an oppressive government when quite ignorant of its aims and purposes–will undoubtedly ... with so much more courage and vigour"[6] fight for socialism.

---

[1] Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 25.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 23, p. 245.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 366.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 93.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 21, p. 40.
[6] Ibid., Vol. 16, p. 346.

Two more points need to be made.

What is behind Lenin's confidence that protest and discontent, the energy of resistance, will eventually merge? First of all the fact that the proletariat is objectively destined to liberate not only itself, but all the working people and society from exploitation and antagonism, and secondly, Lenin held that the authority of the working class draws on the authority of world revolutionary experience. The working class, wrote Lenin, needs authorities, "the proletarians of every country need the authority of the world-wide struggle of the proletariat. We need the authority of the theoreticians of international Social-Democracy to enable us properly to understand the programme and tactics of our Party. But, of course, this authority has nothing in common with the official authorities in bourgeois science and police politics."[1]

Finally we should point out that Lenin had his eyes on the psychology not only of the lower, but also of the upper classes. Summation of all particles of protest and indignation at one social extreme meant growth of an opposite sentiment at the other. Let us see what Lenin said on this score: "Generally speaking, it must be said that our reactionaries (including, of course, the entire top bureaucracy) reveal a fine political instinct. They are so well-experienced in combating oppositions, popular 'revolts', religious sects, rebellions, and revolutionaries, that they are always on the *qui vive* and understand far better than naïve simpletons and 'honest fogies' that the autocracy can never reconcile itself to self-reliance, honesty, independent convictions, and pride in real knowledge of any kind whatsoever. So thoroughly imbued are they with the spirit of subservience and red tape that prevails in the hierarchy of Russian officialdom that they have contempt for anyone who is unlike Gogol's Akaky Akakiyevich or, to use a more contemporary simile, the Man in a Case."[2]

5. FROM THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION TO THE SECOND

If Lenin's observations on social psychology were arranged chronologically, we should find that in quantity they gravitate to two time centres: the 1905-1907 revolution and the period from 1917 to 1922. This was when Lenin scrutinised the most

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, pp. 412-13.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 5, pp. 281-82.

subjective and intimate aspects in the life of the masses and classes. We have seen that although Lenin was not a psychologist by profession, he was one as politician and revolutionary. And only naturally it was at times when the task of revolution took material shape that his psychological insight became more acute.

It was not just that Lenin's interest in the psychological aspects of the revolution increased at these times, but that he believed, and the facts bore out, that revolutions are attended by dramatic changes in the psychics of individuals, of masses of people, and of entire nations. That is when a revolutionary worthy of the name must be a psychologist more than ever. "Every revolution," Lenin explained, "means a sharp turn in the lives of a vast number of people.... And just as any turn in the life of an individual teaches him a great deal and brings rich experience and great emotional stress, so a revolution teaches an entire people very rich and valuable lessons in a short space of time. During a revolution, millions and tens of millions of people learn in a week more than they do in a year of ordinary, somnolent life."[1]

He wrote this in 1917, but at the height of the 1905 revolution Lenin wrote and felt the same: "In the history of revolutions there come to light contradictions that have ripened for decades and centuries. Life becomes unusually eventful. The masses, which have always stood in the shade and have therefore often been ignored and even despised by superficial observers, enter the political arena as active combatants. These masses are learning in practice, and before the eyes of the world are taking their first tentative steps, feeling their way, defining their objectives, testing themselves and the theories of all their ideologists. These masses are making heroic efforts to rise to the occasion and cope with the gigantic tasks of world significance imposed upon them by history; and however great individual defeats may be, however shattering to us the rivers of blood and the thousands of victims, nothing will ever compare in importance with this direct training that the masses and the classes receive in the course of the revolutionary struggle itself."[2]

And here is one more passage from a 1917 report on the 1905 revolution, which revealed the dormant energy of the prole-

[1] Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 225.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 104.

tariat: "In a revolutionary epoch ... the proletariat *can* generate fighting energy *a hundred times greater* than in ordinary, peaceful times. It shows that up to 1905 mankind did not yet know what a great, what a tremendous exertion of effort the proletariat is, and will be, capable of in a fight for really great aims, and one waged in a really revolutionary manner!"[1]

Quoted were Lenin's views on social psychology in the period between 1905 and 1907. They bear witness to a sharp growth of Lenin's interest in this aspect of public life.

But let us list below some additional observations relating to the collapse of faith in the tsar. Lenin held that what was left of the childish faith in the tsar would vanish the moment the revolutionary energy and instinct of the working class burst the police ruses and artifices.[2] "Generation after generation of downtrodden, half-civilised, rustic existence cut off from the world," he noted, "tended to strengthen this faith. Every month of life of the new urban, industrial, literate Russia has been undermining and destroying this faith."[3]

Because of this the decade preceding the revolution produced many thousands of Social-Democrats who had consciously repudiated this faith. "It has educated scores of thousands of workers in whom the class instinct, strengthened in the strike movement and fostered by political agitation, has shattered this faith to its foundations."[4] Hence, the reverse predictions and prospects: "The masses of workers and peasants who still retained a vestige of faith in the tsar were not ready for insurrection, we said. After January 9 we have the right to say that now they are ready for insurrection and will rise."[5]

In 1905 Lenin wrote: "Nor is it only the barometer that indicates a storm: everything has been dislodged by the mighty whirlwind of a concerted proletarian onslaught."[6] What far-reaching changes took place during this short period of storm, how many illusions were shattered, how many new psychic traits appeared: "The bourgeoisie and the landlords have become fierce and brutal. The man in the street is weary. The Russian intellectual is limp and despondent. The party of liberal wind-

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 240.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 107.
[3] Ibid., p. 112.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., p. 113.
[6] Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 392.

bags and liberal traitors, the Cadets, has raised its head, hoping to make capital out of the prevailing weariness born of the revolution.... But below, deep down among the proletarian masses and among the mass of the destitute, starving peasantry, the revolution has made headway, quietly and imperceptibly undermining the foundations, rousing the most somnolent with the thunder of civil war."[1]

Then the counter-revolution gained the upper hand and years of reaction followed. The number of Lenin's observations on social psychology diminishes. In 1908, however, he writes at length for the first time about the petty bourgeoisie and the philistines: "Today, in the period of sweeping counter-revolutionary repressions, the philistines are adapting themselves in cowardly fashion to the new masters, currying favour with new caliphs for an hour, renouncing the past, trying to forget it."[2] But he knew these phenomena to be skin-deep, for nothing on earth could reverse the spiritual changes produced by the revolution. These were irreversible, they were in the hearts and minds of millions of people and would surface sooner or later as does the winter seed. To bear out his point, Lenin pointed to similar spiritual changes left behind by the Paris Commune of 1871. "The epic of its life and death," Lenin wrote, "the sight of a workers' government which seized the capital of the world and held it for over two months, the spectacle of the heroic struggle of the proletariat and the torments it underwent after its defeat–all this raised the spirit of millions of workers, aroused their hopes and enlisted their sympathy for the cause of socialism. The thunder of the cannon in Paris wakened the most backward sections of the proletariat from their deep slumber, and everywhere gave impetus to the growth of revolutionary socialist propaganda."[3]

The December 1905 events likewise created an aftermath that no reaction could fully stamp out. As Lenin put it, the exploit of the Moscow workers was an unforgettable example for the masses, it "started a deep ferment among the urban and rural working people, the effects of which never died down, in spite of all persecution.... After the December events it is no longer the same people. It has been born anew".[4]

[1] Ibid., Vol. 12, pp. 114-15.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 15, pp. 50-51.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 17, p. 143.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 28, p. 373.

On the strength of this, Lenin observed at the beginning of the second revolutionary upsurge certain psychological symptoms, vague though they still were, among the workers. Signs of activity appeared in 1910, with economic and political strikes alternating or overlapping and fusing the proletariat. "The proletariat has begun. The democratic youth are continuing. The Russian people are awakening to new struggle, advancing towards a new revolution. The first beginning of the struggle has shown us again that the forces are alive which shook the tsarist regime in 1905."[1]

That period, it is true, was psychologically peculiar: in the absence of open struggle, the masses showed a desire for general theoretical knowledge.[2]

Along with increased revolutionary activity, we find Lenin's interest increasing in the psychological processes underway in various strata of the working class, among the peasants and other social groups. This growth of revolutionary feeling led in the final count to the October Revolution.

Lenin foresees the coming of the second revolution which as early as 1913 displayed a much greater potential of proletarian revolutionary energy than the first revolution. This livening up comes not from above, although the class consciousness, experience and determination of the working class and its vanguard, the Party, have grown. "In our country," Lenin wrote, "this rise is taking place spontaneously, because tens of millions of the semi-proletarian and peasant population are passing on, if one can use this expression, to their vanguard a sentiment of concentrated indignation which is surging up and overflowing."[3] Picture a strike demonstration in 1913, a red banner fluttering in the streets of the capital, revolutionary speeches and slogans addressed to crowds. A strike like that, Lenin says, can neither be instigated nor stopped when it seizes upon hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people. But the strike as such is just a means to arouse and attract feelings of protest and indignation all over the vast country. "It is essential," Lenin adds, "that the smouldering resentment and subdued murmurings of the countryside should, along with the indignation in the barracks, find a centre of attraction in the workers' revolutionary strikes."[4]

[1] V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 358.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 17, p. 35.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 18, p. 472.
[4] Ibid., p. 477.

Let us pass over changes brought about in mass psychology by the First World War in Russia and abroad. Partly, the proletariat was smothered by bourgeois chauvinism, but on the whole the war did not halt the surge of revolutionary sentiment.

Then came 1917 when the uplift was so steep that it turned into a revolutionary crisis. Again Lenin's psychological palette abounds in colour. Among the facts to which Lenin attaches importance is the shift from one camp to another of a "broad, changeful and vacillating mass", generally more or less identifiable as the peasantry. It gravitates now to the right, now to the left, Lenin says. At the beginning of 1917 this mass, as exemplified by the soldiers, "swung *away from* the capitalists *towards* the revolutionary workers. It was the swing or movement of this mass, strong enough to be a *decisive* factor, that caused the crisis".[1]

"Revolutionary crisis" or "revolutionary situation" is a very important concept in Lenin's social psychology heritage. He produced the teaching of the revolutionary situation–part of the "science of revolution"–in the period between the two revolutions. Though most of the initial ideas are found in articles dating to 1905-1907, it was outlined more succinctly in 1913 in *May Day Action by the Revolutionary Proletariat* and *The Adjourned Duma and the Embarrassed Liberals*, then in 1915 in *The Collapse of the Second International*, and later in *'Left-Wing' Communism, An Infantile Disorder* (1920).

Here, however, we are concerned with that aspect of the concept of revolutionary situation that illustrates the role Lenin assigned to the psychology, the mood and activity of the masses. As Lenin saw it, the shift of the masses from a state of passivity to an active state of indignation and rebellion was one of the most important contributing factors of the revolutionary situation. In his works of 1915 this change of state is listed second and third among the symptoms of a revolutionary situation: "2) when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual; 3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in 'peace time', but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis *and by the 'upper classes' themselves* into independent historical action."[2]

[1] Ibid., Vol. 24, p. 214.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 21, p. 214.

The crisis of the "upper classes" concerns social psychology because it produces the crack "through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth".[1] In the abstract of his paper *First of May and War* (1915) Lenin summarised the essence of a revolutionary situation as follows: "(α) the lower classes do not want, the upper classes cannot (β) aggravation of suffering (γ) extraordinary activity."[2]

As said above, the sources of Lenin's later teaching on the revolutionary situation are traceable to 1904, as in the following brief formula: the Party of the proletariat must "start an uprising as the moment when the government is in the most desperate straits and popular unrest is at its highest".[3] Here the psychological aspect stands out in bold relief. And in 1905 Lenin wrote that slogans calling for an uprising are premature if no signs of a crisis are in evidence and "until the masses have definitely shown that they have been roused and are ready to act".[4]

Much later, long after he had worked out his teaching on revolutionary situations, Lenin drew the following picture of this aspect in the emergence of the revolutionary situation after the January events of 1905:

"Within a few months... the picture changed completely. The hundreds of revolutionary Social-Democrats 'suddenly' grew into thousands; the thousands became the leaders of between two and three million proletarians. The proletarian struggle produced widespread ferment, often revolutionary movements among the peasant masses, fifty to a hundred million strong; the peasant movement had its reverberations in the army and led to soldiers' revolts, to armed clashes between one section of the army and another. In this manner a colossal country, with a population of 130,000,000, went into the revolution; in this way, dormant Russia was transformed into a Russia of a revolutionary proletariat and a revolutionary people."[5]

In 1915 Lenin examines the emergence of a new revolutionary situation and notes the following socio-psychological factors: "The smouldering indignation of the masses, the vague yearning of society's downtrodden and ignorant strata for a kindly ('democratic') peace, the beginning of discontent among the

[1] V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 21. p. 213.
[2] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*. Fifth Russian Edition, Vol. 26, p. 379.
[3] V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 27.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 369.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 23, p. 238.

'lower classes'–all these are facts. ... The experience of the war, like the experience of any crisis in history, of any great calamity and any sudden turn in human life, stuns and breaks some people, *but enlightens and tempers others.*"[1]

Now comes 1917, the year of world-wide significance. "The revolutionary situation in Europe is a fact," Lenin writes. "The extreme discontent, the unrest and anger of the masses are facts. It is on strengthening *this* torrent that revolutionary Social-Democrats must concentrate all their efforts."[2] In *A Letter to Comrades* Lenin summarises what he knows of the feelings of the masses: "that 'everybody' reports it as a tense and expectant mood ... that 'everybody' agrees that the workers are greatly dissatisfied with the indecision of the centres concerning the 'last decisive struggle' ... that 'everybody' unanimously characterises the mood of the broadest masses as close to desperation."[3] Lenin sums it up in two words: "enough of wavering."[4]

That is the psychological aspect of the political process witnessing a steep growth of the active masses and of their activity. Here is how Lenin puts it: "Symptomatic of any genuine revolution is a rapid, tenfold and even hundredfold increase in the size of the working and oppressed masses–hitherto apathetic –who are capable of waging the political struggle."[5] Elsewhere he says: "A revolution is not made to order; it results from an outburst of mass indignation."[6]

6. POST-REVOLUTION PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA AND TASKS

It seems proper to say that we saw Lenin more distinctly as a psychologist in the post-October period. The fundamental orientation changed. Before the revolution it had been futile to think of an all-round transformation of man; the most one could expect was for the revolutionary struggle to re-educate and transfigure man. After the revolution, eliminating the capitalistic heritage from the psychological make-up of the masses–no matter how difficult and long a process it was–became practicable.

1 Ibid., Vol. 21, pp. 215-16.
2 Ibid., Vol. 23, p. 270.
3 Ibid., Vol. 26, p. 209.
4 Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 110.
5 Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 85.
6 Ibid., Vol. 26, p. 345.

A few days before the October Revolution, Lenin put down an idea inconceivable in his earlier writings: "The Party could not be guided by the temper of the masses because it was changeable and incalculable; the Party must be guided by an objective analysis and an appraisal of the revolution. The masses had put their trust in the Bolsheviks and demanded deeds from them and not words...."[1] Yes, on the eve of the seizure of power, Lenin singled out the only important sentiment, compared to which all the others are immaterial: the people had put their trust in the Bolsheviks. The Socialist Revolution was bound to take place. The day after it took place all psychological tasks would be essentially different and in a certain sense opposite to those before the revolution. To be sure, Lenin knew that this "transition from historical somnolence to new historical creativeness",[2] this shift from enthusiasm centred on revolutionary tasks to a creative enthusiasm centred on building a new life would not be a rapid one. However, it opened up a new chapter in Lenin's science of social psychology.

From now on the essential task was to maintain the hold on power. Before the revolution, winning power was the cornerstone of the revolutionary psychology of the masses; now the main cry was to retain this power. Lenin wrote in 1920: the workers, peasants and Red Army men "have suffered more during these three years than the workers did during the early years of capitalist slavery. They have endured cold, hunger and suffering–all this in order to retain power."[3] He had predicted in the early stage of the revolution that the masses would show boundless heroism, energy and self-sacrifice in defending the revolution and coping with the difficulties besetting the Soviet system. The "we" groups and the "they" groups were essentially different: the former stood for the revolutionary people and for their new social system, multiplying the spiritual strength of the "we" group and evoking profound sentiment. "Victory will be on the side of the exploited," Lenin wrote soon after the October Revolution, "for on their side is life, numerical strength, the strength of the mass, the strength of the inexhaustible sources of all that is selfless, dedicated and honest, all that is surging forward and awakening to the building of the new, all the vast reserves of energy and talent latent in the

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, pp. 191-92.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 210.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 401.

so-called 'common people', the workers and peasants. Victory will be theirs."[1] The counter-revolutionaries, it is true, became active too. But, Lenin observed, "no matter how great may be the anger and indignation in some circles ... deep among the people a constructive process is taking place, an accumulation of energy and discipline, which will give us the strength to survive all blows".[2]

The psychological birth of the new man begins with the fight for the positions seized in the revolution: firstly, "miracles of courage and endurance" on the part of the armed workers and peasants in the Civil War, coupled with heroism and more heroism on the part of the masses on the home front, and in its wake a deep shift in consciousness. In 1919 Lenin wrote in his immortal work *A Great Beginning*: "It is the beginning of a revolution that is more difficult, more tangible, more radical and more decisive than the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, for it is a victory over our own conservatism, indiscipline, petty-bourgeois egoism, a victory over the habits left as a heritage to the worker and peasant by accursed capitalism."[3] Not until after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie "the masses, i.e., the toilers and exploited as a body, can display, for the first time in history, all the initiative and energy of tens of millions of people who have been crushed by capitalism".[4]

Maintaining the hold on power meant coping with the economic dislocation and the famine, it meant restarting production and defeating the enemy in battle. In *A Great Beginning* Lenin pointed to what he described as a vicious circle: to escape famine one had to raise the productivity of labour. "We know," he wrote, "that in practice such contradictions are solved by breaking the vicious circle, by bringing about a radical change in the temper of the people, by the heroic initiative of the individual groups which often plays a decisive role against the background of such a radical change." This was precisely the kind of initiative displayed by the participants of the subbotniks, "in spite of the fact that they are weary, tormented and exhausted by malnutrition".[5] The subbotnik movement raised the authority of the workers in the eyes of the peasants and that of Party

[1] Ibid., Vol. 26, p. 403.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 167.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 29, p. 411.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 188.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 29, pp. 426-27.

members among non-members.[1] Long before writing *A Great Beginning* Lenin predicted a shift in the psychology of labour, appraising the mentality inherited from the past by the exploited: "Naturally, for a certain time, all his attention, all his thoughts, all his spiritual strength, were concentrated on taking a breath, on unbending his back, on straightening his shoulders, on taking the blessings of life that were there for the taking, and that had always been denied him by the now overthrown exploiters. Of course, a certain amount of time is required to enable the ordinary working man not only to see for himself, not only to become convinced, but also to feel that he cannot simply 'take', snatch, grab things, that this leads to increased disruption, to ruin, to the return of the Kornilovs. The corresponding change in the conditions of life (and consequently in the psychology) of the ordinary working man is only just the beginning."[2]

In other words, the psychological change would be wrought by heroic efforts to prevent the return of the former autocratic-capitalist order and by the understanding that the only way out of the economic difficulties is in a new attitude to work. "Labour discipline, enthusiasm for work, readiness for self-sacrifice, close alliance between the peasants and the workers," Lenin explained, "this is what will save the working people from the oppression of the landowners and capitalists for ever."[3] In *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government*, in which Lenin set out many fruitful ideas on the psychology of the masses, he wrote: "In a small-peasant country, which overthrew tsarism only a year ago, and which liberated itself from the Kerenskys less than six months ago, there has naturally remained not a little of spontaneous anarchy, intensified by the brutality and savagery that accompany every protracted and reactionary war, and there has arisen a good deal of despair and aimless bitterness." Hence the necessity for prolonged and persistent efforts by politically advanced workers and peasants "to bring about a complete change in the mood of the people and to bring them on to the proper path of steady and disciplined labour".[4] And he continued: "We must learn to combine the 'public meeting' democracy of the working people—turbulent, surging, overflowing

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 202.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 270.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 29, p. 251.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 244.

its banks like a spring flood–with *iron* discipline while at work, with *unquestioning obedience* to the will of a single person, the Soviet leader, while at work."[1]

More ideas concerning the change in the psychology of labour are found in the original version of *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government*. First, Lenin writes about the psychology of labour under capitalist oppression: "This inevitably created a psychology in which public opinion among the working people not only did not frown on poor work or shirkers, but, on the contrary, saw in this an inevitable and legitimate protest against or means of resistance to the excessive demands of the exploiters."[2] He pointed out that dejection and consequent disorganisation were understandable and inevitable among a people ravaged and exhausted by the war. He remarked that to hope for a rapid change of heart by means of a few government decrees "would be as absurd as resorting to appeals in an attempt to restore good cheer and energy into a man who had been beaten within an inch of his life". At the same time, the Soviet government, created by the working people and taking into consideration the "growing signs of recovery among them", will be able, as Lenin saw it, to change radically their psychology.[3] The small-proprietor mentality, exemplified by the "grab as much as you can" and "the devil take the hindmost" attitudes, was very much alive, Lenin wrote; and he urged "rousing these people to history-making activity"[4] and remaking their morality depraved by the spirit of private property.

Lenin emphasised that "the masses must not only realise, but also feel that the shortening of the period of hunger, cold and poverty depends entirely upon how quickly they fulfil our economic plans".[5] He enlarged on the need for combining enthusiasm (both political and labour) with business principles and labour discipline based on personal interest. Originally, he wrote, we expected to start production going on the crest of popular enthusiasm, but we understood that personal incentive too would help raise output.[6] Enthusiasm, perseverance and heroism will forever remain a monument; they played their great part and

[1] Ibid., p. 271.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 42, p. 83.
[3] Ibid., pp. 83-84.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 268.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 511.
[6] Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 58.

in years to come will be remembered by the international labour movement; however, there came the time for business principles and trade.[1] Leading tens of millions to communism, it is sound policy to build economy "not directly relying on enthusiasm, but aided by the enthusiasm engendered by the great revolution, and on the basis of personal interest, personal incentive and business principles".[2]

Of interest, however, are not only the motives underlying productivity and the intensity of labour, but also the shift in people's minds. "We have now reached the supreme moment of our revolution: we have roused the proletarian masses and the masses of poor peasants in the rural areas to give us their conscious support," Lenin wrote. "No revolution has ever done this before."[3]

The radically new "we" psychology born of the victorious people's revolution manifested itself in many different ways. As the two years of the revolution bear out, Lenin wrote in 1919, the masses have shown "not only a model in the fulfilment of their duty but have also shown examples of the greatest heroism and of revolutionary enthusiasm and devotion such as the world has never before seen".[4]

In 1917 Lenin saw far ahead: "Only now is the opportunity created for the truly mass display of enterprise, competition and bold initiative."[5] New tasks call for a new type of men: "What we need is tens of thousands of picked, politically advanced workers, loyal to the cause of socialism, incapable of succumbing to bribery and the temptations of pilfering, and capable of creating an iron force against the kulaks, profiteers, racketeers, bribe-takers and disorganisers."[6] Lenin also anticipated the increasing importance of various forms of competition in the new system of social relations, particularly, labour relations. Competition, as he saw it, was at once a form of initiative and a means of developing a new labour discipline.

The significance of competition to the social psychology, he held, was that it allowed full play for the force of example. In other words, what mattered was the pattern of following a

[1] V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 33. pp. 104, 172-73.
[2] Ibid., p. 58.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 32, p. 58.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 30, p. 68.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 26, p. 407.
[6] Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 390.

good example and, conversely, condemning a bad example. In
The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government Lenin stressed
that socialism "for the first time opens the way for competition
on a really mass scale", noting that responsibility and publicity
would turn dead bureaucratic reports "into living examples, some
repulsive, others attractive".[1] Under capitalism, example plays
a limited role in social life. When the proletariat holds political
power this state of affairs changes radically for the "force of
example for the first time is able to influence the people".[2]
That is a most important aspect in the emergence of a new
psychology.

"Naturally among the people who have only just thrown off
an unprecedentedly savage yoke," Lenin observed, "there is
deep and widespread seething and ferment; the working out of
new principles of labour discipline by the people is a very pro-
tracted process, and this process could not even start until
complete victory had been achieved over the landowners and the
bourgeoisie."[3] Under socialism, however, as Lenin wrote to
Krzhizhanovsky in 1920, even the country's electrification requires
"competition and initiative among the masses".[4]

Valuable, too, are Lenin's views on the psychological
aspects of the Civil War and the fight against the foreign inter-
vention. He took note of the psychological readiness or
unreadiness for war of the masses. In February 1918 he wrote
that the masses were not in a state to wage war, but predicted
confidently that the time of hardships would pass soon enough
and the people would recover its strength and find itself capable
of resistance.[5] However, he did not wait for this to happen; he
prepared it. Here is how he explained the decision to invite
Pskov peasants just back from the front to the Seventh Congress
of Soviets: "We shall bring them to the Congress of Soviets
to relate how the Germans treat people, so that they can change
the mood of the soldier in panic-stricken flight and he will
begin to recover from his panic and say, 'This is certainly not
the war the Bolsheviks promised to put an end to, this is a
new war the Germans are waging against Soviet power'. Then

[1] Ibid., pp. 259-60.
[2] Ibid., p. 261.
[3] Ibid., p. 258.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 467.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 46.

recovery will come."[1] And a little later he recorded the fact that "these months have passed, and the turn has come. Gone is the time when we were impotent. . . . A new discipline has been created, and new people are joining the army and laying down their lives by the thousand".[2]

During the Civil War Lenin's attention was focused on the psychology at the front and in the rear. On the one hand, he noted even the effect of the autumn cold on morale: "You know that the autumn cold affects the Red Army men, depresses them, creates new difficulties."[3] On the other hand, he counted on the psychological factor in coping with the many wartime difficulties: "The situation is extremely grave. But we do not despair, for we know that every time a difficult situation for the Soviet Republic arises, the workers display miracles of valour and by their example encourage and inspire the troops and lead them on to fresh victories."[4]

Lenin showed a keen interest in the psychological processes among peasants. He noted the striking difference between the socio-psychological state of the workers and peasants. All over the world workers are more or less organised, he remarked, adding that remoulding the psychology of the peasant is an important aspect of the struggle for socialism. ". . .Hardly anywhere in the world have systematic, supreme and self-sacrificing attempts been made to unite those who are engaged in small-scale agricultural production and, because they live in remote out-of-the-way places and in ignorance, have been stunted by their conditions of life."[5] This would take a long time. Certainly, it had not been accomplished by 1921, when the peculiar traits of the peasant psychology were so forcefully in evidence, warning of the need to change the Soviet economic policy. "This was," Lenin wrote, "the first and, I hope, the last time in the history of Soviet Russia that feeling ran against us among large masses of peasants, not consciously but instinctive-

[1] V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 112-13.
It is not accidental that Lenin uses the expression "the mood of the soldier in panic-stricken flight"; it refers to the special field of war psychology; cf. what Lenin wrote in 1912: "The Turks' retreat became a disorderly flight of stupefied, starving, exhausted and maddened mobs." (V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 372).
[2] V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 125.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 312.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 30, p. 66.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 436.

ly. . . . The reason for it was that in our economic offensive we had run too far ahead . . . that the masses sensed what we ourselves were not then able to formulate consciously."[1]

Thus, the trend in Lenin's post-October socio-psychological observations is essentially different. His former concern was to unite the revolutionary forces and crush the old regime. Hence, everything was done to bring home to the masses the line separating "we", the toilers, and "they", the exploiters, with their state and church. After the revolution all efforts were centred on inculcating and consolidating an altogether different "we" concept.

Among other things, Lenin gave much thought to new psychological traits in the relationship between the masses and the state. "The state," he wrote, "which for centuries has been an organ for oppression and robbery of the people, has left us a legacy of the people's supreme hatred and suspicion of everything that is connected with the state."[2] This legacy affected somewhat the issue of accounting and control. Yet the antagonism towards state leaders and organisations—the "they" group as opposed to the "we" group, the masses—had to be gradually overcome. That the masses at large considered not only the achievements but also errors of the Soviet Government and the Party as their own was for Lenin a fact of the greatest progressive significance. "They have tackled this formidable task with their own hands and by their own efforts. And they have committed thousands of blunders from each of which they have themselves suffered. But every blunder trained and steeled them."[3]

Both before and after the October Revolution, Lenin's interest in the social psychology is entirely purposive: he sees it as a symptom of the condition of the revolutionary forces and as a vital requisite in defending and advancing the cause of the revolution. Prior to the revolution, but a few of the stable customs and traditions interested the "science of revolution", generally oriented on fighting the existing social usage. After the revolution, the main purpose was to create and consolidate a new psychic make-up, a new character and new psychic standards. An enemy of stagnant customs before the revolution, Lenin became a proponent of new concepts turning into habits.

[1] Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 421.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 255.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 28, p. 140.

55

He wrote: "We can only regard as achieved what has become part and parcel of our culture, of our social life, our habits."[1]

This shows that the difference between the psychic changes and the psychic make-up may be only relative from a Marxist-Leninist psychological standpoint and that the significance of the two depends entirely on concrete historical conditions.

7. PSYCHOLOGY AND REVOLUTION

Lenin was interested in social psychology as a revolutionary and as far as it concerned the tasks of the revolution. That was why he almost exclusively focused his attention on the changeful and dynamic socio-psychological phenomena usually defined as "moods", while the relatively stable phenomena—"psychic make-up" or "character" of a class or a professional, ethnic or any other group—were beyond his sphere of vision. In social psychology these two groups of phenomena are not poles apart, but different all the same.

The word "mood" is found dozens of times in Lenin's writings. Lenin used it even in 1895: "There is the sharpest division of the people into workers and bourgeois. Hence the workers' frame of mind is rather oppositional."[2] Lenin uses the word quite often; indeed, it is a leading concept in his social psychology. Appropriately enough, an investigation of Lenin's views on social psychology by B. D. Parygin, presented as a thesis for the candidate's degree, was entitled "V. I. Lenin on the Formation of the Moods of the Masses".[3]

But it would be wrong to overemphasise this or that term. Lenin uses many other words, e.g., "instinct" (class instinct, revolutionary instinct). Its meaning is close to that of "spontaneity", also extensively used by Lenin. Then there were such concepts as "flair", "sentiments", "energy", "passion", "enthusiasm", "weariness", "anger", "hatred", "apathy", etc. Here are a few samples of how Lenin used these terms:

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, pp. 487-88.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 34, pp. 20-21.
[3] B. D. Parygin, "V. I. Lenin ob obshchestvennykh nastroyeniyakh" (V. I. Lenin on Social Moods), *Vestnik Leningradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta* (Proceedings of the Leningrad State University), 1959, No. 17, paper in *Problemy obshchestvennoi psikhologii* (Problems of Social Psychol-

56

"The working class is instinctively, spontaneously Social-Democratic"[1]; "a period of accumulation of revolutionary energy"[2]; a wave of "public ferment"[3]; "by the rising of hundreds of thousands of workers who have not forgotten the 'peaceful' 9th of January, and who long for an *armed* January 9"[4]; "the workers themselves are spontaneously carrying on just such a struggle. Too passionately did they live through the great struggle in October and December"[5]. And the monarchical illusions nourished by the peasantry "often paralysed its energy . . . and gave rise to empty day-dreams about 'God-given land' "[6]; "with the politically non-conscious, drowsy, vacillating masses any changes to the better are impossible. . . . Unless the masses are interested, politically conscious, wide awake, active, determined and independent, absolutely nothing can be accomplished in either sphere".[7] And more: "The drowsy, philistine spirit which often in the past pervaded some of the Swiss workers' associations is disappearing to give way to the fighting mood. The workers held their ground as one man"[8]; "what is common . . . is a mass dissatisfaction overflowing all bounds, a mass resentment with the bourgeoisie and *their* government"[9]; "owing to the resumption of the predatory war, the bitterness of the people naturally grew even more rapidly and intensely"[10]; "you cannot lead the people into a predatory war in accordance with secret treaties and expect them to be enthusiastic. And it is impossible to arouse popular heroism without breaking with imperialism"[11]; "the people cannot and will not wait patiently and passively"[12]; "there are signs of growing apathy and indifference. That is understandable. It implies not the ebb of the revolution, as the Cadets and their henchmen vociferate, but the ebb of confidence in resolutions and elections. In a revolution, the masses demand

---

1 V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 32.
2 Ibid., p. 151.
3 Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 43.
4 Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 285.
5 Ibid., Vol. 15, p. 53.
6 Ibid., Vol. 17, p. 125.
7 Ibid., Vol. 18, p. 128.
8 Ibid., p. 160.
9 Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 170.
10 Ibid., p. 237.
11 Ibid., p. 363.
12 Ibid., p. 71.

action, not words from the leading parties, they demand victories in the struggle, not talk"[1]; "discontent, indignation and wrath are growing in the army, among the peasantry and among the workers"[2].

Solving the national and agrarian issue, Lenin wrote, would cause "a real outburst of revolutionary enthusiasm among the people"[3], and, last but not least, he observed: "I know there is a change of spirit among the peasants of the Saratov, Samara, and Simbirsk gubernias, where fatigue was most marked and fitness for military action was lowest of all."[4]

This choice of passages reveals Lenin's socio-psychological perspicacity. No portrait of Lenin the publicist, the revolutionary, could be complete without it. We see that his concern is mostly about the psychic movement in the classes and masses, and about the psychology dynamics. Less frequent and less deep is his interest in the more stable psychic traits of the working class and the various social groups and professions. His observations on this score are less complete than on socio-psychic movements and changes. Yet they are often invaluable, because the stable psychological forms he points to are those the revolutionary movement must destroy, though, to be sure, sometimes it may even use them for support. As we have seen, Lenin's aim after the socialist revolution was for it to enter the flesh and blood of the masses and to be embodied in firm psychological habits.

So far we centred out attention on Lenin's appraisal of the psychology of the masses. Yet his observations of bourgeois psychology are equally invaluable to historians. For one thing, like Marx, he noted the vacillation of the petty bourgeoisie between ultra-revolutionism and reaction, pointing to the psychological specifics of the big and petty bourgeoisie. "The bourgeois are businessmen, people who make big commercial transactions and are accustomed to getting down even to political matters in a strictly business-like manner," he wrote. "They take the bull by the horns rather than putting their trust in words."[5] And his observations of 1905 fit many other historical periods: "The bourgeoisie's recognition of the revolution

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 184.
[2] Ibid., p. 59.
[3] Ibid., p. 98.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 28, p. 43.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 23, p. 196.

cannot be sincere, irrespective of the personal integrity of one bourgeois ideologist or another. The bourgeoisie cannot but bring selfishness and inconsistency, the spirit of chaffering and petty reactionary dodges even into this higher stage of the movement".[1]

Unmasking bourgeois liberalism, he reveals the psychological factors underlying it. Making concessions to the nobility in politics, the bourgeoisie was also inclined to absolve its sins psychologically, while viewing its own middle-of-the-road stand as a special refinement of the liberal spirit. Lenin wrote: "This liberal logic is psychologically inevitable; our nobility must be depicted as negligible in order that its privileges may seem only a negligible departure from democracy. With the bourgeoisie occupying a position between the hammer and the anvil, idealistic phrases, too, are psychologically inevitable, phrases which our liberals in general and their pet philosophers in particular are now mouthing in such bad taste."[2]

If, as Lenin saw it, the bourgeois fight for liberation was inconsistent and half-hearted, the two currents surfaced therefrom among the pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia, though it was for the most part of bourgeois origin: on the one hand "the revolutionary intelligentsia, which comes mainly from these classes, has fought heroically for freedom"[3], while on the other, it was a time-server at the beck and call of the autocracy and bourgeoisie. "There you have the psychology of the Russian intellectual," writes Lenin. "In words he is a bold radical, in deeds he is a contemptible little government official".[4] Time and again, however, Lenin drew attention to the natural and inevitable conflicts between the bourgeois intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie. Take the following passage: "The refusal of the intellectuals to be treated as ordinary hired men, as sellers of labour power, has led from time to time to conflicts between the bigwigs of the Zemstvo Boards and the doctors who would resign in a body, or to conflicts with the technicians, etc."[5]

Many of Lenin's psychological observations relate to employees (functionaries), the military, and the clergy.

---

[1] Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 126.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 429.
[3] Ibid., p. 511.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 11, p. 461.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 285.

Those related to the military draw interesting comparisons between the morale of the tsarist and that of the Soviet armies, intimating long before the revolution of the inexorable socio-political differentiation in the armed forces. The more the tsarist government sent troops against the population, the more inevitably soldiers were drawn into political life. This, Lenin says, inevitably produces in the counter-revolutionary army, firstly, a nucleus of fighters for the revolution, and, secondly, a mass of neutrals. In other words, Lenin observes, when the government sends the soldiers against the revolution "it is stirring to action the most backward people, the most ignorant, the most cowed, and the politically inert—and the struggle will enlighten, rouse, and enliven these people".[1] Let us recall another psychological trait, now widely known from literature, the theatre and art: Lenin instantly sensed the change of mood towards soldiers. "We know that another voice is now rising from among the people; they say to themselves: now we need not be afraid of the man with the gun."[2]

Lenin's descriptions of the stable traits of the pre-revolutionary Russian officialdom and its political vacillation in 1917 are highly expressive.

Out of the many things Lenin said about the clergy let us single out just one—his sketch of the village priest made in 1908: "Why has the village priest—that policeman of official orthodoxy—proved to be *more* on the side of the peasant than the bourgeois liberal? Because the village priest has to live side by side with the peasant, to depend on him in a thousand different ways, and sometimes—as when the priests practise small-scale peasant agriculture on churchland—even to be in the peasant's skin himself. So it turns out that the most reactionary priest finds it more difficult than the enlightened lawyer and professor to betray the peasant to the landlord."[3]

Lenin spoke frequently about the status of women in pre-revolutionary Russia, the part women play in the proletarian movement and in building socialism. Some of his observations should interest the psychologist. "Proletarian women," he wrote in 1916, "will not look passively as poorly armed or unarmed workers are shot down by the well-armed forces of the bour-

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 352.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 26, p. 465.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 15, p. 27.

geoisie."[1] And in 1921, referring to the emancipation of women from household slavery, he wrote: "This transition is a difficult one, because it involves the remoulding of the most deep-rooted, inveterate, hidebound and rigid 'order'."[2]

We could not here cite all Lenin's characteristics of social groups, strata and classes. Our purpose is to show his working principle: to know and take into account the psychological peculiarities of each strata, profession and, of course, of each class.[3] He observed in this connection that "there are and always will be individual exceptions from group and class types. But social types remain."[4]

At this point it is proper to view that aspect of social psychology which is related to the national question.

Referring to Lazzari's claim that the Italian socialists "know the Italian people's mentality", Lenin said sarcastically: "For my part I would not dare to make such an assertion about the Russian people."[5] Lenin, the great Russian revolutionary, does not claim to know the psychology of the Russian people! A significant fact.

To begin with, Lenin implies that every national culture contains two antagonistic cultures, meaning that no psychology common to all can exist in an ethnic community such as a nation.[6] He also implies that accentuation of any trait common to the whole nation only tends to implant bourgeois patriotism and nationalism, impeding the revolutionary awakening of the masses.[7] And probably the main point he implies is that national peculiarities when overemphasised split, rather than unite, the world revolutionary movement.

Lenin's approach to national sentiment is best illustrated by his work, *About the National Pride of the Great Russians*: "The interests of the Great Russians' national pride (understood, not in the slavish sense) coincide with the *socialist* interests of the Great Russian (and all other) proletarians."[8] "We are full of a sense of national pride, and for that very reason, we *particularly* hate our slavish past ... and our slavish

[1] Ibid., Vol. 23, p. 82.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 32, p. 162.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 192.
[4] Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 276.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 32, p. 465.
[6] Ibid., Vol. 20, p. 24.
[7] Ibid., Vol. 29, p. 22.
[8] Ibid., Vol. 21, p. 106.

present. . . . Nobody is to be blamed for being born a slave; but a slave who not only eschews a striving for freedom but justifies and eulogises his slavery (e.g., calls throttling of Poland and the Ukraine, etc., a 'defence of the fatherland' of the Great Russians)—such a slave is a lickspittle and a boor, who arouses a legitimate feeling of indignation, contempt and loathing."[1]

Lenin considered national assimilation under capitalism's influence as great historical progress.[2] He hailed national liberation movements so long as they were directed against the domination of one nation by another. Yet he did not divorce the national movement from the classes participating in it. "The typical features of the first period," he wrote, "are: the awakening of national movements and the drawing of the peasants, the most numerous and the most sluggish section of the population, into these movements, in connection with the struggle for political liberty in general, and for the rights of the nation in particular."[3] He objected to opposing nations to one another, seeing it as poison for "the minds of the ignorant and downtrodden masses".[4]

Lenin's interest in the psychological aspects of national liberation movements centred, among other things, on injured national pride, resentment of the oppressor nation, and the sense of suspicion against the oppressor.[5]

But there is little or nothing in his works concerning "ethnic psychology", i.e., distinctive national traits or the psychic make-up of these or those peoples or nations; just a casual remark here and there about the Russian people's readiness for self-sacrifice or the Germans' preference for theoretical thinking. As a rule, however, points of that kind did not engage Lenin. He took guidance in the postulate that "in any really serious and profound political issue sides are taken according to classes, not nations".[6]

In sum, Lenin was interested principally in socio-psychological changes. For him social psychology was no eternal and primary basis for social phenomena. Social psychology can and must

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 104.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 20, p. 27.
[3] Ibid., p. 401.
[4] Ibid., p. 237.
[5] See V. I. Lenin, *On the Question of Autonomous Government* (in Russian), Gospolitizdat, 1956, p. 25; cf. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Fifth Russian Edition, Vol. 43, p. 128.
[6] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 36.

change. We should not idealise or treat as a changeless law the spontaneous phenomena, instincts and passions of the masses. The tsar's agents-provocateurs, we may recall, worked hard "to fan base passions among the ignorant masses"[1]. What interested Lenin was just that element in mass psychology which worked for, or was transformed by, the revolution. "The admirers of Lavrov and Mikhailovsky," he observed, "are obliged to reckon with the psychology of the downtrodden masses and not with the objective conditions which are *transforming* the psychology of the *militant* masses."[2]

Here is how Lenin described the socio-psychological dynamics in his article, "Before the Storm", in 1906: "More and more workers, peasants and soldiers, who only yesterday were indifferent, or even sided with the Black Hundreds, are now passing over to the side of the revolution. One by one, the illusions and prejudices which made the Russian people confiding, patient, simple-minded, obedient, all-enduring and all-forgiving, are being destroyed."[3] In the same year he amplified: "The workers' party places all its hopes on the masses; on the masses who are not frightened, not passively submissive and who do not humbly bear the yoke, but who are politically conscious, demanding and militant."[4]

These examples help us understand Lenin: he was neither a blind worshipper of moods nor a blind admirer of the masses in general. Of the Communist Party he said: "But we are a party *leading* the masses to *socialism*, and not at all one which follows every change in mood or depression in the spirits of the masses. All Social-Democratic parties have had to cope at times with the apathy of the masses, or their infatuation with some error, some fashion (chauvinism, anti-Semitism, anarchism, Boulangism, etc.), but never do consistently revolutionary Social-Democrats yield to every changing mood of the masses."[5]

Lenin prompted revolutionaries to use mass psychology in razing to the ground former social relations and the old way of life. But he also prompted them to erase from the mass mind all that hampered the rapid course of history. The peasants as a class, he pointed out, have a psychology of their own: they

[1] Ibid., Vol. 10, p. 73.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 11, p. 205.
[3] Ibid., p. 135.
[4] Ibid., p. 416.
[5] Ibid., Vol. 15, p. 295.

are at once toilers and proprietors; they are sober-minded, astute and practical people.[1] One should learn to win over, to remould their psychics, like that of any mass. "And not to dare to give orders!" Lenin admonished.[2]

As a perspicacious psychologist, Lenin knew many specific traits of the social psychology, and accentuated the *mass contagion* of seditious action.[3]

However, though Lenin's science of revolution helps the science of social psychology to take stock of its vital tasks and possibilities, we should not commit the error of applying mechanically his observations to other historical conditions. Lenin was not a professional psychologist. What we endeavoured was merely to show historians the benefits they could derive from psychology.

The following chapters will deal with the elements and basic concepts of that branch of psychology as a science known as social psychology.

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 377.
[2] Ibid., p. 211.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 26, p. 77.

WE AND THEY

1. IS COLLECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY CONCEIVABLE?

Whether a "collective psychology" (e.g., ethnic, social or mob psychology, etc.) is at all logically conceivable has long been an object of controversy.

A wealth of factual material, particularly on ethnic psychology, needs deep study. Any two peoples, neighbours or not, differ distinctly in traits of character or emotional make-up. The distinctive features in the mould of people of two different trades or professions prompt us to say: "Well, all blacksmiths are alike" or "all artists are alike" or "that is typical of mathematicians". The natural wish is to apply comparative psychology or look for the underlying objective scientific pattern.

However, for decades opponents of social psychology argue that psychology is concerned with the mental and spiritual processes in individuals and personalities, and that concepts of a collective spirit are mystic and therefore unscientific. This view obtruded still more insistently when new information was obtained on the structure and functioning of the brain, i.e., after the discovery and investigation of the physiological substratum of subjective psychic processes, proving that no collective brain existed outside the individual skull. Consequently, the concept of a collective group or social psychology contradicted materialist psychology, based on the physiology of the higher nervous activity, benefitting idealist psychology which sometimes ignored the brain. Since the brain was individual, psychology could be nothing but individual.

This antinomy dates far back to 1859, when Lazarus and Steinthal, the editors of *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* (The Journal of Ethnic Psychology and Linguistics) announced in the first issue the birth of a science

studying national spirit, "applicable only where many people live and act in common as an entity".[1]

Needless to recapitulate the long story of the controversy. At one extreme were men who saw nothing wrong in accepting incorporeal spirit, e.g., the spirit of a nation, a worthy object of research. They held that collective psychology was at least equally legitimate as psychology of the individual spirit or the spiritual individual. The two chief branches of this trend were ethnic psychology (the psychology of peoples and nations) and sociological psychology (the psychology of social community, either organised or unorganised). Both trends had many prominent exponents noted for signal empirical observations, ranging from Wilhelm Wundt to such of our contemporaries as Margaret Mead in the field of ethnic psychology, and from Emile Dürkheim to Gabriel Tarde in sociological psychology.

No matter how interesting and at times profound and fruitful their views and generalisations may be, however, two things invalidate their idealistic outlook: first, they see incorporeal spirit (the essence of which, as defined, admits of no experimental approach) as the object of psychological study, and, second, they are strangely compelled to oppose their studies to the psychology of the individual. After all, no psychologist, even of the idealist school, denies the impact on the personality of the social and national milieu. Psychologists admit as one man that much in a man's spiritual world is predetermined by his upbringing and education, the environment, his choice of friends, his superiors, teachers, workmates, the family, the neighbours, sometimes even casual acquaintances, and also by the books he reads, the radio and television. Yet all this comes under the head of "social psychology", which, as we see, is in the individual's mind, while the rest—the intercourse and interaction of individuals and their psychic make-up shaped by the social conditions and inherent idiosyncrasies—is a derivative.

The controversy is still at its height. Those who regard collective psychology as a science in its own right argue that it studies factual material along with the pertinent theoretical and philosophical aspects. This view is set out in numerous books and articles. What these treat is not bare speculation but facts,

[1] From an announcement of the new periodical as quoted by G. Shpet, *Vvedeniye v etnicheskuyu psikhologiyu* (Introduction to Ethnic Psychology), Moscow, 1927, pp. 19-20.

facts that science must study, for all forms of social relationship are necessarily objective facts.

Yet their opponents argue in the first place that the group of facts referring to the identity or, if you like, simultaneity or community of conduct rather than to the psychic interaction of individuals, should be rejected out of hand. And one must admit that this is not an object for a particular science (social psychology). They offered the following example: is the number of suicides among students of 23 or less a fit object for socio-psychological study? It is not, because the psychic way of each did not interact with that of the others. They form a group in the statistical sense only and a sociologist will find the way to analyse that group and elicit, among other information, the traits common to the psychology of these suicides. The same applies to the view that similar socio-economic conditions produce similar traits and ideas. We are obviously within the bounds of individual psychology so long as we treat identical causes and effects. It is no concern of ours at all whether these people communicated directly among themselves and how this affected their psychics. What we deal with are parallel series of individual psychologies with their characteristic patterns.

A like result or joint action by many persons is not necessarily an object for investigation by any science other than individual psychology. Georg Simmel noted rightly that "when a mob ransacks a house, passes a sentence or breaks out in a howl, the actions of many individual subjects aggregate in an event which we define as a wholeness, a materialisation of a single concept. That is where the great confusion occurs: the concurring outward results of many subjective mental and spiritual processes are interpreted as the effect of a common process of a collective soul. The identity of the resulting phenomenon is reflected in the supposed identity of its psychic cause".[1] Simmel inferred that the human individual was the only bearer of mental and spiritual states and that, hence, social psychology had no *raison d'être* as an independent science. To be sure, Simmel made his first departure from this view by conceding that some department of general psychology should devote itself to the effects of the social environment on the mental processes of individuals. We may therefore ask: Is that really only "part of the science dealing with the psychology of

[1] G. Simmel, *Soziologie*, Leipzig, 1908, S. 559-60.

individuals"? Simmel prefers to gloss over that point, confining the social aspect of psychology mainly to studying psychic types, i.e., some average traits of character, the mode of conduct, etc., produced by similar social conditions.

Secondly, the antagonists of collective or social psychology advanced an objection that sounds more like a surrender.

The supporters of collective or social psychology, such as Tarde, Le Bon and Sighele, who examined "mob psychology", averred that individual reactions manifested in a collective, in a homogeneous human milieu are usually much more intensive, i.e., they are swifter and stronger. We shall return to these theories and to the essence of these phenomena. Let us first see, however, what their opponents retort on this score: the allusion is to an intensification of only some aspects of the mental and spiritual activity of individuals; hence, the study of these phenomena is the competence of individual psychology; what is more, even determining a fact like swiftness of reaction presupposes the individual psychological approach. After all, they say, no such thing as swiftness or intensity of reaction of a collective, group or mob exists. What it amounts to is the sum-total of individual reactions. Individual reactions become more intensive because of environment. So what? Reactions are effected not only by social causes, but also by the natural environment. Take the temperature of the air. If mechanisms such as psychic contagion, imitation and suggestion are worth studying at all, then only as external factors influencing the psychic condition of individuals. And they underscore the word "individuals". But that is where they betray the weakness of their position. Since this group of factors (psychic contagion, imitation and suggestion) exists, it evidences a particular aspect of the psychics of people, not individuals. Why concentrate on the person subjected to suggestion, not the one that suggests? Would not a vacuum ensue if we considered them in isolation?

Now the ultimate objection to social psychology by its antagonists. They concede that some psychic experiences may be dyadic, i.e., involving two subjects. Take imitation, suggestion, sympathy, understanding, etc. Moreover, linguists recognise that at least two persons are involved in a linguistic phenomenon—the speaker and listener, the informant and the informed. No speech, language, information or understanding would otherwise be conceivable. Some cardinal psychic phenomena,

possibly including the most profound, are thus in fact located not in one brain but a pair.

At this point the antagonists of social psychology show signs of wavering. Perhaps the dyad should, indeed, be the object of a specific science? But happily a dyad is no more than a dyad, and one may easily sidestep the difference between Robinson and Robinson plus Friday. On the face of it, nothing changes. A complex community may, after all, be presented as a complex combination of different dyads. Just two (Robinson and Friday) will still be the primary element. There is still the hope of getting along without collective psychology, although, no denying it, the "dyadic experience" is a stumbling block.

2. FROM "I AND YOU" TO "THEY AND WE"

Let us digress from psychology for a trice and turn to philosophy. In contradistinction to German classical idealist philosophy, one of Ludwig Feuerbach's most fruitful ideas was to replace the former category "I" as the subject of cognition by the category "I and you". Plekhanov interpreted Feuerbach's idea thus: "In reality *I* is only such an *I* which is opposed to *you* and which in its turn becomes *you*, i.e., the object for another *I*. To itself *I* is a subject, to others an object."[1] In other words, Feuerbach refused to consider consciousness apart from the relations of people. No "I", the subject of cognition, is conceivable, until two persons are involved, each becoming a subject solely on the strength of their mutual relationship. For Feuerbach philosophical materialism concerned not one "subject" as opposed to the "object" (the objective world), not the "I" and its "sensations" and other attributes but necessarily two "subjects" and their relationship. Feuerbach gave an example: ethics implies relations between men, between "I" and "you". He amplifies: "I is *I* only through you and together with you. I am aware of myself only because you are in opposition to my consciousness as a visible and palpable *I*, as another man."[2]

The impact of this great insight of Feuerbach's on philosophy has been immense. For one thing, for progressive thought the abstract and isolated subject-individual, who dominated philosophy from Kant to Stirner, was dead.

[1] G. V. Plekhanov, *Ot idealizma k materializmu* (From Idealism to Materialism), Moscow, 1924, p. 38.
[2] Ibid., p. 43.

Marx reproduced Feuerbach's idea in *Capital* by jokingly comparing man to a commodity: "Since he comes into the world neither with a looking glass in his hand, nor as a Fichtian philosopher to whom 'I am I' is sufficient, man first sees and recognises himself in other men. Peter only establishes his own identity as a man by first comparing himself with Paul as being of like kind."[1]

Marxism advanced far beyond Feuerbach's surmise of "I and you". Why just a dyad? The transition from the "singular" to a dyad ushered in many new concepts in which the relations between men were more primary and important than man, the product of these relations. It followed that a dyad, too, was an abstraction. The next necessary step was the Marxist teaching on society. Robinson and Friday and Paul and Peter are not a society. Similarly, in a developed system of commodity production, each commodity is compared not to another commodity, be it even gold, but through gold with all the commodities on the market at any given moment. Paul learns his own nature through Peter only because the latter has society behind him, a multitude of people forming a whole by virtue of a complex system of relations. Marx and Engels reduced these relations to basic and derivative, centering their attention on economic relations, the basis of the social structure. Metaphorically, the double star was supplanted by a vast sky of stars. "I and you" no longer seemed the elementary human cell, because a multitude of "we", "you" and "they" groups appeared on the scene.

Though social science as a whole has been treading this path a long time, social psychology has yet to catch up with the other of its departments studying the social man and human society. Opponents of social psychology tripped over the concept of "dyadic" psychic experience as if this actually led from the individual brain to some mysterious "inter-personal" psychology. However, they could cross the Rubicon no more than bourgeois economists could part with Robinson and Friday, picturing society as a host of elementary relationships: dyads, i.e., Robinsons and Fridays.

The method of social psychology cannot be borrowed whole from Marxist political economy or some other branch of social science. It has its own specifics, but the vector is a common one: from "dyadic" psychic experiences to social ones.

[1] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1961, p. 52.

Let us leave aside the physiological aspect for the moment, namely, speech, that inherent mechanism of the higher nervous activity which fuses the minds of millions of people as effectively as the cerebral hemispheres are fused in the cranium, and dwell on the specifically psychological aspect.

To see whether or not social psychology is in principle conceivable, we should substitute "we", "you" and "they" as basic concepts for "I", "thou" and "he".

The grammar of all languages evidences the psychological fact that words are conjugated and, at least in some languages, declined not in two but in three persons (we, you, they go). Moreover, there are languages (e.g., the semitic languages) in which nouns are declined in persons: our, your, their object (or action). All existing and conceivable persons and relationships are classed, first and foremost, in these three categories. What is more, some primitive peoples have the plural only, and no singular. Engels summed this up in lucid terms: "The tribe remained the boundary for man, in relation to himself as well as to outsiders. . . . Impressive as the people of this epoch may appear to us, they differ in no way one from another, they are still bound, as Marx said, to the umbilical cord of the primordial community."[1]

So, let us pick the oldest relationship in the plural. To follow Feuerbach, the initial form should be "we and you". However, a closer analysis yields an unexpected result: "you" (and "thou") is a derivative category fitting a later stage than "we" and "they".

Social psychology does not become a science until "we and they" (or "they and we") are taken as the initial psychic phenomenon in place of "I and you", and the relationship between two persons is replaced by that of two communities. The second person "you" (or "thou") develops necessarily from this initial relationship and, in turn, takes it a step farther. It stems from contact between "we" and "they" and is a product of the dialectics of their relationship.

But how does community penetrate the individual's consciousness? Take two primitive groups—families or tribes. If the two groups never met, none of the individuals in group "A"

[1] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 255.

would ever become conscious of belonging to a community. As they did not differ from each other in the community so they would not distinguish their like from any others. That was merely an objective community. Before a subjective "we" could appear, they had to encounter and dissociate themselves from some "they". Subjectively and psychologically, "they" is still more primary than "we". Therefore, the appearance of the concept "they" in the human mind should be regarded as the initial act of social psychology.

The history of primeval society and that of other epochs indicates that the "we" concept may at times be weakly expressed or even non-existent, while that of "they" is always clearly expressed. "They" is not "not we"; more appropriately, "we" is "not they". The sense of "they" produces the desire for self-determination, for dissociating from "they" as "we".

At first "they" is far more specific and real, and associated with concrete notions: misery from "their" invasions, "their" inability to understand "human" speech, etc. The "they" concept needs no personification by the image of a chief, a group of elders or organisation. "They" may be conceived as multiform and not at all as a community in the specific sense.

The psychics of a child shows how genetically old this experience is. Children have the ability to distinguish all "strangers", though, naturally, the differentiation is fortuitous, since they do not distinguish between dangerous and harmless strangers, etc. Instantly, a very strong psychic mechanism responds to any attempted contact by a "stranger", triggering a complex of specific reactions, including tears and howls, or, we could say, "appeals" to "one's own".

"We" is more complex and, in a sense, more abstract. The community that existed in primeval times, the connection between individuals, was perceived by all through personification or through rites and customs underscoring the fact that they belonged to the community as distinct from "they".

We may note as a point of interest that in primitive society "we" always stood for "people" in the direct sense, i.e., people in general, whereas "they" stood for "not quite people". What many tribes and peoples called themselves is translated as "people". This shows that psychologically "we" is not a simple category, not the mere awareness of real bonds, of an everyday association of a number of individuals. That may appear to be the case at first glance. In fact, this awareness is achieved

through the antithesis: "we" are those who are not "they"; those who are not "they" are genuine men.

To be sure, the matter looked as that only at the dawn of history far removed from our vision. What we see is mainly the product of history–the various "we" and man's awareness of belonging to some community. The farther from primeval times the more "they" and "we" changed roles: man became psychologically aware of the various communities by distinguishing himself not from any concrete "they" but from all those who were not "we".

It is probably preferable to assume as the original community one that is the easiest to assume: a group of people related to each other, that is, people of common origin, known to each other, associated in life and common hunting. However, and this is often the case, the easiest to conceive is not always objectively true. If we were to assume that the simplest human community is bonded by a blood relationship, that it is not a relationship existent in people's minds, how to explain in the case of tribes and peoples in the earliest stage of development that a blood relationship is often a figment of the imagination, an imagined relationship to justify the association of people in a tribe. They may claim to be the descendants of some animal, an animal of a particular species, or the descendants of an imaginary forebear, or they may adopt a person of another tribe after certain rites, after which he or she is said to become a personification of some deceased kinsman. The concept of blood relationship, even at the lowest totemism stage is not as natural as it may seem. We have no cause to assume that community primary. The idea of a "primitive labour collective" only seems exoteric. Yet who was admitted to it and who was not? Again a vicious circle until we postulate "they" as the psychologically primary category.

And going still farther back we may even assume that this initial, this, we might say, psychologically primary dissociation from some "they", reflects the coexistence of men on earth with their biological predecessors, the paleolithic man (the Neanderthal man). They could well have been considered dangerous and unacceptable outcasts, "non-human" or "semi-human". This hypothesis endeavours to show that the initial human psychological relationship is not self-awareness of a primitive tribal community but the attitude of people towards their close animal-like ancestors, prompting them to regard themselves as

73

humans, not as members of their community. Not until palaeolithic man became extinct did this psychological model spread to the relationship between groups, communities and tribes, and eventually to all the other uniformities within the biological species of contemporary humans.

The above factor—relationship with the Neanderthaler—probably changed its role substantially in the course of human history. Periods of mutual extermination were followed by dispersals, convergences bordering on symbiosis (probably in the neolithic and eneolithic periods) were followed again by periods of separation.[1] Possibly, these changes corresponded to modifications in the cultural history of mankind. But invariably, and the later the more surely, the palaeanthropae became extinct and the role of this factor declined, finally reaching nil. But then we advance this hypothesis merely as the initial push, to show that the centre of gravity shifted more and more from "they" to "we".

"We" became a universal psychological form of the self-awareness of all human identity. Yet "we" always presupposes differentiation from an either definite or indefinite "they".

Millennia passed before it occurred to man that "we" may coincide with all mankind and, therefore, not oppose any "they".

3. COMMUNITIES

It has been shown that social psychology may employ concepts such as "community", "collective" or "group", without therefrom ceasing to be psychology.

Social psychology takes its origin from the abstraction of the infinite multiformity of a simple unit or individual cell, i.e., a community. In fact, the general theory of social psychology is a comprehensive psychological analysis of this central community concept.

Before dwelling on the subjective aspect, it should be clear that there exists an infinite variety of communities differing in objective social content, character and type. Communities may range from two persons to great nations, peoples and classes or unions of peoples and classes. Communities may be either

---

[1] See B. F. Porshnev, *Sovremennoye sostoyaniye voprosa o reliktovykh gominoidakh* (Contemporaneous State of the Question of Relic Hominids), Moscow, 1963.

lasting (i.e., based on a stable economic and historical foundation) or short-lived, with many transitional stages between them. Communities may cover territories ranging from small to large, or they may also be extraterritorial. They may be dense or dispersed, their members scattered among other people. The spectrum of relations between communities extends from antagonistic and overtly hostile to friendly competitive as a form of mutual assistance.

The separate individual may belong to communities of different types and orders at one time. He may, for example, be a citizen of the U.S.S.R., belong to a nation, be a member of the working class, member of the Party and a trade union, a member of a family, club, circle or society, participate in an international movement, belong to a circle of friends, be one of the crowd at the stadium, participate in a demonstration, be a spectator in a hall or auditorium, participate in an excursion or a walking tour, etc. However, he cannot belong at the same time to antagonistic classes, antagonistic social systems, etc.

This cursory enumeration shows that human communities are innumerable and multiform, including unstable and short-lived ones, which baffles bourgeois psychological sociology and social psychology. To bourgeois sociologists all communities seem alike. Modern "sociometry"[1] ranks first the most ephemeral associations: groups of two or three persons bound by mutual sympathy, intercourse or attraction. On the face of it, "microsociology" offers promising ground for the statistical processing of mass questionnaires and for drawing reasoned conclusions. In fact, however, little or nothing is at hand for generalisation and the yield is poor.

The social psychology of "smaller groups" or "microgroups" is not social psychology in the full sense, for it considers community as but an outgrowth of the psychology of individuals. It holds that every person for reasons inexplicable scientifically or springing from the individual's conscious or unconscious development, is well disposed towards some people and shuns others. At the 18th International Congress of Psychologists in Moscow in 1966 J. Moreno said he had succeeded thereby in discovering the reality of "society". He as much as admitted that sociology had become a science, whereas in the past "society" was a

---

[1] See J. L. Moreno, *Sociometry, Experimental Method and the Science of Society*, New York, 1951.

fiction, because the only really existing entity was a certain number of individuals. Now it has been discovered at last that an individual may sympathise with some people while steering clear of others. That, it appears, is the substratum of society! The utilitarian side of this new science surfaces in the study of various life-imposed minor resemblances. Special methods are used to measure the extent to which the composition of these groups may or may not coincide with the purely psychic grouping of people according to individual dispositions. Microsociology offers its services to employers for forming crews of workers, to the armed forces for forming companies, to trainers and coaches for selecting teams, etc. Literature expounding these ideas is extremely prolific. Yet its theoretical groundwork is absurd. What, indeed, is the theoretical background to the selective faculties of the individual vis-à-vis the people of his environment? No matter how complex each case may be, the basis of this selection is comparison with a model. In a number of people one may appear more familiar than others: he or she has by association stirred a sense of something familiar. The choice of a partner or companion may also be due to the discovery of common sense of values, a preference for specific behaviour or habit, etc. There are more complex appreciations, too: a striking difference or peculiarity (including that in appearance) gives rise to an intense desire of converting the person from "he" (or "she") into "thou", i.e., enfolding it in one's own "we", from which he or she is so evidently different. Friendship and love spring up frequently by this second alternative–the conjugation of "we" and "they". Hence, personal preferences are no irrational cornerstone for social psychology; they have a cause and do not trace back to inaccessible depths of personality. We vaguely associate some of the people around us with something of "ours", others with something "strange" or "alien". Therefore these categories are primary for social psychology.

For the same reasons social psychology cannot regard purely psychic associations unsupported by any socio-economic basis as elementary and primary communities.

The reason for failure is rooted in the idealistic approach. Materialism should deny neither this multiformity of communities nor that some of them are purely psychological. It should emphasise that communities corresponding to the objective and material trends of economic development, the class struggle and

socio-political life are the only stable, durable and historically important communities.

Then the purely psychological or mainly psychological communities and collectives emerging and disappearing continuously are, historically speaking, a reconnoitring mechanism of spontaneous development. There is nothing in historical materialism to imply that psychological phenomena necessarily trail behind economic or social changes, which they ultimately reflect. The emergence of new transient socio-psychological formations no more contradicts materialism than active-approach or "trial and error" behaviour, etc., contradicts the physiology of the higher nervous activity. Contemporary physiology is farthest from the thought that the body of an animal performs nothing but actions encouraged from without, prompted by an obvious biological necessity. The body conducts endless reconnaissance, a ceaseless search (a very wasteful one), for without it its reactions would not adjust themselves to changes in the environment and changes in the body. This reconnoitring and anticipating apparatus does not conflict with the determinist principle. On the contrary, it helps lift the veil on how only those of the many movements made by the animal are consolidated and selectively converted into conditioned reflexes that correspond to the strictest causal regularity.

Naturally, no direct analogy exists here with the relation between the continuously appearing unstable psychic associations and the human communities necessitated or predetermined by the laws of socio-economic development. What the above was meant to show is how to disprove bourgeois sociology. The factual material it happens to gather concerning minor short-lived associations unsupported either economically or historically, should not be brushed aside. One should merely stand the matter back on its feet: these associations should not be considered a basis and prototype of human community or of collectives, but as a form without content continuously extended as feelers by way of reconnaissance; not unless favourable conditions arise do they fill out with an objective public content.

It is this form that we express by the "we and they" principle. This universal principle underlying the psychic formation of communities must manifest itself with more or less force to make possible the formation of even the historically most strongly predetermined and most profoundly objectively conditioned communities, collectives, unions, or groups.

77

All communities may be roughly divided into four categories, though not infrequently social psychologists distinguish macrogroups and microgroups only. It appears more proper, however, also to single out megagroups, that is global communities, organisations or movements. Not only mankind as an aggregate, but also international associations based on class, professional, scientific or political likeness, such as the World Peace Movement, should come under this head. So should the world-wide movements for the protection of children, for the equality of women, for racial equality, against famine, etc., and such world religions as Christianity, Mohammedanism and Buddhism. As suggested by the German, W. Friedrich, social classes and strata, national, local, sex, professional, ideological, school and age groups, all come under the head of macrogroups,[1] though the list is far from complete, its purpose being merely to elucidate this category of communities. As for microgroups, they may include stable organised small-scale collectives such as families, factory teams, squads, etc. In special literature, however, the tabulation of microgroups chiefly embraces purely psychological associations of a few individuals based on sympathy, selectivity or preference. This type of community, the least material in character, has prompted abundant, widely advertised socio-psychological literature. Finally, we should pinpoint communities of an even lesser order in the sense that they embrace not even individuals, but just their thoughts, experiences and manifestations. They may be called submicrocommunities, applying particularly to acts of "acquiescence", i.e., to unison with regard to an idea, be it a duo, trio, quartet, ensemble or choir. This community ranges in duration from an instant (act of acquiescence) to permanence (community of convictions).

To be sure, these four tabulations are rather loose and readily overlap. And in each we find communities strongly rooted in the objective laws of social life and more, even entirely, subjective and hence unstable communities.

Marxist sociology builds on the laws of such communities as classes and parties, nations and nationalities, for knowledge of these laws is the only key to the less deep or more short-lived formations.

Those are sociological contours that have to be borne in mind

---

[1] See W. Friedrich, "On the Relationship Between Behaviour Patterns and Types of Macrogroups", *Voprosy Filosofii*, Moscow, 1966, No. 4.

when elaborating social psychology. However, they are not its object, but only one of the scientific premises.

An entirely different class of community-groups bonded by a mood—introduces us to the depth of social psychology as a science.

Take the rather unimportant historical phenomenon of fashions. Western psychologists are attracted to this problem primarily because of its utilitarian commercial interest. For us it is a very suitable example, one that fits our purpose perfectly. People who follow the fashions may not belong to any sociological community. But neither do they comprise a purely statistical community, for they accept fashions not independently of each other due to some identical motive, but by imitation or direct contact with each other. They may be said to infect each other. Fashion is essentially mutual imitation. However what belongs to the sphere of moods, i.e., to social psychology, are not the fashionable things or actions as such, but the "fashionableness". For the psychologist it is not the positive aspect that is important, but the negative. People are less attracted by the beauty or utility of new things, but rather by the distinctiveness from "unfashionable" people; the frequent change of things fashionable distinguishes one from people who are slower in keeping up with the fashions. Hence, the bearers of fashion form a kind of socio-psychological community, a highly amorphous and unstable one. It is a breeze among the more powerful and deeper currents of social emotion.

On the whole, however, as outlined in the preceding chapter, socio-psychic phenomena gravitate towards one of the two characteristic forms: the psychic make-up and the psychic shift (in other words, the mood). Both are communities.

Psychic make-up is subject to tendencies of relative stability, to tradition, class features or features of a stratum, profession, people, nation or any other group. Stable traits of the psychic make-up are moulded by customs, habits, or the way of life inherited from older generations and the environment. Often they are adopted uncritically, passively, but at times the critical approach is throttled by either an imposed system of ideas or direct compulsion. This psychic category is multiform: the stable psychic traits of a class, e.g., the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, are formed in different ways than those of an ethnic community—a tribe or people. Elusive features such as character (itself composed of many elements and traits) and the historically

79

more changeable but nonetheless lasting complexes of habits, customs, traditions, tastes, prejudices, peculiar relationships and features deriving from language singularities, all come under the head of psychic make-up.

The relative stability of these socio-psychic communities is traceable to the fact that they coalesce with what is called culture, or more specifically, spiritual culture. The psychic make-up of a community–part and parcel of its culture–expresses itself through culture, depends on culture and, as we have said, manifests itself in and is governed by the language.

Moods, on the other hand, are relatively mobile and dynamic, but there is no break between the two forms. Psychic make-up is incessantly evolving and changing, now slowly and now more slowly still; and as for psychic shifts, in one way or another they, too, draw on the traditions of a community. The separation or opposition of these two forms is not absolute but of an auxiliary nature. In some cases it is altogether irrelevant, as when we speak about the revolutionary traditions of a class or a people: "tradition" suggests something static, while here we deal with the traditions of dynamics. What concerns us now is not classifying moods, but showing that they, too, are a form of community, though highly specific. B. D. Parygin, for one, suggests that we consider mood a Marxist-Leninist sociological category.[1] As we probe further, we shall find that "mood community", too, ranges from causal and short-lived to what is deeply rooted in objective historical factors. We have seen the importance Lenin attached to shifts in the opinion, emotion and behaviour of the different classes and social groups brought about by socio-economic changes and, in turn, paving the way to definite socio-political events. Moods always bridge the gap from the "history of conditions" to the "history of events".

In more or less static phenomena, such as national or class character, the psychic make-up or psychic order of a collective, the negativism towards "they" is sometimes hard to detect, and discovering it requires a special analysis. Yet in a dynamic phenomenon or mood the negative aspect is almost always easily seen. A mood carries an obvious negative charge against some aspect of the former way of life. A negative attitude

[1] B. D. Parygin, "Obshchestvennoye nastroyeniye kak sotsiologicheskaya kategoriya" (Social Mood as a Sociological Category), *Vestnik Leningradsko-go Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta*, 1963, No. 5, Series on Economics, Philosophy and Law, Part 1.

towards the bearers of the vices of both the past and present is characteristic of any social mood. Moods are always actively directed not only at something but more specifically against something. In other words, the "they" category is patently instrumental in bringing about that kind of communities.

It may be argued that there are moods of calm, contentment or satisfaction, none of them directed against anything. Yet they, too, are opposed, and strongly, to any potential disturbance of the status quo. They are defensive moods. Any impression to the contrary is due to the fact that when satisfied, people recall their past: rejoice in a victory achieved, in having overcome difficulties, in vanquishing the enemies that had stood in their way. If this is not the case, then the calm is not a mood, but an absence of one, i.e., a tranquillity of the senses.

The nature of social moods is infinitely multiform, depending on the objective content of the given historical dynamics. The mood of the masses during a revolutionary upsurge or fighting for national liberation is worlds removed from the indignation gripping people against violators of customs or, say, from the eruption of discontent over some action by a tribal chief. However, an unmistakable "against" is always at hand.

This is why the state, church and the dominant ideology in societies divided into antagonistic classes inhibits the dissemination and overt expression of a considerable variety of social moods, for, as a rule, they tend to undermine the existing order. The exception is when moods are channelled along a deliberate course, such as religious fanaticism against people of a different religion, national and racial chauvinism, anticommunism, etc.

This tabulation of forms and types of community, for all their infinite variety, bears out the fact that in the socio-psychological context they are invariably constituted by the contraposition of "we" and "they".

In this contraposition one of the elements may be more definite and identifiable than the other. So, let us consider the extreme cases, when only one of the elements is defined and known.

1. Russian autocracy or nazism were so repulsive a "they" that they provided considerable room for a meeting of minds among the most disparate forces and communities; it was opposition to those clearly recognisable "they" that prompted different social forces and communities to unite in a vague and easily disintegrating "we".

However, opposition to Russian autocracy or nazism formed a bloc of well-defined communities. By contrast, the psychological patterns governing "mob" action–and bourgeois social psychology emerged and long busied itself with precisely the study of "mob" behaviour–are a case in which one of the members of the contraposition of "we" and "they" is highly elusive. It was probably due to this bourgeois influence that the psychics of the most amorphous community in existence, that of a mob, was elevated to the rank of an universal model.

A mob is often a merely casual assemblage of persons. They may have no internal bonds and become a community for sole reason that they are pervaded by an identical negative and destructive emotion directed against some persons, ideas or events. In short, a mob frequently constitutes a community only by dint of an "against", of opposition to a "they". That is unquestionably the initial and most primitive form of socio-psychic community.

This deliberate choice of the object of study by bourgeois social psychology predetermined the conclusions; it seems likely, in fact, that these desired conclusions predetermined the choice. Dreading the growth of the mass revolutionary movement in Britain, France and Germany, bourgeois sociologists advanced similar theories to the effect that the psychics of a mob or mass of people is primitive, even pathological. Le Bon, Tarde and Sighele argued that critical thinking is impaired by belonging to a mob, that a person becomes capable of destructive action only against somebody ("they"!). They assigned the decisive part to the reaction of imitation, to psychic contagion ("we"!). Spontaneous mob action, therefore, is explained, on the one hand, by incitement on the part of agitators and, on the other, by imitative mob reactions (i.e., atavism) inherent in gregarious animals.

Criticism of these rudiments of bourgeois social psychology should not only refute data produced by the above authors, but also expose the unscientific choice of the object of study: one will hardly encounter in life such an "ideal" mob, an amorphous and random association of people. In any case, it has nothing in common with a mob or mass homogeneous as regards class background, taking part in revolutionary acts, street demonstrations, assaults on government buildings, etc., in which some preliminary greater or lesser internal bond ("we") is always detectable.

2. A group of friends, an exclusive religious sect, and many other situations may be cited as examples of a concrete and definite "we" opposing a highly amorphous "they".

When he was fifteen, a writer tells us, he divided mankind into people who knew and appreciated Alexander Blok, the Russian poet, and all the other people. "These other people," he writes, "seemed an inferior lot." The writer pointed to the reverse aspect of "adulation", that is, identification and negation of the "inferior lot". What concerns us is not his love of Blok. At a more advanced age one may be as impetuously devoted not to a hero, but an ideal, idea, dogma or truth. But impetuously one always divides people "for" and "against" on the basis of "we" and "they".

Here the opposition is not active, because the "we" groups are intent on setting themselves apart rather than attacking anybody. Take a class of schoolchildren; mostly, they will not unite against a couple of rowdies; in that situation, almost invariably, a group of friends forms an exclusive circle, isolating itself.

After the mob psychology concept miscarried, bourgeois social psychology went to the other extreme: Italian sociologist Moreno and others concentrated their attention on the smaller "we" bonded by mutual sympathy, friendship and emotion, tending to isolate themselves from the amorphous multitude. Investigations were conducted in the armed forces, at factories and in schools with questionnaires and evaluations of people by a points system. The investigators discovered the "microstructure" or "infrastructure" of personal relationships, seeing a mosaic of mutual attractions and repulsions, in place of a company of soldiers a group of workers, a class, etc. This enabled them to issue a set of practical tips to commanders, supervisors and executives and doubtless some of their suggestions could be useful for socialist society, too.

However, the investigations are rather superficial, dealing with extreme variants only that are marginal among sociopsychic phenomena.

Now that we have considered the two extreme cases, it may be appropriate to accept the concept of least organised and most organised communities. A community distinct from an amorphous or indistinct "they" may be defined as organised: it has a leader and authority, the executive functions in it are differentiated and it has a corresponding internal structure.

Conversely, the more definite and limited the "they" group is the more homogeneous and monolithic is its community, the less it is organised and the less it is hierarchic.

This definition fits not only microgroups in which the invisible, i.e., a purely psychological hierarchy, may be clearly outlined, while all who are not "we" are completely indefinable. It may fit macrocommunities, and very large ones. On the face of it, the example of war appears to deny this: the enemy is highly organised, but this requires harsh discipline and a hierarchic structure. But take the case in its dynamics: so long as no war breaks out the army is potentially pitted against all foreign armies in general and none in particular. And when a country is invaded by an armed and organised force, resistance has almost always in history tended to assume the form of a people's war. Then the invader is opposed along with the regular army by the population, i.e., a relatively less organised mass of people, this giving rise to local initiative, initiative from below. Actually, the relationship of organisation to no organisation is highly complex.

We have so far considered abstract extremes only. However, it is much more promising to study the range of intermediate situations in which the "we" and "they" are variously or equally defined, for these comprise the majority of past and present-day socio-psychic communities.

4. ETHNOPSYCHOLOGY, ETHNIC AND ARCHEOLOGICAL CULTURES

In ancient times settling as far apart as possible was probably the most widespread act towards strangers, the "they". Ethnic, linguistic and cultural communities and sharp boundaries evidently began when further spatial separation was impossible. Archeologists note that the farther we go back to the past the greater the distance between settlements. For some unfathomable reason, people crossed vast expanses, floated on logs down great rivers and, what was more, entrusted themselves to unknown currents in seas and oceans to reach other shores, many losing their lives in the attempt. The dispersal of *homo sapiens* in the four habitable continents, the archipelagoes and isolated islands over some 10 to 15 thousand years bespeaks less the fertility of the species and much more the action of some mainspring that scattered men all over the planet. This mainspring,

doubtlessly, could be described as mutual repulsion. Mutual ethnic and cultural attraction and fusion was a considerably higher stage in the opposition of "we" to "they".

Save for the small vanguard groups that once pushed especially far in the search for new settling grounds and lost touch with their kin, there was never in known history any tribe or people totally isolated from its neighbours. That implies not only positive intercourse, such as barter, family or marriage bonds, mutual visits and cultural exchanges, but also negative intercourse, for if two men turn their backs on each other and refuse to be alike, that, too, is a relationship. And this was probably the kind of relationship that was most widespread between tribes and peoples in the remote past. But they never lost sight of each other and it is therefore proper to qualify this as a relationship.

True, many archeologists, anthropologists and linguists are inclined to picture primeval mankind as consisting of isolated social units, say clans, nomadic in their way of life and knowing nothing of each other. This concept developed to supplant the old linguistic idea of parent languages, i.e., of the historical unity of vast families of languages and peoples traceable to the earliest humans and their language. However, some Soviet scientists advanced the new, fairly convincing scheme: a continuous chain of primitive speech, with every two neighbouring groups speaking different dialects, but dialects that were comprehensible to the other. Naturally, the degree of intelligibility diminished in the case of more distant groups, while migration could even break this continuity with the tribe or group settling in the neighbourhood of a people speaking an entirely different language. For us this point of view only underscores the difference between the speech of the neighbouring groups. That difference did not come about for natural causes. It had served the group as an artificial means of isolating and distinguishing oneself from strangers. Some probably spoke more rapidly, others stressed the words differently, some opened their mouth less when speaking, others opened it wider, with the result that labial sounds gave way to dental or lingual; some avoided sibilants while others did not, etc. Strangers were identified by their difference from one's own, while one's own were identified by their difference from strangers.

However, language is but one of the elements of culture. Archeologists found different types of tools, dwellings and uten-

sils on adjacent sites. Would that mean that the bearers of these differences were isolated from each other? Social psychology is inclined to deny that: the differences were merely an external means to express the "we" and "they" relationship.

Ethnography could tabulate many examples of this artificially sustained cultural difference between neighbours. Families, tribes and local groups invariably sought to be different from others, to have an identity.

The traditional holiday garb in the Baltic countries, for example, is very colourful, but differs from locality to locality. And in pre-revolution Russia, for example, there was dualism in some deliberately stressed ethnographic detail even between two neighbouring villages: "The platbands of our windows differ from theirs," they say, or "we dance this figure differently." The distinctiveness between adjacent areas was highly varied and even found expression in mutual ridicule.

Seeing ethnographic and archeological facts concerning local spiritual and material peculiarities from this angle, we discover that they serve as boundaries between different communities. One could not conceive of "men's unions" and "men's homes" without opposing them to women, and vice versa. Neither could one conceive age groups, say, of adults and those under age, unless we isolate the two and draw a clear ritual line between them, say, in the form of initiation. That line could be either external, as between two clans, communities, settlements or tribes, or it could be intrinsic as between factions, unions, companies, social sections, castes, estates, etc.

The objective character of these relations is also highly varied. Take the following example from the hunting practices of Tungus clans in the rigorous expanses of the pre-revolution Siberian taiga. Each clan was distinguishable by the facial tattooing and differences in weapons and utensils; since the hunting grounds of each clan were not clearly designated, one simply killed anyone with a "stranger's" tattoo and left the corpse to the wild beasts. This brutal form of tribal hostility is, of course, worlds removed from good-natured banter or conventional ceremony. But in either case the examination of sociopsychic, including ethno-psychic, communities only from within, in the context of their intrinsic association and imitation, is unrealistic. It was opposition of one's own community to another's that impelled the development and consolidation of ethnic particularities and thereby cemented community.

The earlier the stage of development, the clearer this stands out. Investigators of the way of life and the beliefs of Australians, including witchcraft and magic, noted the pervasiveness of emotions such as fear or horror and their relation to the antipathy between communities and tribes. Sickness, death and other grief is invariably ascribed to the sorcery of a member of another tribe. And more often than not the whole tribe was blamed, rather than any individual. Describing Arnhem Land tribes, ethnographer Baldwin Spencer noted that "natives ... are always most frightened of the magic of another tribe or distant part". Spencer and Frank Gillen observed in reference to Central Australian tribes that all alien things horrified the native, who is especially fearful of evil sorcery from a distance. Missionary James Chalmers, too, indicated in a reference to the aborigines of southern New Guinea that the state of mutual fear permeating the minds of savages was lamentable. They believed, he said, that every member of another tribe and every stranger imperilled their life. A slightest rustle, the sound of a dry leaf falling, the movement of a pig and the flight of a bird frightened them at night, and they shivered from fear. Explorer E. M. Curr noted that the death of a co-tribesman from disease or accident was ascribed by aborigines to the sorcery of some hostile or unknown tribe. After the funeral, a detachment of warriors sets out, thirsting for blood; they march 50-100 miles stealthily at night in search of the tribes whose names are unknown to them, and on spotting a group belonging to another (hostile or unknown) tribe, they hide themselves and attack after nightfall, and massacre men and children in their sleep. Enmity and imagined evil blend in an antagonistic feeling towards strangers. Alfred William Howitt, who studied the Australian Kurnai tribes, remarked that in some respects the life of a Kurnai was a life of horror. He lived in constant fear of everything visible and invisible. He never knew when a Bradgerak tribesman would choose to pierce him with a spear from behind or when a secret enemy of his own tribe would cast an irresistible spell on him. Most wars between the Australian tribes are traceable to mutual charges of witchcraft. This is also mirrored in their respective rites. Guessing the identity of the "culprit" of the death of a tribesman was an important part of the funeral rites of many Australian tribes.[1]

    [1] See S. A. Tokarev, *Ranniye formy religii* (Earlier Forms of Religion), Moscow, 1964, pp. 81-84.

Obviously, the above is true not only of the Australian aborigines, but also of other primitive tribes. The natives in the interior of former German New Guinea thought that every death was caused by a secret enemy in the neighbouring settlement. Papuans of the Mafulu tribe never imputed calamities to the medicine man of their own village, whom they consequently did not fear, and always to the witchdoctors of other villages. Parkinson wrote of the Bainings inhabiting the interior of the Gazelle Peninsula (New Britain) that if a friend or relative died suddenly, this was ascribed to enemies, the people of the shore, with no thought as to motives and the manner of killing. Ethnographer Malinovsky reports that among the aborigines of Dobu Island (near New Guinea) magic "is a prominent factor in all intertribal relations. The fear of magic is overpowering, and greater still when the natives visit far-away places and see foreign and unfamiliar things". Karl von den Steinen, who explored Brazil, found that to a Bacaïri tribesman "all the evil (*kurapa*, which means both 'not ours' and 'alien') sorcerers live in foreign villages".[1] As we see, "they" and "strangers" are seen as the personification of sorcery, death, even cannibalism. And the interesting fact is that attributing magic powers and wickedness to another people or its medicine men is mostly mutual; for example, the Indian Todas consider their neighbours, the Kurumba, as powerful sorcerers, while the latter fear them for the same reason. The Laplanders (Saami), too, inspired awe in their neighbours, the Finns, Karelians and Swedes, who considered them dangerous sorcerers (see the Kalevala tales of the horrible sorcerers of Pohjola), while the Laplanders thought the same of Finns and Swedes.[2] Evidently, magic powers were attributed to whole settlements and tribes in the earlier stages of development, while in more recent times, tribes singled out some of their own members, attributing to them the powers of sorcery.

This again reveals the significance of the outside "they" in the evolution of the self-awareness of every community. However, the more developed is a community the less distinct this aspect becomes, giving the impression that a community is bonded by intrinsic factors on which external opposition has no bearing. This applies particularly to fixed psychic patterns, e.g., to ethnic or national character. Yet this concept led ethnic psychology to a theoretical impasse time and again.

[1] S. A. Tokarev, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
[2] Ibid., p. 88.

88

The ethnopsychologist who empirically observes the peculiar behaviour, the reactions and emotions of a tribe or people, who compares them with those of other tribes or peoples, faces the question: where to look for the root causes of these peculiarities? The writers who offer answers to this question may be classed in two categories.

Some seem to cling to inferences suggested by natural science. For them physical, corporal and anthropological specifics account for psychic idiosyncrasies. But scientifically, their ideas proved irrelevant. There is no causal connection between the two sets of phenomena. A child of one physico-anthropological type or race brought up in a foreign socio-cultural environment and isolated from his compatriots does not possess the idiosyncrasies of their psychic make-up. Vellard, a French ethnographer who studied the Guayaki (a savage South American tribe), picked up a small girl abandoned by the Guayaki fleeing in panic at the approach of the party of ethnographers. The girl was taken to France and raised in Vellard's family; she was given a first-class education, and became an ethnographer herself, and finally the helper and wife of the man who saved her.

Relating ethnic psychic peculiarities to physical anthropology outside traits specific to temperament which account neither for complexes nor for higher psychic functions, is therefore unscientific. This may be an error, a gross one, but made in good faith, or an artifice to camouflage racism, the doctrine of the biological superiority of some races and peoples.

There is also the school, as old as the hills, which attributes psychic make-up and character to climate and geographic factors. Many antique authors reasoned along these lines, among them Hippocrates and Strabo. In the 18th century French educator Montesquieu produced a system arguing that natural conditions predetermined the disposition and customs which, in turn, determined the political order. Montesquieu arrived at the conservatist conclusion that natural conditions being almost invariable, each people must cling for ever to its specific political order and squash all temporary non-conformities. In the newer bourgeois ethnography this climatico-geographical trend has a fairly big following, its essence being as conservative and covertly racist as ever.

Those who associate the psychic make-up with the historically specific economic, social and cultural rather than natural conditions, belong to the second category.

Their approach is far more scientific, though the different trends are many, and some of them quite helpless. Those who infer that social order and culture are eternally immutable and inherent, are unable to explain the origin of ethnopsychic characteristics; they have neither the argument nor the function, neither the cause nor the effect. Even though they do not deduce psychic features from anatomical features, they treat them as constant and immutably characteristic of the given people. This is akin to biologism and racism.

The more cautious approach is to look for functional or causal relationships between the existing culture and the psychic make-up, though the search is not always a promising one. That is the case with the Western school which attributes to the cultural milieu the decisive influence in forming psychic idiosyncrasies in the first few months of the individual's life. Hence the attention it pays to the traditional national methods of nursing infants. Critics describe this jokingly as the diapers complex. The joke, if taken too far, may be misplaced, for the initial psychic experience of a child should not be overlooked. However, the exponents of the "diapers complex" tend to ignore the contemporaneous "age psychology" concerning the extent of the influence of impressions and habits acquired in the initial months of life. The notion that more than 50 per cent of the personal idiosyncrasies issue from education in the pre-speech period is obviously unscientific. The modern psychologists are more inclined to attribute a bigger role to speech (external, internal, internalised) in the psychic motivations of human behaviour.

Future investigators will probably measure the relative importance of the various factors with greater accuracy. Prominence will be given to the traditional forms of work, whose influence on the psychic make-up is unquestionably very great indeed, for work is the most important sphere of human intercourse. However, work processes have a tendency to similarise, their ethnic and national specifics give way to technological homogeneity dictated by the similarity of the objects of labour. The linguistic factor, meanwhile, is likely to gain importance in future investigations precisely because language is the principal mechanism of communication, while also the mechanism of isolating the "we" from other communities ("incomprehension"). Ethnic community is not the only community sustained by linguistic differences; take the exclusive systems of signs used by various social

groups, professions, castes, sects, territorial communities, even circles of friends (e.g., nicknames), etc.

Co-operation between ethnic psychology and historical linguistics is therefore highly promising and likely to be fruitful, because of the predominance of speech among the psychic factors moulding the personality. Lexicology and etymology should be given precedence over language structure, phonetics, morphology and syntax. Language is the bank of historical experience to a far greater extent than any other sphere of culture, but its own formal differences are sometimes related to shades of the psychic make-up.

Interesting, though not unquestionable, is the contention of the Danish ethnographer, Jens Bjerre, who in his comparative study of Bushmen and Australians, similar in many respects, reveals that the system of their languages (in which gender is expressed by inflexion) favours the development of mythology (as an attempt to understand the classification of phenomena performed by the language). Inflected languages are conducive to personifying natural phenomena or heavenly bodies, Bjerre says, while the primitive peoples speaking non-inflected languages (e.g., negroid tribes) have no mythology and are ancestor worshippers.[1] This may be right or wrong, but is valid all the same as an example of how language characteristics affect socio-psychic processes.

The relationship between language and the deeper processes is very close. According to the latest physiological concepts, hieroglyphic and phonetic writing actuate different areas of the cortex in even a somewhat different interrelation.

Mimicry and pantomime (gesticulation), though they are poorer mechanisms of communication than speech, are also psychic determinants of ethnic community. One need not be over-perceptive to note, for example, that in similar situations representatives of one nation smile more often than those of others. It is not the quantity that matters, of course, but the sensory and semantic implications. In this area, too, traditions are as deep and pervasive as in the lingual context.

It would be unrealistic trying to concoct a socio-psychologic table listing the characteristic and distinctive traits of ethnic communities. The important thing is to note that the smaller

---

[1] Jens Bjerre, *The Lost World of the Kalahari* (in Russian), Moscow, 1963, p. 156.

an ethnic community is, the more specific and limited the tokens by which the "we" is distinguished from the "they" and vice versa. This "external" discrimination, as we have stressed, is logically primary in relation to the resulting "internal" unification of a community, which fact is easier traced in the more primitive and smaller groups of people.

Properly speaking, ethnopsychology was originally intended to study such small communities. Its scope widened at a later stage to include the modern nations and groups of peoples, and then races.

And it is in its dealings with this macroworld that ethnopsychology sheds its scientific aura. Bourgeois psychologists specialising in the Scandinavian peoples have no choice than to speak of a "cultural" rather than national character, because the psychic differences between the Scandinavian nations are obscured by the many common traits of culture and character. By contrast, in Indonesia many cultures blend in one nation still in its formative stage.

The only sphere where macroscale ethnic psychology is living up to the hopes of its exponents though the scientific results are still imperceptible, is study of the national psychology of potential war enemies, a flourishing topic of Western war psychological literature. Regrettably, such eminent psychologists as Horer, Benedict and Honingham are closely associated with the idea of psychological indoctrination, with propaganda and help to political agents abroad. In effect, any practical benefits that may accrue therefrom come less under the head of "psychological" and more under that of ideological warfare, i.e., of propaganda and inculcation of ideas. This has no immediate reference to social psychology. Certainly, it is helpful to know the culture, customs and mores of foreign peoples–not only of enemies, but of allies, for this knowledge promotes fruitful intercourse. But that, too, is neither ethnopsychology nor social psychology. When experts sell to military institutions what is purported to be psychological characteristics of nations, they are really palming off their short-sighted customers nothing but trivial nonsense.

It is different when military institutions of imperialist countries employ ethnopsychological knowledge in their colonial and neo-colonial activity. Traditional differences are often inflated to split developing nations, fanning discord among tribes or tribal groups, which only goes to confirm the fact that ethnopsychology applies chiefly to smaller rather than larger communities, and

92

less so to their internal cultural bonds than to their cultural distinctions and exclusiveness.

Now to sum up. For archeology and ethnography culture is never in the singular, but always a relationship of cultures. What occurs is a dual process: cultural dissociation (creation of differences between "we" and "they") and cultural assimilation by borrowing and penetration (partial or complete association in a common "we"). Western authors call the latter process acculturation. In that case cultural dissociation should be called "disculturation". Historically the two never existed separately, though their relative proportion varied.

5. WE

The subjective side of any human community, of every collective, springs from the dyadic or bilateral psychological phenomenon we described as "we and they", by dissociation from other communities, collectives, groups, and a simultaneous mutual identification of the persons in the group. Psychologists also use the terms "antipathy" and "sympathy" (co-experience). However, these terms are too narrow and, moreover, instead of antipathy there may be friendly rivalry, raillery or a simple organisational pattern. Distinction externally and identification internally may also be described in the psychological terms, "negativism" and "contagiosity".

The two aspects should be considered in close association. Practically all series of socio-psychic phenomena have both these sides. Socio-psychic processes bind and, in a way, standardise a community, prompting similar predilections and acts of behaviour. This runs parallel to socio-psychic processes that engender tendencies of opposition to or isolation from other communities by some specific quality.

The two simultaneous processes may be spontaneous or deliberate and ideologically motivated, depending on social conditions. Their material substratum is in the physiology of nervous activity. Among other sources, psychic contagiosity draws on automatic imitation, which developed long ago in our animal forebears; their mysterious mechanism has not been discovered so far. That is the biological basis of contagiosity. A "we" forms from mutual identification, i.e., the action of the mechanism of imitation and contagion, while "they" forms from their inhibition by suppression, imitation or refusal to imitate imposed on

individuals by nature and the environment. All "we" are either overtly or covertly opposed to a "they", and vice versa.

What we see are two fundamental phenomena like, say, excitation and inhibition in the physiology of the higher nervous activity of individual bodies. Identification and dissociation are opposite processes, but they interact and form a variety of combinations. Probably, this accounts for the rich fabric of social psychology. These simple and abstracted elements become as complicated as the social reality.

First, approach the question abstractly and generally. Let A and B be two human communities. The extreme cases of their mutual dissociation would be, first, a minimum of difference, with all other characteristics the same, and second, a minimum of similarity, with all other characteristics different. It goes without saying that this similarity and difference should belong to the socio-psychic sphere, i.e., be fixed and accented by attention and behaviour, in contrast to similarity or difference in physical and material traits, always objectively present. There are, of course, many transitional stages between the indicated extremes, but what we are after here are precisely the extremes.

The first may be illustrated by two teams of workers performing similar tasks in close proximity of each other. For the second extreme picture contact between two distant ethno-cultural communities which have neither a common linguistic medium nor any other means of communicating.

In both cases the "we" is so deeply impressed in the consciousness that the points of distinction from "they" recede into the background and seemingly disappear.

This recession of psychic negativism is, in a way, a synonym for the organisation and solidarity of the given community. The better the internal organisation of a group the more is it opposed to all non-members, not merely specific outsiders. A choir is a group of people singing in unison. It is a "we" opposed to an audience or, on a bigger scale, to all non-singing people.

As soon as a "we" group forms, it can either accentuate or inhibit the emotions or actions of its members. It is the "booster" that "accelerates" an inclination, enhancing and possibly intensifying it many times over.

Co-operation or a job performed collectively bear this out. United force is greater than the sum it composes of individual forces, and not merely due to division of labour, but also to the fact that the individual forces increase. Marx described this

phenomenon in his *Capital.* In a simple union of homogeneous labour by many persons, he wrote, not only their combined power becomes greater than the sum of individual forces (this fact relates to the sphere of production processes), but their contact in the process of work "brings forth emulation and a sort of growth of animal spirits which enhances abilities of individual workers". Marx implies by "animal spirits" that science has not as yet discovered the nature of the psychic mechanism impelling this growth of individual energy through competition in a collective. A few lines lower he suggests an explanation: the fact is, he says, that man is inherently a social animal.[1]

One of the trends in social psychology in the capitalist countries seized on this empirical fact, and the exploiter class was only too happy to supply it lavishly. Reports published by such Western psychologists as W. Meode, H. Herzner and others on the greater intensiveness and higher efficiency of group labour, experimentally confirmed the data of particular interest to employers.[2] Soviet psychologists are also interested in this set of phenomena, although from entirely different social considerations.

One of the elementary concepts of social psychology is that of a social group seen not as an aggregate of individual psychics, but a system either intensifying or inhibiting various aspects of individual psychics. In dealing with this aspect, social psychology can justifiably abstract itself from opposing a community to any other community, the abstraction permitting only an internal analysis of the community.

In so doing, however, we move into that area of social psychology which studies relations between a community and an individual. For the time being, we shall confine ourselves to extremes with no marked opposition between a community and its member (to be discussed in the following chapter), where the prevailing attitude is that of a "we" group, the "they" awareness being so weak or vague as to escape conscious perception.

We have had an earlier example from the historical and ethnographic past of the Tungus hunters. People tattooed their faces and ornamented their weapons to be distinguishable from other clans of the same tribe. Against the setting of this intra-tribalenmity, the need for mutual aid and knitting the clan

1 See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1965, p. 326.
2 H. Herzner, *Human Relations*, Berlin, 1961.

more closely together accentuated the contagiosity of tribal customs, until at last all thoughts of "others" were forgotten and the tribal customs were accepted simply as their "own" or "ours".

The stronger is the awareness of "we" the more widespread are the imitative acts and the mutual contagiosity. And this awareness is the greater the more organised the community is.

In recent years the anti-communist hysteria in the U.S.A. sparked a peculiar campaign in sports. A doctrine appeared, propagated by an organisation, that genuine sports in the world of "free enterprise" implied the sport of individual sportsmen, and that team competition should be boycotted. For the exponents of this obscurantist idea, the popularity of team sports (as though they did not become popular until socialist countries appeared on the map) is a sinister communist gain, for in team sports the "individual dissolves in the collective". They advocated banning team competition, a source of "communist infection".

These ranting champions of individualism forgot that team games are as old as is sport (closely related in ancient times to the art of war). As for the psychology of sport, all sportsmen know that the presence of spectators, especially of fans ("we"), spurs contestants to somewhat better results than they showed in training. But even when practising by himself, the athlete is not really alone, for he consciously or unconsciously imitates rivals or mates or both, running, mentally, with other runners, and picturing the excitement of the spectators.

But what concerns us here is the phenomenon in its pure and tangible form. A team game unquestionably spurs on every player. This has been experimentally investigated and described in textbooks under the head of social psychology. A schoolboy is given a dynamometer and he registers his maximum on it. Then the procedure is repeated in front of his classmates, and the result is invariably higher. Many such experimental methods have been suggested and tried.

Picture yourself in a psychologist's office. That hypnosis and suggestion are more effective in the case of a group of subjects than in the case of an individual, with only the hypnotist and the subject facing each other, is common knowledge. This fact is often exploited in medical practice, for it is held that mutual suggestion by subjects (or spectators) adds to the power of suggestion. Also, effectiveness is the higher the greater the size of the group and, what is more, it increases more rapidly than

the number of persons subjected to suggestion. Furthermore, the effect depends largely on the prestige or authority of the hypnotist in the given environment, or, on the personification in him of the organisation and solidarity of a collective.

Above, we dealt with experiments in the laboratory, in the psychologist's office, and they were necessarily one-sided. But our memory will readily recapitulate a great many situations from life to illustrate the same mechanics.

The athlete in a stadium, the pupil gripping a dynamometer before his class, an actor before an audience and a speaker taking the floor all show an additional margin of skill, wit and expressiveness.

Another example is the age-old mechanism of religious suggestion to a crowd of things such as exaltation, visions, fanaticism, that could never have been suggested to members of the crowd separately.

We know from history that the "we" feeling-fanaticism, sectarian sentiment and bigotry-are exploited for aims other than the interest of people. Religious rites knit people together in communities marked all too frequently by an extreme exaltation of the "we" sentiment.

Was not a similar mechanism employed by the nazis to befog the minds of millions of people? Have not the nazi-staged "endless parades and movements of dehumanised people to the stupefying beat of drums and hysterical ranting trained legions of automatised assassins"?[1]

Similar things, though not as hyperbolised, may be seen in the political practice of the capitalist world, e.g., the election campaigns.

However, this reactionary "we" feeling that goes against the interests of the people is opposed by the historically progressive consolidation of the working masses in the class struggle and the national liberation movements. The working class displayed a strong inclination towards uniting as soon as it stepped onto the historical scene. The large scale of capitalist production was conducive. Workers united first in the enterprises, then in the branches of industry, then on a national scale, and finally in international associations to fight for their economic and political interests. A spirit of unity and solidarity pervades the finest

---

[1] *Problemy sotsialnoi psikhologii* (Problems of Social Psychology). Moscow, 1965, p. 229.

chapters of the history of the working-class movement. The "we" feeling grew into an awareness of the socio-historical necessity of joint action by the workers, their political parties and trade unions.

Movements of the non-proletarian sections of the people, though based on less scientific awareness but still of a high ideological and psychological order, appear, on the scene frequently at times of national unification and liberation, especially in the context of the anti-imperialist struggle.

In socialist society these socio-psychic mechanisms have changed, for it has no intrinsic antagonisms that would breed any objectively or scientifically substantiated particular "we" groups in opposition to other "we" groups. The psychological traits entirely new in socialist society are less tangible to the people there, but strike the eye of foreign observers. Alan Sillitoe, the progressive British writer, for example, made a special note of the fact that Soviet workers as compared with the British have developed a sense of common possession. A Soviet worker, he observed, will say: "We're building new houses", "We're putting up a new factory", whereas, say, a Nottingham worker would say: "They're building. . ." or "They're putting up. . .". In the Soviet Union, Sillitoe added, everybody says "We are building", be it a writer, a city Soviet deputy, boxer, taxi-driver or student.

Though Sillitoe's impression may sound somewhat schematic, it conveys the immense difference between the socio-psychic "we" category in capitalist society, wrecked by class antagonisms, and in socialist society, where no class antagonisms exist.

Yet a socio-historical "we" group is inconceivable without opposition to a "they" group, for the "we" group is no more than an abstraction if viewed in isolation. Consolidation of the working class is not a purely intra-class process, but rather a revolutionary one, i.e., a consolidation in the course of struggle against an antagonistic class, the bourgeoisie, in pursuit of the ultimate aim, the overthrow of capitalist rule. And the unity of the Soviet people can hardly be viewed in isolation from the continuous war danger emanating from the capitalist world or the economic competition and ideological struggle.

However, we have noted that the "they" category does not necessarily imply enmity and war. The closer the people unite in socialist society, the more clearly socialist labour competition emerges as an intrinsic law of socialist growth and progress. From

competition between individuals we soon passed on to collective competition in which inter-team (inter-shop, etc.) "contagion" with labour enthusiasm combined with rivalry between teams, workshops, factories, collective and state farms, districts, etc.

This brings us back to the basic thesis. Neither history nor ethnography know of any groups or communities of people, of any "we" groups, isolated and unopposed to others. It would be out of the natural context to discuss the specific increasing or diminishing influence of a collective or community on the motives or patterns of conduct of its individual members, unless we consider the simultaneous external features distinguishing that collective or community from others. Those are two sides of the same phenomenon.

However, a social psychologist or historian should always remember that these may also be imaginary "they" groups. If a "we" group cannot constitute itself without opposition, it may resort to illusions, fancy, fiction, or fabrication. The "they" group is then imaginary, of which history abounds in examples.

Frequently politicians rallied the social forces by deliberately circulating rumours or false reports of imaginary conspiracies or spies, "Comintern plots" and "the hand of Moscow". The absurd fabrications about Negroes and Jews designed to cement the national "we" whenever it is rent by real antagonisms and class struggles, belong to this imaginary "they" category, the work of racists and anti-Semites. Examples may be cited ad infinitum.

The extremes exemplifying the imaginary "they" are the hosts of invented demons and angels, infernal spirits and divine forces. The social role of these phantoms, among other things, is to replace real "they" groups where these are lacking, in order to form large or small psychic communities. And we may even analyse the concept of deities or the one god from this angle. It will be shown below how a "he" emerges at the junction of the "we" and "they" groups and how that "he" changes into "you". In religion (Christianity, Islam) God is both a "he" and a "you". In relation to the psychic opposition of "we and they" social psychology offers new horizons for a scientific study of the origin and nature of the religious concepts.

In the extreme manifestations, the imaginary "they" is entirely unrelated to real things. In the majority of cases, however, we witness a less pronounced phenomenon: a real trait is hyperbolised, inflated or distorted by the imagination. In this

context the imaginary "they" are a characteristic and widespread socio-psychic phenomenon.

The psychologist must be on the lookout for these "they", imperceptible at first glance. This psychic mechanism is a constant critical gauge for one's own "we": perhaps elements which are camouflaged as "we", but are not really "we" and belong to the "they", have filtered in. This relentless, keen search is absolutely essential. And naturally it is the more intensive the more camouflaged are the alien elements. Accordingly, hostility and alienation may be directed not only at distant cultures or communities, but also at the closest ones almost identical with the "we" culture. Possibly, the socio-psychological opposition of "we and they" is even sharper in relation to these supposed camouflaged "they".

6. MOOD

It will be recalled that all types of socio-psychic community may be roughly divided into stable and mutable, i.e., into psychic make-up and mood. What has been said of "we and they" is also true of the contraposition of any two peoples, any two classes, any two social strata or two professions, and of the contraposition of discontented, antagonistic and militant groups of people to antiquated socio-political systems and their bearers. In both cases external differences stimulate the inner identification; negativism directed at a "they" group stimulates contagiousness among the members of the "we" group.

People gripped by a homogeneous mood and expressing it more or less jointly thus comprise a community. As a rule, mood is manifested not circuitously—through culture and habits reproducing everyday routine—but directly through certain emotions and shifts in the consciousness. Moods are born from contradictions in social being or from objective social conditions. The needs and interests of people come into conflict with the possibilities of satisfying them.

Both the needs and interests are a fairly complex sociological and, simultaneously, psychological concept. Needs are not a purely natural physiological category; they are different in different historical socio-economic and cultural conditions. Moreover, needs are not only material, but include a greater or lesser number of spiritual requirements.

Needs are different in intensity, e.g., there may be an attrac-

tion, a wish, a craze; as soon as the most vital and urgent needs are satisfied, choice and preference grow. Whatever it is, it is always an inclination for something that is lacking. And a need satisfied is a need no longer.

Interests, personal interests and those corresponding to the objective needs and subjective pursuits of a community, are formed by the sum of the persisting stable needs. Class, social, specifically professional and group interests are deeper than personal ones, and at times restrict the latter. In bourgeois society the personal and community interests clash. A paramount feature and task of socialist society is to ensure their harmonious accommodation.

Social interests give rise to social aspirations, ideals, wishes, hopes, some vague, others more or less considered and conscious.

Finally, social moods are an emotional state related to fulfilment or impracticability, to the various phases of the effort making hopes and expectations, plans and designs come true. As a rule, social mood is an emotional attitude towards those who hinder or, conversely, aid in fulfilling desires. They range from purely affected moods to frame of mind and even public opinion.

The group or collective mood attracted the attention of many outstanding scientists, among them V. M. Bekhterev,[1] who endeavoured to create the science of social psychology, the points emphasised being the impulsiveness, dynamics, changeability, hesitation and capacity of moods to turn into actions. Just as mob psychology, moods were chiefly considered in relation to an amorphous mass of people. It is quite true that moods spread rarely among the whole of a stable social community. However, stemming from objective needs and interests, they often seize the majority of a community. Still more important, a mood, in turn, makes and shapes a community, and the more it does so, the more it is enduring and organised, i.e., apprehended and clear.

Passing social moods, which at times affect classes and strata, may change into each other. Moods may be erroneous, as when bred by a false rumour. But the more stable they are the more they represent a "we" group and, therefore, a distinctive social

[1] V. M. Bekhterev, *Predmet i zadachi obshchestvennoi psikhologii kak obyektivnoi nauki* (Subject and Tasks of Social Psychology as an Objective Science), St. Petersburg. 1911; V. M. Bekhterev, *Kollektivnaya refleksologiya* (Collective Reflexology), Petrograd, 1921; L. Voitovsky, *Ocherki kollektivnoi psikhologii* (Essays on Collective Psychology), 2 vols.; Vol. I. Moscow-Petrograd, 1924; Vol. 2. Moscow-Leningrad, 1925.

factor. The higher the degree of social development the greater is the scope for these dynamic communities. Moods may be mainly positive, i.e., answering the hopes and efforts aimed at fulfilling aspirations and ideals. These give rise to class solidarity, national sentiment, revolutionary feeling or the urge for national liberation, labour enthusiasm, confidence and good cheer, high spirits and heroism, patriotism, moral, aesthetic or religious uplift, etc. Moods may be antagonistic when the realities go counter to the aspirations. Discontent, worry, uneasiness, weariness, fear, wrath and indignation are then the characteristic traits. Moods may be specific for an era, as was the lust for reckless and fortuitous ways of enrichment during the period of primary accumulation, the inclination to chivalry and pilgrimages during the era of crusades, and the appetite for refined pleasure or, by contrast, renunciation of creature comforts in the last centuries of the Roman Empire.

B. D. Parygin, a Soviet investigator of socio-psychological problems, describes the nature of a mood thus: "So, a mood is a complex, many-sided and highly impulsive and emotional state of a personality. Group, collective and mass moods, while retaining these traits, possess a number of additional ones, e.g., contagiousness, greater impulsive force, mass character and dynamism. These characteristics make group mood a particularly important link in the formation of social psychology. The impulse of a mood and, at the same time, its response to influence, make it the chief link in remaking the individual's internal world."[1]

There is this extremely important aspect in the social mood: it responds to influence, can be shaped and changed within limits, and it can be mastered. At one extreme, mood is contiguous with action, and at the other with persuasion and propaganda. The people may be educated and guided by means of moods. This is evidence of the potentialities of social psychology for it enables the scholar to analyse the factors producing moods in a class and between classes, in a country and internationally it enables him to analyse national and international emotion-

102

playing a prominent part in our life, to analyse mass enthusiasm and despondency, collective actions and even collective crimes.

In the world of today, the credibility and truthfulness of ideas, their scientific character, are increasingly important as the requisites for mastering moods. Psychologically, this paves the way for the inevitable victory of the progressive forces, for the making of moods and of the actions of the masses is ultimately a contest between the indisputable scientific truth and the refutable untruth.

A mood unites people into a consensus, a "we", but it is also associated with an imaginary ideal "we". People say to themselves, as it were, that they live in an "alien" or "foreign" world. Mass movements against the existing order contained utopian elements. People looked for their true "we" in the remote past, in early Christianity, in the "Golden Age", etc. Or they espied the genuine "we" in our time, on some unknown island or among the unspoilt savages. Also, the genuine "we" was seen somewhere in the future, this being the most realistic and often the most effective form of day-dreaming. In the past people embarked on reforms and revolutions with utopian ideas about an unclouded universal bliss. Bitter was their disappointment when they learned that life was full of contradictions and that some "they" still existed. But utopian ideas gradually gave place to rational scientific thinking. Yet its impact on the mood of the masses did not diminish; on the contrary, it has increased.

However, mood is subject to the influence of consciousness, not as much to the sphere of thought as of emotion.

Emotions and sensations are either pleasant or unpleasant. They are like an electric charge, either positive or negative. On the face of it, it was nature that bestowed this division of sensations on animals and humans. In fact, the similarity of human and animal emotions is but external; physiology has yet to prove that the state of emotional excitation in animals may be described in terms of pleasure and displeasure.

True, many scientists, including the Soviet physiologists P. K. Anokhin and P. V. Simonov, tried to produce a purely physiological theory of pleasure and displeasure. Their discoveries in the physiological substratum of emotions were material. They found that certain emotions corresponded to specific changes in the subcortical sections of the brain and the physiological systems of the body. But they took it for granted that emotions were necessarily a "yes" or a "no", good or bad, pleasant or

unpleasant. An experiment, made at about the same time, which seemingly demonstrated the presence of a "centre of pleasure" in the animal brain (and consequently centre of displeasure), added weight to that theory. An electrode connected to a power source was introduced into the brain of a rat; the rat could itself switch it on and off. Surprisingly, the rat energised the electric stimulator, although it did not signal any biologically useful factors. It was inferred therefrom that the stimulus was one of gratification; in other words, the current excited the rat's "centre of pleasure". A more likely explanation is that electric stimulation caused a hallucinatory gratification of some requirement. As it was illusory and caused no physiological after-effects, the animal resorted to it again and again, ad infinitum. In short, the physiological analysis of emotions was correct, except for the binary division, i.e., the introduction of evaluations attributing positive and negative values. That was a projection by the researcher of his own human psychics.

In humans these positive and negative stimuli stem not from opposite biological, vegetative, vascular or endocrinal antagonistic changes in the organism. Nothing of the kind. One may tremble from joy, anger or fear. One may perspire from horror, shyness or fear. Laughter may not necessarily be evoked by a funny situation; it may be the expression of satisfaction or of a painful or distressing state. A great many different experiences may cause one to blush or pale. Tears express pain, joy, compassion; emotions do not necessarily evoke tears. As Academician K. M. Bykov picturesquely put it, "sorrow not expressed by tears makes other organs weep". This means that an emotion may manifest itself in remote, mediate physiological circuits, causing reactions of pain in internal organs and systems.

As we see, positive and negative emotions are not directly related to their physiological mechanism. How, then, to discern their opposition? Actions are no criteria, for a person can voluntarily submit to pain (a definitely negative sensation) and experience a positive sensation from it. Does this mean only that humans are capable of subordinating pleasant and unpleasant sensations to lofty motives? No, for the nature of the sensations changes. This holds true of animals as well. A dog may be trained to respond positively to pain (e.g., an electric shock) if this is backed by a positive action, such as feeding; it submits willingly to pain in that case. A prominent French surgeon and a writer on the problem of pain, finally rejected his

own propositions and all current theories, for none succeeded in describing and covering the whole range of facts. In short, a person may self-inflict a sharper pain to alleviate the one he is suffering.

Pleasure and displeasure are not physiological concepts; in humans their origin is complexly psycho-ideational; more specifically, it is the effect of fulfilment or failure in attaining goals, ideals and desires. What is happiness? Psychologically it is a coincidence of accomplishments and aspirations. Happiness is of the highest order, joy considerably lower, but also expressive of correspondence between the reality and the dream, the hope, or aspiration. Pleasure is a still lower order, the goal being more vague, though in essence it is basically the same. Therefore, the matter is rooted in designs, ideals, aims, dreams, which are anticipated but as yet non-existent sensations. And in their absence no "pleasant" feelings of emotions are conceivable.

This places the question on a different plane–from the plane of individual psychology to social psychology, which is deeper. Pleasure corresponds to a "we" (existent or potential), while displeasure is representative of a "they". The idea of family bliss, of comfort, happiness, joy, friendship, solidarity, mutual aid, as well as intellectual and aesthetic gratification belong to an imaginary "we", to an aggregate of traits characteristic of a "we" group; they are related to common tradition, imitation, example, precedent, recollection. An unpleasant sensation is disagreeable–as though a person is affected by a "they". When we bruise ourselves, we mutter curses at someone unknown; the child looks for someone to blame for the pain it suffers; a savage is sure to ascribe sickness, death or poor hunting to the ill will of some "they", imagining some remote influence, i.e., sorcery. A savage considers certain occurrences as "they" sorcery; they are negative, causing trouble and displeasure. It is not the occurrences that are "alien" because unpleasant, but unpleasant because "alien".

Naturally, these occurrences are not only what actually distinguishes "we" from "they": they are also that which upsets the "we". The death of a relative is a misfortune, sorrow and grief. It destroys the most direct "we" ties.

Social psychology upsets the accepted pyramid. Ordinarily, in people's minds, the pyramid stands on its apex, not on its base: the "I", the individual, classes his feelings and emotions in two groups. Scientific analysis, however, shows that there is no dicho-

105

tomy of comfort and discomfort, pleasure and displeasure out-
side the "we" and "they" concepts. This unexpected turn taxes
abstract thinking. But it answers Ivan Pavlov's wish "to look
beneath the facts". The socio-psychological contradistinction of
"we" and "they" can penetrate deeply into individual psychics
and become its essence.

Therefore, it is time to consider an individual or a personal-
ity from the standpoint of social psychology.

But first let us conclude that section of social psychology to
which the present chapter is devoted.

Is psychic make-up stable at a given moment, and if so, which
kind is? Or do the more dynamic moods prevail? If so what
kind of moods? This depends on historical conditions and not
on arbitrary will or accident. Objective processes of socio-his-
torical development give rise to corresponding activity among
men. Some historical forces have a stake in checking imminent
changes, others strive to hasten them; the former favour cus-
toms, traditions, continuity of generations, while the latter assist
in arousing moods, particularly those of discontent. In other
words, the science of social psychology looks for the root cause
of both psychic make-up and mood, of relative fixity and mobil-
ity (sometimes impetuous mobility), of the psychic state of
peoples, masses and collectives, in the deep-lying historical and
sociological patterns.

We are operating with generalisations that apply to different
realities and to different circumstances in space and time. The
socio-psychic phenomena and consistent patterns we have consid-
ered—contagiosity and negativism, relations between "we" and
"they" groups, the interaction of individuals with the "we",
stable psychic make-up, negation or destruction of some aspect
of the customary way of life and psychics, the rise and fall of
social psychic activity—may all play not only different but even
opposite roles under various concrete conditions or in different
historical situations. Thus, despite the dogmas of bourgeois social
psychology, human environment may prompt not base actions
only. Depending on concrete social circumstances, one and the
same psychological mechanism may produce trends either posi-
tive or negative, unreasonable or wise and useful to society.

Lenin's masterly evaluation of psychic phenomena in social
movements and revolutionary struggles is what prompts psychol-
ogists to turn to historicism.

106

In a society some sections of the population exert a stabilising action, while others undermine it. What systems, traditions or establishments are the object of these stabilising or undermining activities, i.e., what actions are progressive or reactionary, always depends on concrete historical and social conditions.

Only a deep understanding of historical laws, of the objective causes of mobility and stability, provides firm ground for the science of social psychology both with regard to past and modern times.

7. YOU

We detached the "we" and "they" categories from concrete socio-historical conditions. Although we took examples from contemporary life, however, those two categories existed in a pure state only at the dawn of history. Later times knew neither pure "they" nor pure "we" groups. In primeval times the attitude towards the "they" groups was clearly a negative one: avoidance, isolation, even slaying. Characteristic of "we" groups was association with one's own like, imitative behaviour and collective industry. In reality, however, as time went on the two categories imposed limitations on each other. Hence, any theoretical analysis of the subject of social psychology should also make its next logical step: the dialectics of the "we" and "they" relation leads us to the question of their mutual penetration.

Picture "they" and "we" groups as partially superimposed circles. The superimposed areas come under the head of the "you" category.

They constitute a sphere of intercourse, not of alienation. "You" is not "we", for it is extraneous; at the same time, it is not a "they", for opposition is replaced by mutual attraction. "You" is in a way an acknowledgement that "they" groups are no longer absolute, being capable of partially forming a new community with "we" groups, i.e., a bigger and complex "we" group. This new "we" group is subdivided into "we" and "you" groups, each of the members being "you" to the other. In other words, each group sees in the other "strangers" ("they") and at once "own folk" ("we").

For example, all men are "you" to all women, and vice versa; adults are "you" to children, and vice versa; families or neighbouring tribes, which exchange visits, hold common festivities,

ceremonies, migrations, are also "you" to each other. Phratries held a similar status in the ancient dual tribes.

Our logical progress from "we" and "they" to "you" leaves us in the plural. Historically, this applies to a distant past and even if the category "you" brings us across the threshold of history, we are still no nearer than the Cro-Magnon period. The new psychic mechanism, which then came into being, inhibited the two earlier mechanisms. As time went by, the "you" expanded, became more complex and richer.

Yet logically the "you" was no more than transitional until it gave birth to subsequent ones. We must not dwell too long on the pure "you", for we are prompted at this intersection to pass to the individual as a next stage in the socio-psychological analysis (to lift the curtain somewhat, the next stage will be "he" as represented by the tangent point of the "we" and "they" circles when the latter are again drawn apart to the point of minimum contact).

We discovered on entering the "you" field that every person belongs to two psychic communities at once–to two "we" groups. From now on every person is a personality, a point of intersection of various communities. Among other things he or she must conceal or withhold something now from one and now from the other group, and "inner" life divorces itself from the "external".

However, logically and historically this point is still far away from "I".

The "you" concept is a bridge for us from Chapter II to Chapter III.

Chapter III

COMMUNITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

1. INTERCOURSE AND IDENTITY

Some sociologists may consider this chapter unnecessary. They may hold that socio-psychic phenomena are the subject of scientific study not because of intercourse between individuals, but because individuals live in similar social conditions, producing a more or less similar psychics. In other words, independently of the will or choice of individuals social being determines an identical consciousness based on a similarity of economic conditions and consisting of a) psychology, i.e., a more direct and matter-of-fact reflection of being less dependent on intercourse; b) ideology, which is a more systematic reflection of being and, therefore, more dependent on social intercourse.

None will deny that people maintain relations with each other, particularly people of the same class or stratum. But in the opinion of some sociologists, social psychology would not want in subject matter even if we were to abstract ourselves from this intercourse. Moreover, the subject matter would be more in keeping with the basic concept: people would display similar traits of consciousness if living under identical social conditions. This they define as true social psychology.

The exponents of this kind of sociology cite chiefly–and not accidentally–the example of a small-holding peasant in capitalist society, who may have very little interchange with his likes; however, the general economic conditions make him representative of a certain class and social group, the similarity of living conditions being unavoidably reflected in his consciousness.

This train of thought applies to the peasant's individualistic illusions rather than to a scientifically cognised reality. The situation in which an individual faces the objective conditions of his economic being alone is a Robinsonade. This interpretation of "routine" consciousness is so routine itself that it falls short of the modern level of the psychological science.

The sphere of analysis in social psychology covers statistical series, or phenomena that may be considered subject to statistical patterns. In that case the investigator abstracts himself from the mechanisms and records the results only. The method of opinion polls, questionnaires and tests ascertains the presence in a given environment of particular psychic traits, inclinations or moods, the investigator operating solely with identity, not intercourse or community. How this identity originates does not interest the researcher; he records it as an empirical fact, though more frequently he correlates that fact with some other similar generalised statistical data—socio-economic, educational or cultural. A functional relationship is thus revealed between the two series. Generally, these investigations give no information as to the nature and mechanism of psychic processes, and none is required of them. For all this, their practical usefulness is at times undeniable. Experience in statistical study of public opinion, including its ideological and psychological components, is generally of great value. This falls into the sphere of so-called social investigations or concrete sociology. Opinion polls, questionnaires and tests help obtain an idea of the family budgets of various strata of the population, their time budget, preferences as to the modes of public transport, or the incidence of various diseases. It is readily seen, however, that only part of these statistical series and mean statistical generalisations has any reference to social psychology. And even that part, too, applies to psychic results rather than the mechanisms that produced them.

However, if social psychology is to be an efficacious science, we should thoroughly study the mechanisms governing the formation of singularities in the human psychics in a given social environment. Scientific progress, particularly over the past century, reveals the harm of ignoring the underlying mechanisms of various laws. In biology, those opposing study of the physical and chemical mechanisms behind biological phenomena, which they considered "reduction" of biology to lower forms of motion of matter, were absolutely wrong. Actually, traits specific to biology are in no way trespassed or restricted by the knowledge of physical and chemical processes in living matter. Just as groundless is the fear that social psychology may replace sociological laws with physiological and psychological ones. Social psychology does not encroach on the objective mechanisms of socio-economic life. It studies mechanisms of psychic interaction

between people whose behaviour, in the final analysis, is determined by the action of sociological laws.

We should overlook not only the psychological, but also the social mechanism, provided we took for granted that identical socio-psychic traits in a series of people are due to similar causes and that social interchange has nothing to do with it.

Of course, such series exist. We already know that suicide is, in some respects, a psychic act. It can be studied by means of statistical methods, assuming, generally with good reason, that suicides neither had intercourse with each other nor formed a community, but committed suicide due to more or less like causes. However, even this extreme example is not entirely valid, for although mutual contagion should not be held as one of the determining causes of suicide, a self-murderer is partly guided by the knowledge of similar cases, because certain periods are marked by a real psychic flare-up of suicides initiated to the greater degree by the irresistible force of imitation.

In other cases, the series of identical socio-psychic phenomena are, as a rule, not mutually independent. Generally, however, they form not a simultaneous but chain-like interaction, spreading over a certain span of time. As we have noted, various elements of the social mood evolve in a chain pattern, which does not make it any the less interpretable as a "we".

In sum, socio-psychic community may be classed in four types.
1. A directly observable community is, of course, one in which all its members know each other, or, in the case of a crowd, auditorium or a concert hall, at least see and hear each other. These are the type of community that attracts the bourgeois social psychologist. Actually, however, such community is rare, and interests the bourgeois investigator either as a primitive commune or horde, or as a poorly organised and amorphous assemblage and mob. From the contemporary viewpoint, study of communities such as production teams or personnel of workshops or small enterprises is far more important. Villages and collective farms come under this head as well, and so the classes in school and groups in a university. Reducing the scope of social psychology mainly to this model (however useful it may be) has prompted bourgeois social psychologists to prefer the smallest groups, wrongly termed primary, such as family, group

111

of friends or short gatherings of people in a queue, street, tram, etc.

2. Take the opposite model of community: most of its members do not know each other, are not directly associated, but are conscious of belonging to the community insofar as they possess a common pivot, personifying the given "we", be it a government, party, ideologist, leader, chief, authority or a group of leaders. This is a far more important model, especially if it is a class or nation, in which case the number of people personally acquainted or directly associated with each other is negligible as compared to the aggregate. Needless to say, it reflects only one aspect of life. But we would do well to remember that this type of "centralised" socio-psychic interconnection without direct personal contacts by all is possible and corresponds to a definite reality.

3. A community may exist only in time, not in space, such as a mood passed on from person to person. In the abstract case it spreads not fan-wise but along a chain, which is, as we have said, characteristic in the extreme case of the "we" called mood.

4. The gap between these three types is actually closed in life not only by transitional and mixed forms, but also by acquaintanceship, a small group of people interacting directly within the limits of a large community. The sociology and psychology of acquaintanceship merits close study. Among other things, this applies to ceremonies and the norms of the first acquaintanceship–through the mediation of a third person–giving one's name, touching (hands, lips, nose), "inhalation of the odour" among some peoples, norms and customs for cultivating acquaintanceship by mutual visits, entertainment, gift-making, etc. All these belong to the acquaintanceship category. It is the channels of acquaintanceship that often account for "identity" of opinion, taste, inclination and other psychic traits. Let us go back to the example of the peasants or farmers in contemporary capitalist society. It is certainly true that similar economic conditions explain similar tendencies in psychology and ideology. However, the law does not apply to each peasant separately. Even birds learn to fly from each other, not by themselves. The peasant psychology is shaped by mutual visits, acquaintanceships, festivities, rites and suchlike intercourse. For isolated farmers, living with their families in remote locations, the psychological effect of their rare mutual visits is all the greater. Visiting is an es-

sential concept, one without which the vascular system of socio-psychic intercourse would be inconceivable. It is the vehicle of contagion. That is why a psychologist is usually wrong to infer none but "identical" psychic phenomena. He simply does not see that much is transmitted and formed through interchange and personal contacts between people of the "same circle", as a rule of the same class, stratum, profession, age, possibly sex, religion, political school and nation.

This bridges the imaginary gap between homogeneous and heterogeneous socio-psychic phenomena, shaped by intercourse or an identical state, i.e., by the affiliation of each to the same objective social category. The above four types of community show that even in a large objective community, such as a class or a nation, the social psychology is bred only by mutual communication.

That leaves one more pitfall for those who think that the only conceivable psychology is that of the individual. Teachers testify and investigations confirm that every group of children has a common favourite. And quite often it is not the child promoted to the capacity of unit leader, prefect, or the like. There you are, exponents of a purely individual method of reasoning will say, a girl or boy is attractive and becomes the group darling, others lack his or her qualities and do not become favourites. Hence, the personality lies at the root of everything. There you are, answers the supporter of social psychology, favourites are singled out in every group of children. If this boy or girl goes away, another is bound to take his or her place sooner or later, showing that the given phenomenon of collective psychology is more or less immutable. There are consistent patterns in which individuals change while systems or series of people remain.

We are compelled, therefore, to go back to the idea of statistical laws, but from a different point of view. In contemporary science the concept of statistical, or probability, laws is so vastly important that no historian studying mass phenomena can afford to ignore them. He can no longer regard the mass as an aggregate of personalities or individuals even if he takes into account that the psychics of each is predetermined. Historians need knowledge about the patterns in which individuals are largely interchangeable. These patterns determine the chief traits of individual psychics, and even the necessity for the dissimilarity or uniqueness of personalities.

2. CAN A PERSONALITY EXIST OUTSIDE SOCIETY?

As we have noted in the Introduction it is still debatable whether or not psychical interaction by persons of a community is secondary and subordinated to the psychic of each individual. Might we add that the terms "psychology of the individual" or "general psychology" do not, as we see it, imply extra-social psychics of any kind. In a broader sense, any scientific psychology is social psychology, because the psychic of a person is largely conditioned by the socio-historical environment. It is highly doubtful, if this is disregarded, whether one could pinpoint anything at all, save a description of the brain, its general functions and the types of nervous system.

Our recognition of the fact that "we" and "they" group relationships are deeper and primary to those of "I" and "you" brings us somewhat closer to the answer to the above debatable question. The dyadic relation of "I" and "you", etc., is no element in the social make-up of psychics; it is much rather its essence. Even in laboratory research the subject is exposed to social pressure, because his relative isolation is preceded by the experimenter's instructions and the experiment itself includes some kind of signals from the investigator. As we probe deeper into the mind absorbed in thought, we descend into a crater seething with social forces and the influences of different communities. As noted, even the simplest division of sensations into pleasant and unpleasant is related not only with individual physiology, but also with the "we and they", the "ours and theirs" principle.

It is true that people differ in temperament, character and type of higher nervous activity, which are not given them by the society but rather govern the part people play in society. But that, too, does not determine the personality. By and large, the human personality is formed along patterns laid by the person for himself in the course of development. Always present in human self-consciousness and self-evaluation is the comparison of oneself to one's mental image, adjusting oneself to the image and the image to oneself. The person and the pattern are invariably different, but often adapt themselves rather than otherwise, fitting the personality to the pattern, this creative conception being of the utmost importance. Without self-evaluation, as long as the question "Who am I?" is not asked, no personality exists. The self is aligned against somebody else, real

114

or imaginary, the person surveys his own deeds and thoughts. He either sees the "we" group to which he refers himself or, horror-stricken, discovers a "they" group. No personality exists out of the context of this opposition of self to something dissimilar or to images of some human community. What is then primary?

The following example may help explain two possible approaches to this problem: Marx's observation that intercourse and competition between workers in a textile mill adds to their energy and individual capacity admits of two interpretations. One psychologist will say that this generates nervous excitation raising the worker's productivity above his usual level. The other, drawing on an explanation suggested by Marx, will argue that man is inherently a social animal and that the contact in joint labour enlarges the individual capacity simply because absence of contact depresses it below the worker's natural level.

Psychological science is in no position as yet to commit itself on this controversial issue. But some of the notions hindering fruitful investigation can now be eliminated on reliable factual evidence.

It has long been a matter of speculation whether a human being entirely cut off from birth from other humans would develop speech, a mind and various faculties, and whether a normally developed human isolated on a desert island or elsewhere would retain, or even develop, his human qualities.

The propaedeutic of social psychology should necessarily include the facts that provide empirical answers to the above questions.

In the 18th century the eminent naturalist Carolus Linnaeus, the first to class humans (*Homo sapiens*) in the animal kingdom, singled out as a species the "wild man" (*Homo ferus*) as exemplified by the then known few instances of children brought up by wild animals. Although Linnaeus did not concern himself with the essence of the leap from animal to human, his introduction of Homo ferus set the question almost pointblank. A few cases were known in the Middle Ages. By Linnaeus's lifetime their number grew considerably, and some were recent and fairly authentic. He concluded that a "wild man" lacked the faculty of speech and had no human consciousness, and moved about on all fours.

Save a few details, Linnaeus's description of children nursed by animals was generally correct, and later corroborated by new

finds, although each was a rarity–an invaluable experiment made by nature and a strange concurrence of circumstances.

To date, known cases add up to over thirty, the most recent one dating to 1956.[1]

In all the known authentic cases the "kidnapers" and "tutors" were wild animals, mostly wolves, and in a few cases bears and even a leopard. Press reports of children borne away and brought up by monkeys, proved false. The Tarzan story, therefore, has no biological corroboration, whereas Rudyard Kipling's story of Maugli, though refracted through a literary prism, has its origin in tales known to the people of India.

But why predatory animals only? For this there is a biological basis: losing its young for some reason, a female that carried off a child for food (Indian women often leave their infants at the edge of the forest when doing field work), succumbs to its maternal instinct. It gives milk to the baby, then repeats the procedure and protects the "adopted" child as its own. The decisive factor, however, is that wild animals feed their young with meat after the suckling period. This instinct of predatory animals–the "foster parents"–saved the life of many an abducted child. By virtue of the adaptability of its human brain the child learned the cries and actions eliciting desired responses in animals, compelling them to feed it over the space of two, three or more years.

No case is known of these "boarders" ever living in the den or pack to adult age. Yet they hung on to their "foster parents" for several generations of natural offspring–"step-brothers" and "step-sisters".

Why did they move about on all fours? Chiefly, we think, because by trial and error they learned that the quadrupedal posture was the most acceptable to their predatory "breadwinner". The erect posture might have evoked the latter's defensive reflex and weakened the feeding reflex. Besides, we teach our children to walk at a certain age, their anatomy and physiology being adaptable to bipedal locomotion on condition that demonstration and instruction are employed at the right time.

The nervous system of the miraculously surviving children showed an astonishing degree of adaptability to the unusual

[1] For the latest list see Lucien Malson, a French social psychologist's *Les enfants sauvages: mythe et réalité*, Paris, 1964.

natural environment. Possibly, they owed this to instincts inherited from ancient *hominidae* that lived among animals and latent in normal human development. Whatever the case, the invisible, unconscious but powerful functions of the nerve tissues of the human brain kept them alive for many years.

A sorry sight they were, however, when hunters discovered them in the dens of killed beasts!

In the Cachar mountains in India, villagers killed two cubs in the den of a leopard. Two days later the she-leopard bore away a two-year-old boy from their village. Three years passed. In 1923 hunters killed the she-leopard and found in her lair, beside its young, a five-year old boy. He moved about on all fours and proved quite at home in the jungle. The skin on the palms of his hands and knees had thickened, while his toes were almost at right angles to the soles. His body was covered with scars and scratches. He pounced upon a hen, tore it to pieces and devoured it in extraordinary haste. Gradually, he grew accustomed to the human environment and stopped biting. In three years the boy learned to walk upright but still preferred to move about on his fours. He learned to eat vegetable food, but some incurable eye disease, culminating in blindness, hindered his "humanisation". He died shortly after.

Among the best known cases is the discovery in 1920 in India of two girls among a litter of wolf cubs in a wolf's lair. One girl was seven or eight, the other about two years old. Sent to an orphanage, they moved about like quadrupeds, and only at night. During the day they slept in a corner, cuddling against each other like cubs, and obviously preferred the company of dog cubs to that of human playmates. At night they howled like wolves, and made several attempts to flee to the jungle. Teachers endeavoured to "humanise" them, but the younger girl, called Amala, died a year later. The elder one, Kamala, lived another nine years. It took almost five years to teach her to walk upright. Slowly, she learned to understand human speech and speak. It appeared that all the resources of her brain had been spent on adapting to an altogether different environment. At seventeen her mental development was that of a four-year-old child.

A similar condition was observed in other saved children.

A boy, believed to have lived six or seven years in a wolf pack, was discovered in the Indian jungle in 1956. Although nine years old, he was mentally a nine-months-old baby. Lucknow Ramu, as he was named, began walking upright and showed

signs of regaining command of his wrists and ankles after four years in a hospital under constant medical care. Gradually, he accustomed himself to dealing with humans and the human diet, giving up the habit of eating raw meat.

This throws light on the gulf between even a highly developed animal and man. No matter how a human brain is anatomically superior and more complex than that of any animal, all it possesses is a potentiality of speech and thought. It may be compared to a motor, which needs electric current to function. This, eliciting speech and consciousness, is a highly specific kind of power–the human capacity for communication, without which man is nothing but an animal, however well adapted to the environment.

Now take the reverse case: can the human brain carrying this "human" charge, lose that charge and degrade to animal level?

No, the facts show that "humanisation" is an irreversible process.

There have been sensational reports in the press about men who lived for years in enforced or voluntary solitude, losing the faculty of speech, consciousness, even human appearance. There have been reports, too, that wearing no clothes, their bodies became covered with hair. These stories proved false, for invariably they gave the name and other particulars of the "wild man", this invalidating the claim of his losing speech and memory, since it was he who had communicated information on the duration and circumstances which led to his isolation.

The idea that a man may become completely "wild" is unscientific, it is deeply hostile to science, much like a superstitious belief. Man does not lose his speech or his thought faculty for lack of intercourse with other humans. That may occur only through pathological malfunctions of the brain. Psychopathology and psychiatry attribute partial or complete loss of these fundamental deep-rooted human faculties to anatomic and physiologic changes, much as dermatology and endocrinology attribute abnormalities of the integument to natural agents. Medicine rejects the idea of such effects being produced by isolation, asceticism, or any other unusual mode of life.

Certainly, man does not flourish in isolation as did the fictional Robinson Crusoe; he then becomes coarser inside and out, forgetting many of the refinements of life. His speech may become poorer, his mental powers will be concentrated on physical self-preservation or–if an anchorite–on introspection, repetition of a

118

stock of thoughts or on prayers. In sum, he may lose a part of his original spiritual potential, but never does he part with all of it. In this context, it is more important to underscore again the authentic facts demonstrating the opposite. Over the centuries tyrants threw revolutionaries, malcontents, rivals and traitors into dungeons for life or long terms of strict isolation. Written sources contain not the slightest evidence of any of them being incapable of speech, of articulate sounds, of their bodies growing hair, although, indeed, on release they were bearded, dishevelled, emaciated, sometimes blind or demented. There is written evidence to the contrary: of people preserving exalted thoughts and feelings, and their spiritual charm during their long solitary incarceration.

Insanity brought on by seclusion is a dislocation of mental and oral functions rather than a return to an animal state. The ability to distinguish phonemes, both heard and spoken, to link the phonetic form of a word with its inner form and sense, once acquired by an individual brain, is never lost.

Thus, criminals hiding from justice, lepers isolated from society, shipwrecked voyagers, lost travellers, prisoners in dungeons do not become "savages", as ignorant people would have us believe. If anything to that effect could be established, it would be a revolution in science; social psychology would be irremediably destroyed, or, more broadly, the whole of contemporary psychology would assume the opposite orientation.

That will never happen, though it is best to explain the error of these tales of men becoming savage to the point of losing their human appearance, hiding in mountains or forests, be it over the span of a single life or, in the case of couples, for several generations.

That idea goes counter to Marxism. The Marxist knows that man is a "social animal" by nature, while the notion of "man going savage", losing speech, overgrown with hair, derives from a hyperbolised individualistic conception of human nature. No, an individual, once he has grown up in a human milieu and has been initiated in social intercourse and behaviour, carries his qualities with him as his essence. This applies also to cases where he is forced to live in complete isolation, away from a collective or community. Marx wrote: "What is to be avoided above all is the re-establishment of Society as an abstraction *vis-à-vis* the individual. The individual *is the social being*. His life, even if it may not appear in the direct form of a *communal* life carried

119

out together with others—is therefore an expression and confirmation of social life."[1]

Now we have come closer in our quest to what is primary, social or individual psychology. True, the above is not the solution. Our continuing search should build on Marx's famous adage: "Man is literally a *zoon politikon*, not only a sociable animal, but an animal which can isolate itself only in a society."[2]

3. SOME INFORMATION ABOUT SPEECH AS A MEANS OF INTERCOURSE

The reader will recall that the preceding chapter began with the question whether or not, generally speaking, social or collective psychology is conceivable at all, since the material substratum of every psychic phenomenon is the functioning of the brain of an individual, a brain enclosed in an individual cranium. Let us look at this again.

Among information conveyed from the outside world to the human brain some is of so peculiar a nature that it seems to explode this cranium. When a dog, cat, or horse hears and "understands" some human word, for the animal this word is essentially the same stimulus as any other of non-human origin. The signal may be indicative of food, pain, danger, and the like. Most of the human signals, on the other hand, belong in a plane different from that of other outside signals.

Therefore, social psychology cannot afford to ignore the lower level of human intercourse. The ways and means for humans to influence each other are multiform and complex, and may include economic, political and ideological factors. This lower level is the one without which men could not communicate with each other and which underlies all complex forms of human relations and interactions. It includes speech, i.e., oral or written communication with the aid of linguistic systems, mimicry and pantomime, external display of emotions and various other systems of signs.

A cursory examination will reveal that human sign systems

---

[1] K. Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. Moscow, 1967. p. 98.

[2] K. Marx. *To the Critique of the Political Economy* (in Russian), Moscow, 1949. p. 194.

differ from those with which nature endows animals and humans, or, more precisely, which they are able to gather from nature. Seen from this angle, the conventional term of cybernetic "information" may seem somewhat anthropomorphous, because it is borrowed from practical life where it denotes a voluntary act of information transmitted from someone to someone, rather than simple acquisition of knowledge. In everyday life we say: sensation, perception, observation, experience. But those are mere terms, mere conventionalities. Human sign systems are intended for information in the narrow sense of the word, i.e., as purposive actions by a person on another person.

To begin with, sign systems are replaceable in principle as they do not belong to the signified object as its objective characteristic. At present there are over two thousand languages and, therefore, an equal number of equivalent and interchangeable signs to denote things, relations and notions. A language is laden with synonyms or means of synonymic nature, enabling people to denote an object by using different words. Proper names may be replaced by descriptive phrases. Gestures, mimicry, expression of emotions may be rendered by words or other conventional movements.

Second, what the signs convey may be signified otherwise; intentional omission may be as expressive: silence as an answer to a direct question and silence as a response to inducement have two different meanings. The former case is a refusal to communicate information, the latter a readiness to act ("silence gives consent"). A pause, too, may be highly expressive; it serves a definite psychophysiological purpose in the process of suggestion. Pauses, in fact, carry a semantic load, much as punctuation marks (i.e., pauses) in written speech. Hence, silence is not merely absence of speech; frequently, it is inhibition or nullification of speech or even anti-speech. Does not the absence of an expected smile or welcoming gesture carry great expressive power? Do we not attach importance to the fact that in a particular situation someone fails to show the customary signs of shame, anger or joy?

Speech is by far the most important among all the sign systems of human intercourse. Ivan Pavlov said the human factor is the strongest stimulus, and this is largely applicable to speech. It may even be said that speech is a super-stimulus, superior to others not only quantitatively and not only by its impact on the nervous system. Words are capable of destroying

121

what the first signal system so painstakingly evolved: the conditioned reflex relationships, which are products of the higher nervous activity, and even inborn, hereditary unconditioned reflexes. They can disrupt the seemingly dependable physiological functions of the body, sweep them away, transform them into opposites, disperse or reshuffle them. In a certain sense, this powerful stimulus opposes all the others. All human biological instincts can be transformed, effaced, or replaced by their opposites through the agency of speech, the second signals system. That is the pitfall which critics of social or collective psychology fall into.

Formerly, general psychology (psychology of the personality) attached little importance to the psychology of speech. Even the psychology of thinking was treated independently, especially the sections dealing with will, associations, emotions and perceptions. Today, the psychology of speech is becoming a central concept of the psychology of the personality.

Credit goes to the eminent Russian psychologist, L. S. Vygotsky, for this change in approach. His successors, A. R. Luriya and A. N. Leontyev, and their assistants, followers and laboratory staff have also done much in this respect.

They found that speech determined psychic processes not only where this was immediately observable. Speech sank deep into the human mind. External speech, either pronounced and heard or written and read, could turn into silent, "covert" speech. The modern highly sensitive electrophysiological techniques of recording bio-currents flowing in the organs of speech, reveal that subvocal speech is a weakened variety of speech as such. When turning over a problem in one's mind, recalling a piece of poetry, deliberating on questions and answers, one speaks though uttering no sound. Speech is then geared down. It has been discovered that thinking is accompanied by a certain excitation of the organs of breathing (an essential component of oral activity), the larynx, palate, tongue and lips. This enables researchers to look deep down into the psychology of thinking. There is no thinking without speech. But the deaf-and-dumb think. How? Some incompetent explanations have obscured the matter. The question is simple: the deaf-and-dumb have the faculty of speech. We turn our language into that of conventional finger signs or facial muscles and we teach the deaf-and-dumb this language much as we teach phonetics to normal children. The essence, therefore, lies

merely in the translation of one system of signs into another. As in normal people, the curtailed speech of the mute transforms itself into reduced internal speech, not visually perceived but detectable by instruments recording the bio-currents.

Conversion of external speech into covert is just one of the many aspects involved in the transition from interpersonal intercourse to the inner world of a person. L. S. Vygotsky follows other psychologists in describing the subsequent phase as "internalisation". Assume that at first a child hears an order, repeats it and does as it is bid. In the second phase it does not repeat the order aloud, and in the third it needs no urging, having adopted the order as a rule of conduct. He who overlooks these scientific observations and conclusions, may begin at the wrong end and construe that because of its propensities and personal rules, a child accepts certain suggestions and instructions more readily than others, this being reflected in its vocal interchange with the tutor. There things are turned on their head.

The aforesaid touches on a highly debatable issue in so-called genetic psychology, i.e., the psychology of the development of speech and thinking. Jean Piaget suggests that a child's speech and thinking develop from an initial "egocentricity", i.e., from the soliloquy of an isolated individual to a gradual "socialisation"; Marxist psychologists suggest the very opposite, i.e., a gradual "internalisation". By now Piaget has partially renounced his views and follows a middle-of-the-road trend.

Today, investigations of subvocal and internal speech are at their peak, though the chapter on this subject is yet to be written into science. What has been achieved so far in the Soviet Union and elsewhere reveals internal speech as a far more universal basis of human psychics than former generations of psychologists dared think.

This indicates, among other things, that there is no direct transition from either the sounds or cries of an animal or infant (before it learns to speak) to speech, or from habits and deliberate actions by even the highly organised animals to the human mode of thinking. The eminent French Marxist psychologist Henri Wallon showed in *From Action to Thinking* the gulf between these two categories.

Actually, the invasion of specific systems of human intercourse into the higher nervous activity does not make them an annex or a superstructure; it is a revolution.

123

The origins of human speech are still shrouded in mystery. Only a few hints have been found so far. We can note two points illustrating this qualitative leap. A vocal signal invariably performs not only a positive but also a negative function: it forbids something. And there is reason to believe that this interdictory function is the older, being threefold:

1. A name or designation "replaces the object" in the sense that it also cancels reflexes directly evoked by this object. The word or gesture forbids handling the object, manipulating it, even touching it, not until then does it prescribe certain limited and deliberate actions. As we see, there is a phase between "action and thought" (H. Wallon) in which a word cancels or forbids action. This phase is observable in the speech-forming processes of early childhood and in certain psychic disorders in adults, laying bare the ancient evolutionary layers of our second signal system. This is underlying substance of the seemingly simple statement that "to man a word replaces the object which it defines". And the fact is that cancellation preceding replacement is an act of human intercourse.

2. In a conversation or any other oral interchange there is an elusive interdiction to repeat the question or words of the collocutor. However, as psychological and physiological investigations show, this urge is very strong. Accurate measurements of the speed of various vocal reactions have shown that repetition of somebody's utterances is the swiftest response of the nervous tissue of the brain, providing definite proof, too, that it is the most ancient. Repetition is highly significant in the formation of speech in an infant, for, failing to repeat what adults say, it would never learn to speak. A symptom called echolalia is observed in hysteria and other neuroses and local disorders of the frontal lobes of the brain. Questioned or given a command, the patient reiterates the instruction more or less automatically, while failing to execute the order or give a sensible reply. This echolalic response is a separation of speech as a vehicle of intercourse from semantic information. That sort of conversation is senseless, though we may safely assume that in the initial stages of human evolution it performed a biologically defensive role. Imagine a dog repeating its master's order "stop" and continuing to do whatever it was doing! What we are driving at is that repetition was a sort of defensive rejection of an order or command. Physiologically it drew on the astonishing capacity of the nervous system to reproduce

the actions of another body. Now a reverse inhibition is imposed on this rejection in human intercourse: one must not mock one's collocutor, for this would carry human intercourse beyond the bounds of a semantic or conscious relationship.

3. Every word spoken, written or thought forbids or "bars" many other words. It may be said to be in conflict with any other word, including those of almost similar form or meaning, though liable to alter ever so slightly the further flow of speech. Variants are continuously eliminated and suppressed. On rejecting all the other words, the word fuses with its own one and only precise meaning. Erratic choice of words is observed in the earlier stages of a child's development, growth of intellect and education.

Furthermore, the instrument of oral intercourse is able to give the signs a different colouring. Elementary particles of a language, e.g., a phoneme, letter, syllable or intonation, can change the meaning of an utterance; at the same time some of their modifications fail to perform the logical function of an elementary linguistic particle, but may serve as elementary particles differentiating one dialect from another and, therefore, "one's own folk" from "strangers".

These three negative functions of words remind us in a broader sense of the socio-psychological opposition of "we" and "they". By its semantic and positive aspect, the word is oriented on the world of things. Its negative aspect, elusive but very deep-rooted, belongs to the world of human relations, particularly negative relations. And by now we know that negativism is characteristic of relations with "they" groups, although it has broad scope ranging from war and hostility to mere competition.

The taboos are never absolute. Some part of what is banned always remains. This surviving grain plays a part in the structure of speech and thinking. Sometimes, and the history of culture and social psychology bears this out, this grain germinates, bearing strange fruit, the origin of which eludes comprehension.

Earlier we mentioned a peculiar phenomenon in the psychology of speech—echolalia, an involuntary repetition of words spoken by another person. Its repression and elimination does not imply at all that it vanishes. Repressed in the direct form, it produced offshoots that grew into psycho-cultural phenomena in their own rights.

125

In many ethnographical phenomena the psychologist will espy echolalical origins. Take the repetition by generation after generation of tribal legends and myths. For us of a higher degree of civilisation it is hard to comprehend the stability and accuracy of repetition of long strings of names of ancestors or of tales about campaigns and migrations sometimes taking hours to recount. What partly helps to remember these names and tales is their poetic form. Transformed echolalia thus produces the "memory of the people", their oral epic legends. Thor Heyerdahl was baffled by the exact knowledge Polynesians displayed of their remote past, a knowledge that survived because no one ever ventured to introduce the slightest change in the words passed on from generation to generation, literally "from mouth to mouth", bypassing thought.

Another ramification of echolalia is the verbatim communication of information not in time but in space, or what the dwellers of steppes and deserts call the "long ear". Nowadays, most people, however remotely settled, get information simultaneously with others through newspapers, the radio and television. Formerly, this information was relayed from mouth to mouth, and, surprisingly, reached the remotest addressee in almost exactly its original form. In modern societies, rumours play a part in social psychology, but the echolalic basis is so weakened that almost everyone changes something in the information he passes on.

One more echolalia derivative. Take the role of a choir, of collective speech, in ancient cultures and rites. The choir is echolalia condensed to simultaneity. There is no semantic interchange among the performers, for no information is transmitted. Yet a choir is probably the most expressive example of what social psychology calls a "we" group.

The second point, illustrating the qualitative leap from the higher nervous activity of animals to human speech and thinking is that speech and thinking represent an inherently specific human structure from the earliest age.

The simplest conscious speech (purely emotional interjections excepted) is, according to linguistics, a binomial or dual act. One-element speech does not exist. One-element acts of speech may alter the sense of a word or utterance, but are insufficient to be bearers of sense, information, meaning.

A binomial act of speech is called a syntagma. It is immaterial whether the syntagma is a combination of morphemes

in a word or a combination of words in a very simple clause or a combination of an oral complex and a pause. The relationship of elements in a syntagma is defined generally in modern linguistics as a combination of the "determinable" and the "determiner".

However, within the framework of formal linguistics we could not evaluate properly the discovery that human thinking possesses a characteristic structure from the moment it appears.

This discovery we owe primarily to Henri Wallon, who described and analysed in Vol. I of his fundamental work, *Les origines de la pensée chez l'enfant* (The Origin of Thinking in a Child), the initial thinking or, we might even say, the prethinking, i.e., the formation of binomial combinations or pairs. But for this mechanism, objects and external events would, Wallon avers, have formed just an amorphous string of psychic phenomena, lacking a real basis for association. As he saw it, these "couples" are definable at the very sources of thought. "The elementary particle of thought is this binary structure itself and not the elements which compose it," he writes. "Duality precedes unity. A pair or dyad is antecedent to the isolated element."[1] Any conceivable series, and any common concept generally, is reduceable to simple pairs. Wallon observed this elementary binary thinking in children, but maintains that it is also in a way a limit of the degradation of thinking in adults; moreover, it is detectable in some mental disorders, when it is probably best visible.[2]

Wallon maintains, and with good reason, that this formation of pairs does not encompass association of objects or terms either by similarity, contiguity or contrast. The logical nature of these pairs is that they are elementary, not binary, i.e., their essence is the bridge between the shores: the pair is precisely the structure outside of which the associated elements cannot be conceived or represented separately. The psychic mechanism of this operation, Wallon holds, is still to be explained.

We may add that physiology, too, has not yet found an approach to this problem. This mental operation, known as a binomial combination in genetic logic, is something entirely different from what physiology describes as a conditioned reflex or temporal relationship. Elements joined in a binomial

[1] H. Wallon, *Les origines de la pensée chez l'enfant*, t. I, Paris, 1945, p 41.

[2] Ibid., pp. 100-01.

combination may either be linked by an objective relationship or be poles apart, i.e., be an absurdity, which is a specific possible product of the human brain.

We shall return to this problem of psychology and logic elsewhere. For the moment, we must stress that we are dealing with a phenomenon that is in a way opposite to echolalia. Take paraphasia, signifying incapacity of repeating the necessary word and the use in its stead of a different word, one that may or may not be related to the former by association. It is paraphasia that may be tied in with the most ancient layer in the formation of human logic, reflected in the emergence of binomial combinations, pairs, dyads. We should stress, however, that on the whole their physiological and psychological nature is still a mystery.

One thing is clear: these rudimentary mechanisms of speech and language, of thinking and absurdity, did not originate in an isolated individual mind. They cannot be inferred from the evolution of the functions of the central nervous system of a separate body. They are a product of intercourse between individuals and, in the final analysis, a product of relationships between communities, not individuals.

For a linguist (interested only in signals comprehended and acknowledged) lack of understanding is something he allows himself to overlook, while for the social psychologist incomprehension is an important aspect of oral intercourse typical of human relationships. Incomprehension is part of the relationship of languages and cultures.

Incomprehension is classifiable in four divisions: 1) the phonetic, when the set of phonemes at the listener's command is different from the speaker's and the sounds mix for the listener into an incomprehensible stream. This may range from slight phonetic incomprehension (e.g., different pronunciation of some words) to complete incomprehension, with the result that group A is to a certain extent protected from the oral influence of group B. Indistinguishable words may cause laughter or annoyance instead of the reactions the speaker seeks to evoke. 2) The semantic, when a group of people speaking slang or a dialect uses conventional words to denote some other notion and object, or when the same word has a different meaning in two related languages, such as Russian and Polish. Generalising these two examples, we might infer that the semantic division of incomprehension is an artificial or historically developed

means designed to hamper oral interchange. 3) The syntactical, when one is under an obligation to understand and, therefore, respond by an answer or action only to that verbal address which corresponds to an accepted grammatical structure. If the speaker fails to conform to this convention, one may legitimately treat him as ignoramus or stranger, and in cases of gross solecism refuse to find sense and ignore his words. 4) The logical, when no obligation devolves to heed another's words if they contain no logic. Self-contradictory speech evokes laughter or irritation. It is like catching and exposing an "alien" or "stranger" who camouflaged himself.

Phonetic, semantic and grammatical differences are sometimes responsible for partial incomprehension between neigbouring linguistic and cultural communities, but the deeper they become the higher rises the barrier to verbal interchange. This is why social psychology focusses on the plurality of languages and dialects, that complex mish-mash of "we" and "they". The language a child learns from his parents is not only a means of communication but also of protection (by way of incomprehension) against the oral influence of outsiders. Linguistics never approaches its subject from that angle.

4. CONTAGION: IMITATION AND SUGGESTION

As we have indicated, the structurally simplest "we" groups offer considerable play to such socio-psychic mechanisms as mutual contagion. In the West, this gave rise to a school that confined the subject of social psychology to the problem of contagion.[1] Beyond doubt, that psychic phenomenon is deep-rooted and ancient.

But what is probably most typical of contemporary social life is the individual's refusal to yield to involuntary contagion. The higher the level of human society the more critical man is of the forces inducing him automatically to perform certain actions. We have noted that every person belongs at once to

[1] G. Tarde, *Les lois de l'imitation. Étude sociologique*, Paris, 1890, G. Tarde, *L'Opinion et la foule*, Paris, 1901; L. Voitolovsky, *Ocberki kollektivnoi psikhologii v dvukh chastyakh* (Essays on Collective Psychology in Two Parts), Part I, Moscow-Petrograd, 1924; Part II, Moscow-Leningrad, 1925; E. S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, 3rd ed., New York-London, 1942; H. Herzner, *Human Relations*, Berlin, 1961.

many communities, to many "we" groups. None can therefore monopolise his mind to the total exclusion of the others; he is, as it were, continuously selecting the "we" group that will for the moment determine his behaviour and feelings. In other words, an educated man requires persuasion; in his case, automatic contagion is weak or altogether ineffective. However, when it coincides with his convictions, he submits to the contagion of a human milieu, of a "we" group.

The reader's memory surely contains many relevant examples, from the most lofty, such as mass heroism in the battle lines sparked by some individual example or battle cry, or such as labour enthusiasm among workers at building sites and factories, to such trifling psychological facts as the mutual contagion of excitement at a football match. Contagion is present also in a weaker and often elusive form in our daily life, in all history, and the more remote the date the more denuded its form.

Two essentially different phenomena–defined as imitation and suggestion–are distinguishable in the psychic contagion of collectives and communities.

Speech is almost the only vehicle of suggestion. Imitation is usually imitation of actions, acts, mimicry and pantomime and dress; imitation of speech–be it involuntary (echolalia) or deliberate–is a particular instance of imitation. In other words, suggestion is exclusively human, while imitation is traceable to a physiological phenomenon common to all higher animals, though it may be of a specifically human nature.

Physiologists have pondered and discussed the act of imitation in the context of its mechanics. An animal only sees how another similar creature responds to an external stimulant, but does not itself experience the effects of this stimulant. This is sufficient, however, to induce a like motor reaction.

It is indeed unclear how watching another animal becomes a stimulant for "a like" reaction with the "same" limb, the head or the body. How does a body identify itself with the one beside it? No solution is yet available. However, the biological usefulness and adaptive impact of this mechanism are very great and evident. It aids in the preservation of progeny and is stronger in younger than adult animals of many species. This instinct of imitation was studied by zoologists and zoopsychologists in gregarious animals, and is hence sometimes described as the "gregarious instinct".

Bourgeois psychologists applied to human society the biological

concept of gregarious instincts and the gregarious conduct of animals. This vulgar "biologisation" of qualitatively different phenomena naturally did to science nothing but harm. Man is descended from animals, it is true, and belongs to the animal kingdom by virtue of the chief characteristics of his body organisation, but he also possesses certain altered behavioural mechanisms, the evolution of which took millions of years. What is of particular interest is that they underwent changes; but more important is that they were supplemented, replaced or forced out by other mechanisms typical of social man only.

The scope of imitation is remarkably broad. We simply do not notice that elements of imitation are present in any ordinary intercourse. The pattern of our daily routine is largely based on imitation: the food we eat, the clothes we wear, the homes we live in and the utensils we use are all imitated. Unconsciously people adopt the manners and habits of others, this being more intensive in children and less so as people grow older. Education is partially based on imitation: repeating the teacher's explanation, imitating other pupils, following good examples. Learning to speak and learning a foreign language is imitation. Learning a trade, art and sport is based mostly on "demonstration", an imitative mechanism. Imitation is an indispensable element of many phenomena in labour and social life.

Verbal contagion, i.e., suggestion, depends on a more complex psychic mechanism.

It is therefore natural for social psychology to concentrate more on oral contagion or suggestion, and not on non-oral and non-signal contagion, although these too play their part, at times unconscious and at times refracted through the prism of consciousness and persuasion.

The essence of suggestion is that if there is an absolute and unconditional trust–in other words, an absolute "we" group–words necessarily convey the images, ideas and sensations which the speaker implies; the explicit clarity and force of these suggested ideas provoke actions as necessarily as if they were elicited by direct observation and knowledge and not through the medium of another person.

Every speaker suggests something, although not every oral suggestion is accepted as such, for nearly always there is evidence of an opposite psychic activity, i.e., critical appraisal and comparison with something else.

Thus, the meaning of the term "suggestion" in a broader sense differs from that which the word has in common usage. Commonly, suggestion implies something related to medicine, and is, moreover, confused with hypnosis. However, medical suggestion (hypnotic or non-hypnotic) is a particular field. Medically, there are three types or forms of suggestion: 1) in hypnotic sleep; 2) in natural sleep; 3) in a waking state. It is the third type of suggestion, too broad for the narrow bounds of medicine proper, which directly concerns social psychology. The first two forms of suggestion are mentioned here merely to illustrate an artificial condition bordering on a complete absence of a critical attitude to words. This could be described as a special physiological medium, eliciting absolute or almost absolute confidence between people when the power of suggestion of the word is purest. Social psychology has no relation to the first two types of suggestion; its entire attention is devoted to suggestion in a waking state.[1]

The other form of suggestion is known as autosuggestion. Individual psychology recognises self-encouragement, self-command, self-excitement or their opposites, such as control of actions or emotions by talking to oneself, under one's breath or aloud. This brings us back to the previous paragraph: speech, usually an external means of intercourse among people, may be so-called subvocal speech, added proof that the power of oral suggestion is boundless so long as distrust or opposition is eliminated.

In the broad sense, suggestion is an universal means of psychic relationship, identical to comprehension of words and speech: every word in a "known" language necessarily evokes a corresponding mental image, this becoming the motive for an action. The clearer the image the greater the urge to act. A known word or a suggested image is one and the same thing.

Therefore, all speech addressed to an individual or group is suggestion which often, from childhood, evokes a negative response.

Non-suggestibility is distrust. Refusal to comply with a verbal suggestion occurs in three cases only: 1) a foreign language is

[1] See V. M. Bekhterev, *Rol vnusheniya v obshchestvennoi zhizni* (Role of Suggestion in Social Life), St. Petersburg, 1898; V. N. Kulikov, "Voprosy psikhologii vnusheniya v obshchestvennoi zhizni" (Questions of Psychology of Suggestion in Social Life), *Problemy obshchestvennoi psikhologii* (Problems of Social Psychology), Moscow, 1965.

used (lack of connection between phonetics and images); 2) a solecism by the "suggestor", with the resultant absence of semantic contact and logic; 3) a paradoxical reaction, in particular a negative one, typical of functional disorders of the nervous system or neuroses. In all other cases, oral influence is irresistible or "fatal", if not countered by distrust–the psychic act of rejection.

Irresistible comprehension and performance are, in a way, the groundwork, while the refusal to understand, disagreement and non-fulfilment are secondary phenomena or a complex psychic pattern on this simple groundwork.

Those are general outlines only, but they may serve us as the springbroad to psychological problems underlying concrete situations, such as the difference between suggestion by individual to collective, collective to individual, collective to collective, and individual to individual in a collective.

Suggestion as a whole is one of the most effective and important sections of social psychology.

Various degrees of uncritical acceptance of suggestion are observed in all people, children more than adults, tired people more than those in good health, persons suffering from an inhibition of cortical function, frightened or embarrassed or lacking confidence more than people in good or normal spirits. However, available material prompts the conclusion that the chief factor is the prestige of the "suggestor" in the eyes of the "suggestee". It consists of two aspects: confidence of the suggestor in the success of his action and readiness of the "suggestee" to yield to an external influence, i.e., his trust and absence of "ifs and buts".

In fact there is almost always a certain amount of distrust or anxiety. Therefore, circumvention of the suggestee's resistance, dismissing his doubts by persuasion and explanation, still plays an important part in social life. In other words, suggestion is related to presuasion and explanation. The greater the discrepancy between the suggested idea or action, on the one hand, and the convictions of the suggestee, on the other, the stronger is his resistance, his defensive reaction. Therefore, the more irrefutable the arguments the "suggestor" wields the higher his prestige, the greater the suggestee's trust in him, the more conclusive the recognition of him as "one's own". An orator has a large choice of means, from logically irrefutable arguments to subtle psychological devices, to create an atmosphere of

133

community and personal contact with the audience. And both these extremes are important for the theory and practice of social psychology.

To illustrate the point, here is an account by Mikhail Romm, the Soviet film director, of V. I. Lenin addressing a meeting of demoralised, hungry and ragged soldiers. It took place in 1920 in a cinema; the regimental commissar, who spoke first, tried in vain to stand up to unfriendly heckling. Then Lenin came on to the stage, and took advantage of the lack of contact between the commissar and the soldiers.

"Lenin instantly sensed the tense atmosphere and understood the mood of the audience," Romm recounts. "He advanced to the edge of the stage, and the audience fell silent. The commissar said: 'It is at a very opportune moment that you arrived, Comrade Lenin! I give you the floor!' Lenin peered at the audience as he walked along the edge of the stage; it seemed that he looked intently at each of us. Then he stopped, winked so the commissar could not see, and said to him as he looked at us: 'Why? You began, and you must go on. Say what you have to, and we shall listen.' Somebody laughed. Lenin, who had noticed that we did not listen to the commissar, won the audience by his humorous remark. He treated us as allies ('we', i.e., he and all those present, 'we shall listen'. The orator quickly finished his speech; then Lenin began. He spoke simply, in a serious confiding tone. He told us why we had to fight a war against Poland, why we could not afford to sign a peace treaty yet, why more new troops were needed and why the food supply would be short for at least another year. Perhaps it was because Lenin walked up and down along the edge of the stage as he spoke, his eyes on the audience, that we had a feeling of close contact with him. He stopped from time to time and looked closely at the delegates. When he spoke, we had the feeling that he kept asking: 'Do you understand and do you agree?' And each of us had the feeling that Lenin's eyes were on him."[1]

This description shows how the two influencing factors combine into clear, comprehensible arguments, and that the more direct the means Lenin used to gain contact with the audience the sharper our feeling that we all belonged to one

[1] M. Romm, *Besedy o kino* (Talks about the Cinema), Moscow, 1964, pp. 36-37.

"we". His great intellectual powers and his gift of leadership made Lenin "one of us" for workers, peasants and soldiers, which, after all, is identical with trust and, in the ultimate, unlimited trust.

As we already know, unlimited trust and suggestion are synonymous. Trust is a feeling and awareness of belonging to "one's own", to the same "we" group.

By and large, phenomena relating to suggestion may in social psychology be reduced to the three following classes: blind (uncritical) trust; criticism, distrust and resistance to suggestion; persuasion to eliminate objections resulting in a recovery of trust.

The less the self-awareness of a "we" group, the more forcible the arguments must be. Authority possesses suggestive powers, but only because it is free from distrust or the faintest suspicion of sharing the thoughts and interests of a "they" group.

Now back to the above concept of information. C. E. Shannon, founder of the modern information theory and hence one of the fathers of cybernetics, abstracted himself from man and his peculiarities as a link of an information system. At a later stage, engineering psychology classed man as an information-receptive element. But it rejected the chief feature, the filter of trust and distrust which screens the interchange of information between people. This filter changes, depending on historical conditions, cultures, civilisations and communities. Absolute trust and absolute distrust are the extremes. Information may be entirely untrue but acceptable, while a positive truth may be rejected. In-between there are various degrees of trust requiring different forms of information control. Unquestioning trust is tantamount to a readiness to accept any absurdity. Turning from logic to psychological terms one may say that absurdity is the response to faith. "Certum est quia impossibile est" (Tertullian). The more primitive and isolated, the purer and the more typical a "we" group the more is its internal structure woven from a fabric of trust, i.e., trust in somebody's bare word. This provides possibilities for circulating false information, even absurdities. Religious communities gravitate towards these exclusive "we" groups. The psychological core of religion is faith. Religious absurdities only strengthen the faith and cement the religious "we" group. The intrusion of distrust awakens thought and renders possible the passing of information among people. Thought springs from the necessity of choosing between two or more suggestions, trusts, communities.

135

It is common knowledge that conditions of absolute trust may be experimentally produced by hypnotic suggestion. The subject then believes in what may be counter to the communications from his first signal system. The essence of suggestion lies in this contradiction of direct information for it is senseless to suggest anything a person already knows, feels or is ready to perform. No act to suggestion is in evidence in the latter case, though in life the matter is far more complex. Confidence (trust) appears to spring from the subject of suggestion or, conversely, is adjusted by his or her reactions of control, doubt, thought. In other words, the hypnotic condition eliminates all potential "we" groups with which the subject may identify himself. In a waking person, suggestion is constantly countered by a certain amount of distrust, i.e., correctives designed to verify whether or not the suggestor belongs to a "they" group.

From the foregoing we may now infer a rather surprising definition of the process of persuasion from the standpoint of social psychology. Persuasion is removal of the barrier or, if you will, of a solid wall protecting the personality from suggestion.

5. AUTHORITY

The socio-psychological situation conveyed by "we and they" is almost never a merely external relationship between communities. A complex mutual diffusion takes place. It is not confined to mutual exchange of people, elements of culture, commodities (a "we and they" situation). The inner structure of a "we" group is complicated by the position in it of separate individuals who, while belonging to the "we" group, are at once something different from it.

This is applicable to any personality in any community. Theoretical analysis, however, should proceed from an opposite situation: how can a "they" be personified in "he"? How can a "we" be personified in "you" or "I"?

Let us picture "we" and "they" as two circles (one of them may even be an arc). Then picture that they are neither apart nor that they intersect; picture a tangent, a tangent in a single point only. This is the beginning of the dialectics of their mutual relationship. Just as the point is the opposite of a line and of the surface it encloses, a personality is the opposite of an elementary and pure community. It is the point of contact of the two circles that represents this transformation of a "they" into

136

"he". In other words, one of the persons of the "they" group is no longer alien to the "we" group. The point of contact is a personality. "He" is in our orbit and belongs to our community, while still opposing it. In primeval history a figure of this kind was investigated in detail and embellished with rich factual material by a British ethnographer, J. G. Frazer, in *The Golden Bough*.[1] This personage is a sacred prisoner doomed to die but worshipped as a chief for a short time. The tribe is personified by him and at once opposes him.

In short, just as in the plural the "they" is more primary than "we" ("you" being the category of their interpenetration or interaction) so in the singular the dialectics of personality formation should begin with "he". However, the point in which the two circles are tangent is of a dual nature as it belongs to both circles. "He" still belongs essentially to the "they" circle, even if the latter interacts with the "we". But the same point belongs to the "we" circle, and is therefore "you". If intercourse is possible with this isolated individual and if he is in some respects equal to others, then one of the circles penetrates the other. This is an important stage in personality formation. Yet "you" and "I" are still poles apart, while "he" and "you" are already adequate means for a socio-psychological determination (of the status) of an authority, chief, or community leader.

It is not unusual for a community to have no leader. Less organised and amorphous communities embody their negativism or indignation in some person, rather than have a leader. In the more stable communities, even the smallest ones, held together merely by mutual sympathy, there is always evidence, if only a trace of it, of domination by one of its members. Larger communities in which all members cannot possibly be related personally or even know each other require persons or organs to externalise them.

It is only for the sake of clarity that we refer to an authority or a leader in the singular. Actually, this extreme case is a simplified mental model. Firstly, an authority, leader or chief is practically never one person in the eyes of a homogeneous community equal in relation to that person. The authority may be a group of persons. And it may be pertinent to emphasise that from remote times political theories distinguished between

[1] See J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough, A Study in Magic, and Religion*, London, 1924.

monarchy (rule by one person), on the one hand, and oligarchy or republic (government by a few or many persons), on the other. However, the line between the two is a very conventional one, for there are examples of diarchy (rule by two persons), triumvirates, etc. Secondly, authorities, leaders and persons of responsibility in a more or less developed and complex community form a sort of ladder or hierarchy. This means that the community is, to a certain degree, composed of co-ordinated communities at several levels. But be it a political, ecclesiastic or some other hierarchy, the leaders at all levels, except the highest, are invested with power not by the community but by the top authority, i.e., are its deputies and personification. Characteristic of the top authority are the age-old juridical concepts of sovereignty and suzerainty: its essence is that it is obeyed inside a community ("we") and not obeyed outside it.

Authority (and hence prestige, authoritarianism, authoritativeness) greatly complicates the subject and method of social psychology.

There are two aspects to the authority concept (leader, ruler, executive): first, he is not obeyed outside the community, second, his word is law in the community. Both aspects are based on suggestion.

Some relations are beneath the threshold of suggestion, others are of a higher plane than unilateral suggestion, i.e., are passed through the filter of criticism. The authority–the bearer of power and influence–is surrounded by a great number of people whose relationship to him is of the former type. It is not a vacuum, but a relationship of non-suggestion.

No matter how big or small a historical community (a "we"), the strangers are always more numerous. Every organised community constitutes itself first by a relationship of non-suggestion with this overwhelming majority.

"Incomprehension" (at different levels) is one such type of relationship. As a point of interest we might recall that many leaders, kings and rulers were foreigners, almost always walled off from the majority of the people by their solid palaces, castles or temples, and by an army of attendants and guards. They were isolated from the rest of the world by insurmountable barriers. The language they spoke was the language of arms. And very often, by a sort of selection, individuals chosen as leaders (unless their power was hereditary) were, by psychic inclination below the usual standard as regards companionship,

138

suggestibility and sociability. The great French 18th-century Curé-Communist, Jean Meslier, said that all kings were criminals, the worst among men, and that only the rational society of the future would choose its rulers from among the ablest and wisest.

In any case, organised communities (with leaders) are opposed to "all others". In other words, the persons composing these communities, more or less obeying the leader, following him, influenced by him, are an exception proving the rule: he is that who is not obeyed; only "we" do the opposite.

The status of authority in a community is always filled with an inner contradiction. An authority, leader or chief is distinct from the rest of the people, and the people mentally isolate him from the "we" group. On the other hand, an authority is always a model to be imitated and thus bound to be stripped of the aura of "exclusiveness". These two opposite trends take many different forms in differing historical conditions and social communities.

Creating an authority is like introducing a heterogeneous and externally different body into a community. Trust in this authority by all the other members of the community promotes the internal consolidation of the community vis-à-vis the outside world. The fact that a person is elevated to a position of authority certainly raises him above the collective. The fact that a man is confided in attaches him strongly to the "we" group. It is an extreme case when an authority is imposed on a community. Sometimes the bearer of authority is an alien, foreigner, or stranger. The other extreme is the status of a leader of a mass movement (e.g., conscious action by the working class or a spontaneous peasant or national liberation war) characterised by free, voluntary and absolute trust and subordination.

This instance may be called the highest form of prestige and authority. Theoretically, this leads away along two lines: greater imitation of the authority and growing distrust.

We have mentioned imitation of the authority stemming from trust. In work, battle, politics, art and science, the leader enforces his authority not only by commanding, but also by demonstrating, by being the example. However, the growing "contagious" spread of the properties of the authority in a community strips the authority of uniqueness. It may become "the first among equals", but also be reduced to "equal among equals", i.e., dissolve in the community that assimilated its

139

exclusive features. In order to prevent this, ancient society had special groups or castes of attendants, priests or aristocrats who prevented imitation of the ruler by the commoners. No one ever saw him. Yet the general trend towards "standardisation" progressed: first the upper classes to strengthen their social role seized the prerogatives of the ruling authority, the next in rank followed suit, and so on, until everything that had been exclusive became commonplace. At first, the Russian word *gosudar* denoted only the tsar, then, a few centuries later, the expression *milostivy gosudar* became current among intellectuals, although it did not, as yet, spread to the peasants; in most countries people address each other as "sir". So it is with many traits of everyday life and behaviour. The ruler, for his part, had to adapt himself sometimes to the lower strata and take to plain living, to be more like the people.

Even this social diffusion can undermine authority, but what undermines it most is trust (i.e., a direct "we" feeling) in some new authority.

It is a mistake to see a negative aspect only in all acts of disobedience. Disobedience of authority is a claim to power, being the measure in which the disobedient individual or someone else claims power.

We have now examined the socio-psychological mechanism of voluntary subordination and unconditional trust; it remains to look at the reverse mechanism—the formation of distrust and insubordination.

Revealing empirical data may be obtained at different levels, ranging from observation of child groups to complex socio-political movements and situations.

The socio-psychological mechanisms of trust and distrust are complicated, their intricate combination accounting for the involvements of socio-psychic life. Trust and distrust form the ever changing psychic substance of the internal life of communities, societies, collectives and groups. It would contribute to the progress of science to discover how to assess and measure trust and distrust. Lack of trust in an authority, its repudiation, may be strong enough to cement the community, the unity of the "we" group.

Usually the classes, even peoples know exactly what authorities to accept unreservedly and what to repudiate and crush during revolutionary upheavals and mass movements; at other times both public and individual consciousness is rent by overt or

140

latent conflicts as to what is considered one's own "we", what ideologists and leaders embody the "we" concept and what "we" should be recognised. The ultimate question in the old religious movements was: "Whom to disbelieve?". The main question for reason and mind always was: "Whom to believe and why?".

Suggestion is the innermost psychic mechanism of authoritarianism. Suppressing opposition, authoritarianism is a mechanism of prohibition and command, drawing a variety of emotions into the sphere of socio-psychic phenomena. However, we should not picture authority as the power of one or a few individuals. A closer look will show that in a certain sense it is an inverse relationship: in the final analysis, one can suggest to people only what on the whole corresponds to the dynamics of their needs and interests, their convictions and will; therefore, authority being psychologically induced, originates from a group or community. It may sound paradoxical, but the leader, the authority, is a slave of the group. Indeed, chiefs of ancient communities were worshipped as gods, but actually were slaves of ritual, their individual freedom reduced to almost nil; they were no individuals but puppets whose strings were pulled by their entourage, fulfilling the obligatory rites. This is another aspect of the dialectics of authoritarianism.

In due course, authoritarianism split more frequently into authority and anti-authority, traditionalism and anti-traditionalism, prestige and neglect, and this not only in conflicts with rivals, but intrinsically, by its nature.

The more an authority is factually and socially irremovable the greater its psychological weight. Both these aspects–subjective and objective–are directly related. What is a "master"? It is an authority that cannot be removed. Its will is automatically obligatory, this, in principle, being equivalent to unlimited suggestion. The master is expressive of permanence and immutability. If he can be removed or replaced, or if one conceives of him as removable or replaceable, his psychological power is shaken, giving place to the mechanism of choice: who is more a master, he or another?

By contrast, democracy is essentially a synonym of unlimited removability. Democracy is consistent with the objective trends of contemporary life, the psychological needs of modern man, while the ancient psychic forms are correlated with irremovability (of sovereigns and masters), legitimism, hereditary power, dynasticism, aristocratism, and hierarchy.

Consider now the psychological aspect of such objective historical processes as the assault of the peasants on serfdom. For a long time, the majority of Russian peasants could not even dream of the *barin* (landowner) ever being removed. Yet when socio-economic development made them realise the opposite, a psychic explosion of disobedience followed. The analysis of this process is fragmentary as long as its psychological aspect is overlooked.

It is irremovability that accounts for the great psychological power of the parents: nobody can replace them, their position in relation to the individual being predetermined once and for all by the latter's birth. However, that situation is not absolute, for it may be changed both subjectively and objectively: there is adoption, replacement by step-parents, there are fatherless children, patricide, renunciation of parents, and particularly the infinite variety of separation by children and parents. Similarly, the husband was undisputed master so long as divorce (including de facto divorce) did not exist. But already in recorded history the wife's adultery was punishable, indicating not only the fragility of the matrimonial bond, but also an underlying psychological opposition to the head of the family. To combat his imposed authority, one had to make him at least partially replaceable, if only in thought.

In short, history shows that the concept of irreplaceability was always precariously unstable, jeopardising direct transmission of will in circumvention of thought.

To compensate for this tendency, man created an irreplaceability of god, a creature beyond the reach of humans. Placed in the inaccessible sky, immortal, eternally equivalent to himself. In deep antiquity, however, gods were replaceable in a certain sense; recall the history of the victories and defeats of the gods in mythological theogony and the fact of polytheism. However, the concept of the absolute irreplaceability of a supreme authority, of a changeless leader, developed gradually along with the downfall and transformation of the mundane powers. God of medieval society and he of the world religions of our time, particularly Christianity, compensated for the increasing mobility of institutions and earthly leaders. This God maintained intact the basis for the suggestion mechanism, that of faith in general, because every earthly power, even the smallest, was in a way identified with the unique and immutable divine

142

power. The downfall of earthly leaders, however, is bound to sweep away this divine compensation.

An authority cannot rest forever on the original psychological mechanism of suggestion. Only those leaders remain that cannot be removed: 1) leaders supported by arms, i.e., no longer by the socio-psychic mechanism but by coercion; 2) leaders drawing on the invincible force of truth, logic, conviction, this being essentially the removal of authoritarianism by the consciousness and scientific thinking.

The latter is gradually including the knowledge obtained by people of the laws of human psychics.

6. ISOLATION OF THE PERSONALITY IN COMMUNITY

Social psychology must not confine itself to models with a more or less homogeneous, uniform social structure. We destroyed one such pattern when dealing with authority and authoritarianism, for it is isolation of a personality from the rest of the community. Now, it is pertinent to consider the matter in a broader context.

As established above, a homogeneous social environment, collective or community can strengthen and thereby consolidate motives and actions. In principle, this applies to any actions, and, therefore, to actions either useful or harmful to society.

In the former case, objective laws and trends of progress benefit from this psychic mechanism, the elementary mechanisms of social psychology acquiring a common vector with social and historical laws. This is exemplified, among other things, by workers joining in a strike or by the surge of energy usually witnessed in socialist labour emulation.

However, the same psychic mechanism may hinder progressive obectively mature changes. In other words, its action may either follow or oppose the progress of history.

Special examples are hardly needed for the latter possibility, being as numerous as the illustrations of the former category. Take racial brutality, religious fanaticism and sectarianism, and political obscurantism.

To put it briefly, a psychological pattern may either facilitate or hinder progress, and, clearly, in the latter case the invincible force of history finds means of shattering or destroying barriers.

Isolation of an individual or personality (or a microcollective,

143

a small family), we discover, is a force hindering progress or, as it were, the reverse aspect of contagion in a community.

Bourgeois psychologists say that a personality and a collective, an individual and the mass, are metaphysically opposed. They praise individualism and heap scorn on collectivism. We object most emphatically to this counterposition of the individual to the collective, and doubly so because every collective is composed of individuals while the personality is, in turn, a nucleus of social relations.

For Soviet psychologists nihilism is entirely out of place in the problem of the individual and the collective. Yet it is wrong to think that the matter was devised by Western psychologists and sociologists, and should not be discussed by Soviet science. We do not regard it as an absolute counterposition. But we must probe both the concrete and historically changeable contradictions and the system of special psychic phenomena comprising the aggregate relations between the personality and the collective.

In special socio-historical conditions need may spur men to rise against the community that fetters them, for that is the only means for self-negation in community. It was this self-negation that assaulted obsolete forms of community and the internal relations, replacing them with others suiting the new objective conditions and vital requirements.

The involved relationship between communities and individuals who isolated themselves (in one way or another) added to the complications. Individuals used psychic mechanisms already known to us: claims to prestige and authority, repudiation of authority, negative attitude towards a community viewed as a "they" group, and, therefore, lining up with some other "we." But these mechanisms never shaped history: they only paved the way for objective laws of social being.

Take the example of the general change-over of modes of production in the course of world history.

Characteristic of the slave-owning system was labour by more or less large groups of slaves. This was the most efficient way of using slave labour, for it was impossible to place an overseer over every two or three slaves. Slaves worked in more or less larger groups on latifundia, mines, canals, roads, aqueducts, bridges, pyramids, crypts, shrines, palaces, amphitheatres, circuses. Some of their immortal masterpieces still exist and impress sightseers. Individual owners, less strongly coerced into groups,

less enslaved, could never have erected anything of the kind.

Progress and transition to the feudal mode of production dealt a fatal blow to large-group labour, which became a hindrance. The exit of slavery was symbolised by the small individual skilled labour of peasants and artisans. Joint, collective labour receded into obscurity in the Middle Ages, for, as a rule, even the corvée was performed more or less individually by each peasant.

Not until the end of the feudal period did collective labour reappear. Individual labour had exhausted its progressive role, new productive forces required joint labour and replacement of small-scale by large-scale production, not only in the economic sense, but also in the context of organisation.

The capitalist mode of production transformed work in simple co-operation, manufacture and the factories into collective labour. It replaced the skilled artisan helped by a few apprentices (who previously widened the range and improved the quality of production) with thousands of labourers working together, because individualism in production was no longer revolutionary and had become outdated. Labour in larger groups opened up enticing possibilities, though no longer just one kind of work done by many, but a combination of different skills compounded into a system.

What socialism inherited from capitalism was the social character of production, yet it greatly changed the organisation of labour. Workers' solidarity in teams, shops and factories increased. And socialist emulation between workers and enterprises injected an entirely new quality into the social organisation of labour relationships.

Clearly, these objectively needed forms of organisation were not the effect but the cause of responses of the psychology of the individual in a collective. In would be absurd to assume that the antique slave was by nature predisposed to collectivism and, therefore, worked in groups, while the peasant and artisan of the Middle Ages was innately individualist. After all, in matters other than work, the medieval working man was a confirmed communalist (e.g., marks, guilds), while antique slaves were obviously averse to "collegia" and "familiae".

The sole point made by the above examples is that different modes of production produce and employ different variants and structures of individual-to-group relations even in the essential labour process.

What these examples also show is that isolation of an individual is merely a form of the break-up of a community, the reverse of community, the latter's self-negation.

Now take memory, that elementary phenomenon of the psychology of the personality ("general psychology"). Though this classical section of psychology has been thoroughly explored, new knowledge may be added if it is approached in the context of social psychology. Strange as it may seem, the emphasis then shifts from remembering to forgetting.

Not all excitations of the peripheral and central nerve cells are retained by the brain of animal or man. Physiologically, they must coincide with excitation of some other group of nerve cells to produce a new temporal connection; failing this, they simply fade. Yet not every excitation thus impregnated is stored in the active memory. Most excitations undergo a peculiar process of forgetting that appears so simple as to require no explanation. However, proof is lacking that animals, too, possess the faculty of forgetting in this ordinary human sense. By means of hypnosis a human may be made to remember what had been transferred to the sphere of forgotten impressions. This proves that nothing is ever lost; forgetting is not losing. Would this not mean that forgetting is a faculty exclusively possessed by social man, a kind of blind that helps him be what he is? This mnemonegativism (amnesia) is part of the psychophysiology of man. Take the process of working out some new automatic motion. No matter how thorough the training, a certain number of failures is inevitable. Professional jugglers will testify that even a perfectly prepared exercise may occasionally miscarry. This natural, inevitable and variable margin of failure is an important psychological factor rather than a breakdown.

Convert this into the terms of social psychology. Repeating a motion until it is automatic and uncontrolled by the consciousness is comparable to suggestion. The latter, as we know, stands for what we have defined as the "we", the "we" concept in its purest, extreme form. Self-suggestion is internalisation of the same thing. A man learning an art unconsciously obeys a command, while a failure in his automatism is essentially a repudiation of a suggestion. On the face of it, one has simply "forgotten" what one learned, but this forgetting is a molecule of repudiation, a micro-rebellion.

In this respect, forgetting is a purely human faculty. Forgetting is equivalent to withdrawal by an individual from a psycho-verbal system, from a chorus, from a particular "we". On the other hand, remembrance is an overcoming of forgetting, a victory over forgetting by the second layer of speech, external or internal. Human memory is a negation of the negation, a reversion on a new basis to automatism and reproduction of stimuli impregnated in the tissues of the central nervous system. This applies equally to involuntary and voluntary remembering, as well as to visual and verbal. Then, socio-psychological relations of suggestion, rejection of suggestion, re-establishment of suggestion through persuasion or consciousness are the deepest basis of memory.

Let us now leave the subject of memory and take one lying on the surface of socio-psychic relations: the desire to be liked. As Lev Tolstoi put it, the wish to be liked and loved is a most natural one. How to interpret this desire? It is a yearning to influence others, to turn to one's account the inherent wish of other people to submit to better influences. The wish to be liked is a competition for suggestion, authority, power. There are many ways of being liked: by reason or resemblance or of difference, the essence being always the formation of a rudimentary "we". A person striving to be liked by others retraces the path from isolation back into the community. However, this striving may be accompanied by cultivation of really attractive personal traits, or by self-admiration and complacency.

The other extreme is self-abasement. Even if it is slight, it contains the above-mentioned search for somebody's beneficial influence, the ability to love others, which Anton Chekhov called a natural human condition.

Of prime practical importance in social psychology is knowledge of the range of psychological relations and psycho-physiological phenomena named emotions and feelings which reflect mutual ties between an individual and a community. Today this is necessary for the all-round education of the new man, the man of the communist society. Understanding these phenomena and knowing their nature is essential to executives, Party and trade union leaders, propagandists, writers and scientists. But do not lose sight of two supplementary aspects of psychology: the social and the physiological, for every time we reach an individual and his emotions we always touch on the material basis, i.e., the physiology of the individual body.

147

At the end of the preceding chapter we arrived at the conclusion that pleasant and unpleasant, pleasure and displeasure are psychological categories drawing on the social aspect of the question: their deep roots are in the universal division into "we" and "they", or into phenomena consolidating or destroying the "we". The dualism of feeling springs from social dualism, although processes in the body are not inherently antipodal.

Widespread dual division of human feelings, such as sympathy and antipathy, love and aversion, compassion and callousness, come under the head of dualism. They are different expressions and shades of the same division of the human environment into "we" and "they". But as we go deeper into the complex world of human feeling and emotion, the clarity of this duality fades.

From times immemorial psychologists divided human emotion into three fundamental categories: fear, love and anger, with all other feelings seen as ramifications of these three. We shall deal with some later.

At this time, let us discuss the other extreme, i.e., the physiological aspect. Here again there are traces of a dual mechanism related not to the division of phenomena into pleasant and unpleasant but into activating and inhibiting the central nervous system.

We have seen that the worker in the shop, the pupil in the classroom, and an athlete in a stadium show greater energy than when alone, this fact reflecting physiologically a higher tone of the central nervous system. At present, science knows of the special histological formation, reticular, of the central part of the myelencephalon, pons, mesencephalon, thalamic area and the median part of the optic thalamus, which account for the tone of the nerve centres and cells of the entire brain. This system is highly responsive, along with other stimuli, precisely to the human factor, the human milieu. The toning up action is general rather than specific: resourcefulness, endurance and courage become greater "in public". As the proverb goes, "two in distress makes sorrow less". Even sorrow lessens when there is company. Watching a public speaker, actor, soldier or athlete toned up by the environment, we see that their behaviour is dependent on the general degree of brain activity and, therefore, on the presence of other people, which influences the reticular formation (and possibly the non-specific nuclei of the thalamus)

and the derivative action of this nervous formation on special brain centres activated at some specific moment.

But how does the human factor affect the said formation which controls brain activity? Imitation–the provocative effect of the surrounding people, their mimics and gestures, plus such means of influence as applause or booing, and above all their words, may act as conditioned stimuli. For example, the individual's name is a strong stimulant. At times, a sleeping man wakes up the instant his name is uttered, though he did not react to other words. At sports events fans encourage their favourite by shouting his name. The group name (that of a tribe, community, team) is also a strong activator. The history of wars shows that battle cries, including the conventional "Hurrah!" or "Banzai!" have an "intoxicating" effect; they are conditioned reflexes, extremely powerful stimuli of the reticular formation and thereby of the cortex. The effect may be either a strictly specific kind of excitation or a more or less general one, spreading in the subcortical areas of the brain and known as emotion or a fit.

Of no less importance is American physiologist Pribram's hypothesis of the existence in the median part of the brain of a formation governing the discontinuance of an activity as soon as a desired result is attained. This is a kind of "stop" device, capable of checking, partly or entirely, an activity predominant at the given moment. It is safe to assume that actions, gestures, mimics, words by the surrounding people may serve as conditioned stimuli for this system as well. Such words as "no" have a great automatic power formed in early childhood. Expressions of censure belong to the same class of restraining factors. Sometimes the conventional stimulus is not a word, but a reproachful look, a disdainful facial expression, the pointing of a finger. These may suffice to cause an inhibitive reaction of the central nervous system.

Here we are dealing with emotions controlling relations between the individual and the community.

To illustrate the point, take the important phenomenon of "shame".

For a long time psychology regarded it as one of the varieties of fear, a fear of censure by certain people, i.e., fear of rejection from their set, from the "we" in punishment for an offence. Plato saw two kinds of fear: trembling in anticipation of a disaster, and dreading defamation, i.e., doing or saying something

149

bad. This latter is shame. Aristotle defined shame as fear of dishonour, an unpleasant feeling related to an evil act bringing ill fame.

In other words, shame stems from the apprehension or awareness of the unacceptability of some action by others. Thus, in the remote times a subordinate person experienced shyness, fear of scorn, censure, mistreatment, in almost every intercourse with superiors. Particularly strong, at times even primary, is the apprehension over one's appearance: facial, exterior, clothes, manners. Shame may control action and the spoken word.

The shamefulness of deeds derives from the type and tradition of the specific community. For a gang of thieves stealing is not shameful. In different times some tribes made only the men cover their bodies, while other tribes required the women to do so. In ancient Rome, matrons undressed in the presence of male slaves, while ashamed of men of their own standing. Noblemen and aristocrats were ashamed of poverty or manual work, which put them on the same level with persons of inferior standing. In pre-revolutionary Russia it was considered unbecoming among the ruling classes to show anger publicly against children or adults of the same social set; sharp words and fits of temper were perfectly right, however, if directed against serfs, workers, subordinates. Exclusive aristocratic circles, "respectable" people, considered acting a disgraceful profession, while aristocratic ways were in disfavour among actors.

Displays of shame may be caused both by public censure and excessive praise, insofar as either breaks the subject's tie with his "we". It is embarrassing to take the floor at public meetings, to attract attention, for one then opposes oneself to others.

Shame is of many shades and gradations. It is one of the finest devices exercising a permanent control over social behaviour, set off by doubt as to a person's belonging to the "we" group.

This fear springs from certain physiological vascular and vegetative reactions, and at once from the historically developed social institutions and ideology. Physiologically, depressive and inhibitive emotions prevail in shame. But shame is neither physiological nor ideological in essence; it is a psychic mechanism through which society controls individuals. Shame may denote deprivation of a person of his social prestige, a threat of expulsion from the "we" group, negativism directed at the person, which shows the educational importance of social psychology.

150

An opposite phenomenon no less important in the eyes of social psychology is pride. This emotion also rests on a physiological foundation (including the neuro-vegetative) and on the historically variable social order. Pride in the results of his work before his fellow workers was typical of the craftsmen at all times. It is a direct enhancement of prestige, and in members of communist society it is a fundamental trait of the labour psychology: pride in work according to one's ability, to the full extent of one's ability.

Methods provoking shame or pride are important in educating children and adults, individuals or groups. Honour, ambition, praise, recompense, fame, disapproval, censure, envy, enthusiasm and rivalry are important elements of the science of social psychology as a whole, helping to impart new labour and behavioral traits in men of the new communist society.

Let us mention also modesty related both to shame and pride. It lies in a plane different from shyness and diffidence. Modesty symbolises absence of any breach by the individual of the unity or uniformity of a group. On the contrary, it brings out this unity sharply. Modesty is renunciation of claims to uniqueness or authority. In fact, modesty is antagonistic to authority (discussed in section 5 of the present chapter) and merits a thorough investigation. Modesty is sure to play a big part in the psychological readiness of man to put into effect the communist principle of distribution of material wealth according to need.

In inter-person relations an important part belongs to such emotions as tenderness, derision, anger. The two latter are emotions expressing repudiation, rejection, threat of punishment. Laughter, generally speaking, is a reaction to a breach of conventional norms, including those of logical thinking. However, if non-observance is premeditated and ill-intentioned, it provokes anger, not laughter.

Anger may be caused by opposition to our goals, by ingratitude, betrayal, neglect or insult. It follows that anger-provoking factors are associated with something outside and alien.

Social conditions teach how to arouse or restrain anger. Aristotle developed a detailed theory of how to incite an audience to anger. Sometimes, good manners and self-control suffice to check an outbreak of anger. Sometimes, a fit of anger leaves a feeling of vexation and grief. Sometimes it takes the form of impotent fury, often directed against innocent persons. Repressed anger is hate. Loosened, it turns to fury and rage.

151

The palette is then rich. Anger is essentially a means of intimidation or coercion and a reaction to something of the "they" in the behaviour of another man. Underlying this is a deep physiological mechanism of change during a fit of anger of the secretory activity of the organism and excitation of the sympathetic department of the nervous system. However, more important to social psychology is that anger can be imitated, i.e., rendered through exterior symptoms, without corresponding physiological shifts in the organism; and can be suppressed and controlled in the presence of violent physiological changes. The same applies to all other emotions.

At a certain stage it seemed that psychology made a big step forward to Darwinism and materialism by transferring the question of the essence of emotions from experience to the expression of emotions. According to James and Lange, the essence of emotion is a change in respiratory and heart activity and in vasomotor and diaphoretic processes, coupled with humoral and endocrinal variations. Later, the focus shifted to changes in the sympathetic nervous system and the thalamic department of the brain. But the psychologists of this school directed most of their attention to facial and other locomotive expressions. In the end, however, this school merged with behaviourism (a psychology without psychics, describing acts of behaviour only). Thus, Watson writes: "An emotion is a hereditary 'pattern-reaction' involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular systems."[1] Behaviorists adhered to a purely biological view of emotions considering them neurosomatic adaptations to conditions and changes in the environment.

A significant advance, credited to Dumas, a French psychologist and physiologist, was the specific delimitation of what environment was primarily meant.[2] While also seeing emotions as external, physiological manifestations, Dumas focussed his attention chiefly on mimicry (considered a means of social intercourse between people) which he believed inherent in humans, not animals, disagreeing on this count with Darwin. According to Dumas, mimicry (and gestures) stems from the environment and is a means of adaptation to it. Man acquires from the surrounding people conventional patterns and stereotypes for expressing

[1] J. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, Philadelphia and London, 1924, p. 215.
[2] G. Dumas, *Les émotions*, Paris, 1937.

joy, anger, fear, hope, which may vary, depending on the social circle, stratum, national group. This applies to "vocal mimicry" also, for man imitates the intonation, timbre and intensity of speech (which blend its semantic and emotional aspects) of his teachers and companions.

Thus, according to Dumas, facial and vocal mimicry is imitation of collective patterns. Even mimicry, which man inherited from his prehuman ancestors, is styled along patterns socially changeable through education and imitation, so that, even when alone, a man manifests his emotions as if for others and like others.

While on the subject, it may be pertinent to note that subsequent investigations showed the relative poverty of the physiological aspect of emotions as compared with their social and psychological aspect. Emotions spring from various conflicts in the nervous activity. Difficult states of the nervous system or unsolvable socio-psychic conflicts provoke "non-adequate" types of reactions (manifested as locomotive and vegetative phenomena) in subcortical centres and areas. However, for all the numerous variants, these phenomena are less diversified than human emotions.[1] In other words, human physiological mechanisms of emotion are fewer in number than psychic emotions. Therefore, their greater multiformity should be attributed to their social character.

Let us point out that Dumas's psychology of emotions has greatly clarified the subject of the inherently human ability to manifest emotions not actually experienced. The centre of gravity shifts to the signal implications of the expression of emotions. These are regulators of the social conduct of the individual in relation to the environment and of that of the environment in relation to the individual, regulators of the complete or partial belonging of the individual, to the "we".

In this respect the departure from Darwin was a progressive one. Prior to Dumas, human mimicry and kindred phenomena were interpreted under the impact of Darwin's ideas[2] only in the context of man's originating from animals, only in the com-

---

[1] A. R. Luriya and A. N. Leontyev, "Issledovaniye obyektivnykh simptomov affektivnykh reaktsii" (Investigation of Objective Symptoms of Affective Reactions); see *Problemy sovremennoi psikhologii* (Problems of Modern Psychology), Moscow, 1926.
[2] Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, London, 1872.

parison with the emotional expressions of animals. Dumas demonstrated the need for investigating facial mimicry, vocal mimicry, and the mimicry of the body from the standpoint of human social intercourse in all its historical and cultural variability.

However, he made no progress in either social or psychological patterns. He confined himself, as James and Lange before him, to the investigation of the expression of emotions, identifying this with their essence, whereas it would have been more proper to explain the very experience of feelings and emotions in terms of their restrained, imperfect, internalised manifestation. Dumas noticed that patterns are a conventional norm for expressing emotions compatible with decency, modesty and good manners. Excess of mimicry or vocal expression may be attributed to lack of education, and in a way place the person beyond the pale of the customary environment. These facts required thorough study. Education teaches not only how to express emotions, but also, and to a far greater measure, how to suppress them. Being experiences in the proper psychological sense, inner feelings appear only in the measure to which their external expression is hindered or eliminated.

Social intercourse teaches self-possession. Various educational methods, among which public reprimand or reward, cultivate in man courage, restraint, modesty, coolness, impenetrability and imperturbability. Puritans moulded a special type of man by inculcating seriousness in children, forbidding them to laugh and play. There goes on in every child a struggle between desire and restraint in associating with other people: it hides itself from outsiders in the folds of the mother's dress, darting a covert glance at the stranger now and then; a direct look is a sign of belonging to the same community, while the look, the name and the touch are accorded only as the stranger ceases to be a stranger.

One may conceal from "strangers" or suppress external expressions of emotion. This is called reserve or hypocrisy. But continuous training is a path from inhibition of expression to the education of feelings, i.e., inner experience. Sometimes, self-control results in pathological disturbances of the nervous system; at times it can channel nervous energy by intricate devious ways into a creative discharge of frustrated inner experience.

However, a purely external reserve is also of interest to social psychology. Being an antithesis to sincerity, reserve expresses an individual's opposition to a given community which he regards

as alien. The more he sees in it an alien environment the greater are his inner efforts to reserve, subterfuge, deceit. These efforts, much as the emotions above, draw on a certain physiological mechanism. While confidence and truthfulness account for the elementary framework of a community, reserve and hypocrisy reflect the complexity of its structure and imply the individual's negation of the community. Evidently, this aspect of the phenomenon relates it to sociology and the historian has every reason to consider the reserve, spiritual solitude or professional activity of a spy in a sociological context.

Reserve and hypocrisy may be examined within certain limits through electrophysiological methods and pharmacological action.

In sum, untruth expressed through a lie and untruth expressed through silence refer to human relations and are, genetically, expressions of the solitude of the individual in a community.

The reverse is true for trust and truthfulness. The simplest manifestation of openheartedness between people–looking into each other's eyes, smiling at each other–are tokens of a "we" feeling. The smile of a child shows the emerging and developing intercourse with surrounding adults as members of the same "we".

This pure "we" group atmosphere exists only in the earlier inner world of the child not yet withdrawn into itself. This means that at least two different "we" intersect the individual, straining his nervous system and causing emotions that are later internalised. An individual is not a condensed microscopic "we", but an intersection of a great number of "we" and "they" relationships. He casts about in making his choice, he has doubts, he attaches himself to, or at least approaches successively one, two or three "we" groups. It is this trial and error that shapes his inner world, including his inner attributes: consciousness, thinking, will. It is quite safe to say that the consciousness of a person is the higher the greater the number of "we" contesting in it, i.e., the broader the scope of the socio-psychic relationships.

The will takes its origin from this choice, being formed deep in a personality as a point of intersection. The science of the human will cannot be isolated from social psychology. The first step in the analysis of will is investigation of the unwillingness to obey automatically, therefore, of the support (real or imaginary) a person finds in other communities and authorities. The will begins to form as a negative act, an act of disobedience, insubordination, negation. Only at a higher stage does it emerge as an endeavour towards the positive goals a person sets, i.e.,

a goal consciously chosen from many potentially possible ones and, finally, towards a goal set independently by the individual's thought.

Similarly, the psychology of thinking is organically related to social psychology; possibly, it springs from it.

The greater the number of "we" intersecting in an individual and the greater the number of boundaries between "we" and "they" the less is there space for blind, half-conscious impulses and emotions, the greater the importance of thinking. It is not simply because the "we" are so many. The number of these intersecting communities is bound to include one conceived as the "whole people". When this community is seen clearly by the consciousness, the individual hesitates no longer: for the first time he finds at his command an unequivocal criterion of selection: a general proof or, in other words, a scientific proof.

All preceding history was just a road leading to this situation. However, general proof is still a long way from seizing on the minds and feelings of all the people on earth even in our time, one of scientific and technological achievements. This is because mankind as a whole is still a long distance away from reorganising its social order on a rational scientific basis.

Communist education and communist consciousness will be inseparable from the triumph in man of conscious collectivism. Comradeship and brotherhood may be visualised as a return of the person into the human community after ages of isolation and efforts to oppose the "I" to the "we".

The futility of absolute individualism has been explained above. A man does not exist separately from "we" groups. Even when he only agrees or disagrees with a certain course of thought, he adheres momentarily to an agreeing "we" group which is opposed to the disagreeing "they", or vice versa. That is what certain aspects of human social psychology will probably be like in the future highly dynamic communist society: no one will imagine himself opposing anybody, communities will increasingly become groups of like-minded individuals. A "we" group will comprise those who have succeeded in seeing, say, the possibilities of a theorem or, on the contrary, an error in its demonstration, while "they" will be those who have yet to be persuaded. Strong negative emotions will evidently stem from somebody's mental lack of understanding, for the less understanding a person is the closer he is to the primitive "they".

However, that is but a dream.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY

1. THE HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

When setting out Lenin's views on spontaneity and conscious-
ness (Chapter I, Section 2), we said they are not only at two
different levels, but also opposites. This reveals the profound
dialectical conflict between social psychology and ideology, a
conflict describable as a split in social consciousness or, in other
words, a unity and the struggle of opposites.

This being the case, we must look back and see what is
spontaneity ("instinctiveness", according to Lenin's synonymous
expression) that occurs so frequently in socio-psychological phe-
nomena.

Specific to spontaneity is a lack of criticism and understanding
which, in the extreme, becomes unconsciousness. Marxist social
psychology does not confine itself to studying extreme (uncons-
cious, irrational, alogical) phenomena in masses or groups of
people, which attract the attention of Western psychologists.
However, we cannot afford to ignore these phenomena either,
for they are essential in elaborating theory.

We repeat: it is wrong to build a Chinese wall between spon-
taneous and unconscious socio-psychic phenomena, on the one
hand, and consciousness, on the other. We dissociate ourselves
from Western "psycho-sociologists" who contend that only those
"cognisant" of the secrets of unconscious psychic phenomena can
rule the crowd. The purpose of Marxist social psychology is not
to oppose the subconscious psychics of a community to the con-
scious psychics of its constituent individuals, but to give the lat-
ter an awareness, an understanding of the mental processes
specific to masses, groups and communities of people.

Would the socialist emulation weaken if every worker and
peasant were acquainted from early school days with the elemen-
tary psychological laws underlying teamwork? Since it is easier
for a teacher to impart knowledge and ideas to pupils in a

group than to each of them separately, what harm would come from his drawing their attention to that fact? Let the collective— a most powerful educational medium—impart respect for the science that studies human psychics much as medicine studies human diseases.

We should not fear a scientific discussion of the concept "unconscious", for the phenomena and mechanisms of social psychology may be largely described as involuntary, unwitting, spontaneous. That the "unconscious" is not fiction but real is easy to understand if only by means of the well-known fact that one may know and remember something, then forget it, i.e., remove it from consciousness, then remember it again, i.e., retrieve it from the unconscious. Obviously, the word "unconscious" need not be understood in the specific Freudian sense. Yet Freud's psychoanalysis contains an element of faith in the power of the human mind: the conviction that the "unconscious" in every man can be imparted to his consciousness by scientific analysis. In this sense, social psychology must also explain some of the subconscious factors governing spontaneous human behaviour in a group or community in order to make these factors known, appraisable, predictable and controllable.

The nature of the subconscious and the spontaneous may be traced through the historical changefulness of the psychics. The opposite phenomenon—logical thinking or scientific knowledge— is essentially uniform in the various civilisations and cultures known to history, the content of the knowledge and the thinking being the only variables. By contrast, the world of spontaneous, subconscious or unconscious socio-psychic phenomena appears to be infinitely changeful, almost elusive in its multiformity. It is as if human nature is not one and the same essence, but inexhaustible in its plurality.

In Western psychology the school of Ignace Meyerson, the eminent French psychologist, was deeply interested in this. It contended that social history causes continuous changes in human nature.

The essence of this approach is best described by Meyerson himself: "Analysis of the behaviour with the use of historical facts changes the psychologist's perspective. The psychologist should deal not with an abstract man but with one belonging to a specific country and a specific time, bound by social and material conditions of his time and dealing with people who also belong to a specific country and time. Therefore, a field of

psychological investigation exists which is historical in character. This creates new difficulties in psychology, but serves as a new source of knowledge."[1]

Meyerson's historical psychology devotes itself to studying actions, deeds, including the work of people, and, particularly, to studying their achievements as the chief source of facts. However, Meyerson kept a safe distance between himself and vulgar materialism. He showed that the direct influence of labour technique on intellectual development, especially in prehistoric times, is beyond scientific reconstruction.

Meyerson's historical psychology is viewed with respect by Soviet psychologists.[2]

It is fruitfully applicable in ethnography and archeology (as it considers human achievements the chief source in cognising psychics) and to studying ancient, medieval and modern history. Regrettably, in most cases Meyerson lacks the scientific approach in dealing with history, objective sociological laws of development, and the causes and effects in social life. However, contributing to a periodical edited by Meyerson are a number of Marxist historians, among them A. Soboul. This is perhaps indicative of the possibility that this psychological school may yet shift to historical materialism. So far, however, this has been nothing but a scientific potentiality.

Along with the name of history-oriented Ignace Meyerson, mention should be made of Jean-Pierre Vernant, a historian interested in social psychology, ancient Greece being the main subject of his studies. Vernant is a Marxist. His knowledge of Ancient Greece helped the development of main concepts of historical materialism, the stress being laid on the problem of the personality in history. It is wrong, according to Vernant, to consider a psychical trait as constant and unchangeable throughout a person's life. In man everything changes with the historical context. "The individual himself is a historical product" and, accordingly, all fruits of man's activity, all literary and material values, testifying to human psychical functions, may serve as the

[1] Ignace Meyerson, *Les Fonctions psychologiques et les oeuvres*, Paris, 1948, p. 11.
[2] O. M. Tutunjan, "Progressivniye tendentsii v istoricheskoi psikhologii Ignasa Meyersona" (Progressive Trends in Historical Psychology of Ignace Meyerson), *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 1963, No. 3. pp. 118-24; "Osnovniye raboty I. Meyersona i yego posledovatelei po istoricheskoi psikhologii" (Basic Works of I. Meyerson and His School on Historical Psychology), *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 1963, No. 4, pp. 190-91.

primary sources in the study of the historical psychology of an epoch, including the psychology of labour.[1]

A pity that Vernant is concerned mainly with the personality rather than society, although historical psychology, developing chiefly or even exclusively in France, is close to social psychology, the two being kindred currents.

Let us try to convert the concepts of the historical evolution of the personality, or the individual, into the terms of the general theory of psychic communities.

The evolution of a personality starts through its absorption of the elements of the surrounding world. A personality or individual was originally a monolyth as compared to the personality or individual in the contemporary sense of the word. Lévy-Bruhl showed in a special article that in primitive societies the notion of individual could not be dissociated from his possessions, trappings, utensils, dwelling, clothes, landed property and domestic animals; similarly he could not be separated from his geographical environment, his relatives, or his name. To harm some part of his environment was to inflict a wound on his body. In other words, the "I" was so extensive as to be almost non-existent. In the course of time the boundaries between the personality and the environment narrowed, and there appeared the "I" (as well as "he" and "thou"). Was this an immanent process of self-development? No, it is traceable to the development and complication of human relations, primarily material relations: delimitation of adjacent territories and corresponding economic rights, and proliferation of various forms of alienation and appropriation of individual material components of the former "I", such as gifts, transfers, replacements. In primeval times these acts were chiefly internal, confined to groups or tribes; yet they were, so to speak, stripping the individual of the various scales that had covered him. Not the self-development of primitive thinking into modern, as Lévy-Bruhl conjectured, but growth of the alienation and appropriation of things gradually stripped the human personality bare. Similarly, in remote times an individual passing from one age or tribal group to another had had to change his name: the old personality disappeared and a new one took its place (the continuity, if any, being expressed only through the few personal belongings). Increased intergroup diffusion finally led to a relative weakening of the name as an

[1] A short outline of Vernant's works was given recently in an article by J. J. Goblot, "Histoire et psychologie", *La Pensée*, 1965, No. 124.

inalienable attribute of a personality. Although on initiation, marriage, enslavement, adoption, or migration a man parted with his former name, and with it, with his attire, hair style and tattoo, utensils and weapons, he remained his own self, or, more specifically, this emancipation from external attributes made him gradually "his own self". At a still later stage, a person's identity was reduced to the naked body and the continuity of memory and consciousness. In this sense the classical ancient slave was far more a personality than the primitive savage. However, a naked body is not the same as the unchangeable "I"; a man can lose his legs, hands, ears and other parts of the body; when he transferred from one social echelon to another, the practice was to pull a tooth, to circumcise or to mutilate him, just as in more recent times rebels had their nostrils torn. The body is then no longer a reliable characteristic in the complicated movements between the "we" and "they" groups, and the evolution of the personality concept rejects it. The essence of a personality thus shifts to the "internal I" or "internal essence". Only at this stage, finally, the personality becomes identified with its own self; a genuine "I" emerges, glorying in its individuality and uniqueness as a microuniverse.

However, this subjective side of the historical formation of the personality becomes reduced to a human interchange: things internal, intimate, subjective, stem from the phenomenon of secrecy, i.e., concealment, dissimulation or, in other words, restraint imposed on the final links in the cause-and-effect chain of behaviour. One cannot lay oneself bare to a "they". There appears what the Russian naturalist I. M. Sechenov named a curtailed reflex or subvocal speech, inner movement, thought. This concealment is in origin a purely social phenomenon: the surrounding people are considered or at best suspected of belonging to a "they", i.e., suspected of dissimulation. When isolating himself, a man as if withdraws from a choir, an elementary "we" group. Thus, development of the inner world in persons is also human interchange, interchange of great sociological importance, interchange subject to evolution abreast of history.

After the personality sheds its many envelopes, its chief function is choice of actions. Suppressing an action is the premise of will. Since the personality is continuously making decisions, allowing or prohibiting actions, the will is characteristic of a personality. But choice and decision imply preliminary doubt, that is hesitation between two possible alternatives. Then, for a

moment or a longer time, the individual belongs to two "we" groups, while considering them potentially "they". This is a subjective reflection of the fact that various communities intermixed and overlapped on an increasing scale as history progressed. The personality is moulded historically to the extent to which different "we" groups intermarry, and has to choose between their commands. The reverse formula, however, is also in a way true: "we" groups increasingly overlap as the personality is moulded historically. In a caste society, intermixing of communities is practised less and the personality is virtually level with the community.

To sum up, the concern of historical psychology is not the formation of the personality, but rather the cross-section of its various stages, which permit to uncover the qualitative specifics of human psychics.

There is evidence of a variety of approaches in French historical psychology–from A. Dupront who attempted to create a Freudian historical collective psychology, to R. Mandrou who endeavoured, following in the footsteps of Lucien Fèbvre, to paint a comprehensive psychology of the French society of the 16th and 17th centuries.

The only point of note is that historically oriented psychologists discovered not only variety but also plurality in the manifestations of human psychics. It is as if these phenomena, unlike manifestations of scientific and logical thinking, cannot be reduced to a common denominator. They are sometimes called "culture", at least in the antithesis of "culture" and "science".

In its proper sense culture is not identical to psychology. But social psychology may be described as one of the aspects of spiritual culture, or at least contiguous to it: tastes, habits, customs, the traditional turns of speech, expressions of emotion, etc., are related both to the spiritual culture and the social psychology of a community. That is why monuments of culture serve us as sources in the study of psychology. On the whole, culture and ideology intersect and interpenetrate logical thinking, on the one hand, and the subconscious socio-psychological processes, on the other.

Accordingly, culture as seen by a historian has two aspects. One is the development of science and technology, a process common to all mankind, which rejects emotionalism to one or another extent; not the emotionalism of scientific creative work or of new ideas, of course, but by acknowledging that truth and

162

usefulness are emotionless and unbiased. By contrast, art, religion and ethics imply emotionality and gravitate to the other extreme. In other words, rational logical thinking militates against some principle opposite in nature to the processes in the brain. Rational logical thinking can either extinguish or subdue this opposite principle.

All we can say, therefore, is that this opposite principle is not only associated with the sphere of emotions but comparable to rational logic and logical cognition as a concept which, to use the mathematical vocabulary, possesses an opposite sign. This is precisely what ethnologists mean by "pre-logical" thinking. However, this negative definition is as insufficient as, for instance, the "pre-capitalist" or "pre-feudal" constructs coined by historians. One should know the nature of this phenomenon; it is not enough merely to say that it preceded another, known phenomenon.

2. THE PROBLEM OF PRE-LOGICAL THINKING

We said in Chapter III that the science of social psychology traces its rockbottom physiological and psychological sources to the lowest echelons of social intercourse, i.e., the mechanisms of mutual influence by speech, mimicry, gesticulation and expressions of emotion.

This does not mean, however, that the fundamental mechanisms of intercourse were an ideal mould for logical thinking from the beginning of time. The history of languages shows that they gradually adapted and modified to fulfil their function better in man's cognition of the objective world. In the earlier stages, language was as yet unsuited for this purpose, because its main function was different: it was the vehicle whereby people influenced each other.

Neither physiology of the higher nervous activity nor semiotics (the science of sign systems) have as yet penetrated the secret of the origin in man of the second signal system in the process of anthropogenesis: how and why specifically human signs (signals, symbols) evolved out of the signs and signals whereby animals recognise things. To a dog the ringing of a bell may be feeding signal causing its glands to secrete saliva; a similar reflex can be conditioned in man, but substitution of the word "bell" then produces the same effect. As a rule, the sounds of the word have nothing in common with the sounds of the bell or some

other instrument designated by the word (the illusion of an onomatopoeia fades as we compare the names an object has in the different languages).

One may advance the view, though cautiously, that the singularity of these specifically human signals is that any object or real characteristic possesses at least two interchangeable speech signals, which justifies their being called signs or symbols. Could this be tied up with the old human duality of "we" and "they"? Probably it could, but we are still unable to say how.

Prevailing in the most ancient human sign systems are the functions of mutual action of men on each other. The function of cognition appeared at a later stage. The prodigious plenitude of facts gathered by ethnologists among primitive peoples sometimes described as "pre-logical thinking", probably corresponds to the epoch of the relative disharmony of these two functions, to the time of the inadequacy of speech as an instrument chiefly of cognition and thinking.

What was "pre-logical thinking" meant to connote? E. Dürkheim, J. G. Frazer, L. Lévy-Bruhl and many other Western ethnologists and, in the U.S.S.R., Academician N. Y. Marr and his numerous followers, used an antithetical construct: primitive thinking or the thinking of human beings in a primitive society is basically opposite to logical thinking of the contemporary man, being governed by opposite, let alone different, laws. Attempts were made to define these laws on the basis of vast descriptive material.

For some unknown reason no one ventured the opinion that those were laws of the imagination. Possibly, the very word implies flight into the unknown, flight uncontrolled by any natural factor. In short, the "imagination" was considered antagonistic to a "consistent scientific pattern" or law.

Dürkheim looked for laws of pre-logical thinking in psycho-sociology; as he saw it, in a primitive society all irrational notions and rites personified the community or collective; most likely, existence of the society was identified with "collective notions", which, therefore, had to be different from all real and logically possible natural phenomena.

Frazer held that pre-logical thinking was traceable to the purely psychological laws governing associations of notions: in a "homeopathic" or "similised" association of notions two similar phenomena are considered one even though this contradicts common sense and experience, while in a "contagious" or "par-

164

tial" association of notions the part is considered a whole, or
something accessory to the phenomenon is seen as the pheno-
menon, but again in defiance of reason and experience. A pic-
ture, a shadow or a name are equated to the man to whom they
belong. This produces actions directed not at the subject itself
but at something similar or related to it. Frazer and many other
ethnologists describe this as magic, while corresponding notions
are magic thinking.

The French ethnologist and philosopher, Lévy-Bruhl, went
farther and deeper. He evolved a general theory describing the
specifics of human thought functions in primitive societies.

Lévy-Bruhl covered all mental operations contradictory to
the logic of the contemporary civilised man in his "law of par-
ticipation", describing primitive thinking as pre-logical or mys-
tic. Never did he contend, as is sometimes said, that primitive
man was generally incapable of understanding the natural
environment and acting rationally. Had this been true, the
savage could not have attained any practical goal and therefore
would not have survived. According to Lévy-Bruhl, the savage
performed rational actions mechanically, much as a billiards
player aims and strikes a ball, calculating the angle of incidence
and the angle of reflection without even thinking of them. These
pre-logical principles, Lévy-Bruhl adds, were dominant in think-
ing. Yet Lévy-Bruhl was no racialist: he did not believe that
these particularities of thinking were inborn in underdeveloped
peoples, seeing them as a qualitative stage of historical develop-
ment.

On arriving at these conclusions, Lévy-Bruhl found himself at
a crossroads. Genuine historicism required that he should reject
the meaningless concept of "mystic thinking" and analyse more
thoroughly the psychology and physiology of human thinking in
the earlier stages. However, not Lévy-Bruhl but Henri Wallon—
a psychologist of the materialist school, a Communist and Marx-
ist, and possibly the greatest psychologist of the 20th century—
followed through along this course, while Lévy-Bruhl remained
an idealist, paying for it heavily. He took the view that mystic
and logical thinking were not two stages of development, but
rather two antagonistic eternal principles inherent in the human
spirit and corresponding to faith and reason. He ascribed a non-
historical character to these elements of irrational and alogical
mysticism. And shortly before the end of his life, he made the
final choice (as evidenced by his posthumously published note-

165

books) between his two old definitions of primitive thinking: instead of rejecting the empty "mystic" definition and elaborating on the scientific content of the definition of the "pre-logical", Lévy-Bruhl did the reverse. He renounced the idea of "pre-logical thinking". All that was left was the mystic aspect, allegedly inherent in the human spirit and observable more distinctly in primitive cultures.

Yet the valuable contribution made by Lévy-Bruhl (who had carried on the work of a number of eminent ethnologists) to scientific thought was picked up and projected by Henri Wallon, though he, too, was not the only one to try and remodel it along materialist lines.

What means should we use to analyse this strange phenomenon, this treasure obtained through scientific observation and generalisation? Ethnologists Frazer, Vierkandt and Lévy-Bruhl knew only their contemporary associative psychology; they had no idea of the physiology of the higher nervous activity or linguistics, nor of the psychophysiology of speech. However, no way is conceivable for resolving this puzzle other than study of the formation of the second signal system, including that in the modern child.

That the answers to riddles posed by the ancient human imagination are somehow related to linguistic problems was appreciated by Max Müller, founder of the mythological school, who suggested interpreting the emergence of ancient myths as "diseases of the language". But no one then thought that the word "disease" would pose new problems as diseases are governed by laws that have still to be discovered.

An altogether different direction was explored by the Soviet linguist, Academician N. Y. Marr, possibly one of the most outstanding successors of Lévy-Bruhl.

We can well afford to omit here the essence of his linguistic conceptions and need only stress that Marr did not look for the formal laws of languages in general, irrespective of time and space, but for the relation of the development of languages to the historical development of the society, primarily the mode of production. According to Marr, the qualitative part of language changes with the epochs. Lévy-Bruhl's idea that thinking of the past differed radically from the contemporary and that, therefore, it was inconceivable to create a general theory of thinking, prompted Marr to use the same outlook with regard to language. In addition, Marr saw the roots for the transformation of think-

ing in the transformation of the essence of language and speech.

But all this was mere speculation. No strict evidence was available. Marr, conversant in linguistics and archeology, applied titanic strength and energy to heap vast amounts of knowledge and hypotheses, facts and conjectures into a pile. Though a contemporary of Pavlov, he knew little or nothing of psychology and the physiology of the higher nervous activity. That is why he did not hesitate to borrow the unscientific views of Lévy-Bruhl and kindred investigators about the "magic" and "mysticism" of primitive thinking. The empty formula of the magic function of speech and thinking in the work and life of the primitive man contained negative implications only: for in the sense we attach to thinking, it was rather non-thinking, while language was non-language in those days.

Marr's original approach to linguistic investigations—for him "palaeontological analysis" of modern and historically known languages, which, unfinished, was hardly understood even by his closest pupils—produced some thrilling fragments, but no conclusive evidence.

Marr's conceptions, we might recall, were sharply criticised. But was the criticism constructive? This alone is of interest to modern science. In other words, has science advanced or regressed from the positions of Lévy-Bruhl and Marr? Frankly speaking, it took a step backward in terms of psychology (genetic psychology, social psychology). Criticism, as the saying goes, emptied the baby with the bath. Marr's critics forgot the principle of Marxist philosophy that investigation of the nature of thinking implies study of the history of thinking, since the latter's nature is historically changeable. What is implied is not a simple change in the content of thinking, i.e., mere accumulation of knowledge, but a different qualitative structure if not of all then of many mental operations of the primitive man as compared to those of contemporary logic.

Because of the criticism of Marr's conceptions, historians and ethnographers fell back on the simplistic, inherently anti-historical notion that the word "religion" adequately explained all particularities, all the nonsense of the spiritual world of primitive times. Indeed, it was a step backwards, and a very appreciable one at that, compared to the scanty theoretical content of even such concepts as "magic" and "mysticism" of primitive thinking. Extensive use of the term "religion" only poses another riddle:

why more and more "religion" is revealed as we refer deeper to the remote past, moving backward from a class society to a pre-class society?

Sciences treating of the "truth", underlying the remarkable achievements of technical cybernetics, such as logic and information theory, mathematical logic and semiotic will be incomplete until supplemented by sciences dealing with the "untruth". The ability of the human mind to fall into delusion, absurdity and contradiction, i.e., into distortions of reality, cannot be explained only in terms of mechanical failures of the thinking machine. It stems from "pre-logical thinking".

3. LOWER LEVEL OF MENTAL ACTIONS

Some cybernetics theorists point to a strange break in continuity: cybernetics is not yet able to analyse all intermediate levels of psychics, ranging from conditioned reflex activity in animals to the higher mental functions of man.

Soviet Academician A. N. Kolmogorov put this title over a section of one of his articles: "Why Extremes Only?" What he implied was that present cybernetics analyses of the higher nervous activity are oriented on the extremes: the conditioned reflexes in animals (making use of this elementary activity of the cortex to develop relatively simple programmes known as the mathematical theory of teaching), on the one hand, and (with the help of mathematics) the formal logical operations of the intellect, the highest function of the human brain, on the other. The vast spectrum between the two extremes–between the most primitive and the most complex psychic actions–has not, practically speaking, lent itself to cybernetic analysis. Kolmogorov views this state of affairs with some embarrassment. In another of his articles he wrote: "Conditioned reflexes are inherent in all vertebrae, while logical thinking appeared at a very recent stage of human development. Yet the synthetic activity of human consciousness (apart from the simplest conditioned reflexes) that preceded formal logical thinking has not been described so far in terms of cybernetics."

Here the essence of the matter is presented in depth. Yet cyberneticians cannot be blamed for the omission. How could they describe what has not been systematised and characterised by the particular sciences? The subject is vague and elusive.

168

Some psychologists suggest three departments in the human higher nervous activity: a) physiology, b) psychics, c) cognition. Though the terms in this classification are manifestly lame the idea is to delimit through the term "psychics" the vast expanse between conditioned reflex activity at the level of the first signal system and man's scientific logical thinking. Kolmogorov calls this "synthetic activity of human consciousness" beyond the bounds of simple conditioned reflexes but short of formal logical thinking. And sometimes it is said that the sublogical range covers emotional and volitional phenomena.

Perhaps, however, it would be easier to choose requisite terms and definitions if the question were approached from the viewpoint of development. It is obvious that fossil types of animals possessed simple reflexes far in advance of the logically thinking man. Would it not be right, therefore, to assume that the second level ("psychics") appeared in hominides, the closest biological ancestors of the Homo sapiens long before the latter emerged? Kolmogorov is inclined to accept this historical evolutionary approach. "Logical thinking," he says, "emerged at a very recent stage of human development." He calls all other conscious activity not simply of a lower order, but "antecedent".

The three levels of higher nervous activity of man can therefore be likened to geological strata. In terms of the subject matter, psychology is no less historical than geology. The geologist sees the earth's crust as a historical formation. He refers all observable rocks or geological structures to some specific period in the formation of the earth's crust. The various levels and mechanisms too, now forming the single human psycho-nervous activity, came into being at different periods. Some appeared in long extinct amphibia and reptilia, others much later in the Quaternary apemen; however, unlike the geological strata, they altered the preceding formations. Homo sapiens received new layers. In contemporary human consciousness the lower evolutionary levels, in contrast to geological strata, were greatly transformed by the higher one—conceptual logical thinking. All three levels are monolithic and interconnected. They come apart, separating into original layers, only in abstract and technical modelling. Nonetheless, a psychologist can also proceed with an evolutionary analysis of contemporary human psychics, which is picturesquely called "palaeontology", i.e., reclaiming antiquity from the depths of our consciousness.

This part of the physiology of the higher nervous activity and psychology is hard to assimilate, requiring a high degree of abstraction. The student must think of familiar phenomena as an onlooker, abstracting himself from the customary concepts. The only guide is abstract scientific thinking.

Thought has always had to contend with anthropomorphism and obviousness, i.e., measuring human phenomena with the ordinary criteria, direct perception. Typification, obviousness, parallelisation with everyday experience have always hampered science. However, science has succeeded in prevailing that the Sun does not revolve round the Earth, that microbes exist, which the naked eye cannot see, that there are social laws independent of man's will. By expanding the limits of the microcosm, the macrocosm and the megacosm, science has compelled man to abstract himself from the dimensions of his body as a measure of the Universe. Science has led man to accept the fundamentally indemonstrable notions of quantum physics and the theory of relativity. But, perhaps the most difficult is to attain a similar degree of abstraction with regard to the innermost recesses of our soul. True, Pavlov's explorations of the physiology of the higher nervous activity were a breakthrough. Behavioral phenomena that had seemed traceable to "obvious" emotions turned out to be obscured by the latter, and began to reappear, from obscurity, as it were, only after Pavlov's urging to disregard these subjective human emotions. Yet this uplift slackened somewhat the moment it was conjectured that Pavlov's abstraction applied to animals only, that it ruled out application to animals by deceptive external analogy of the psychic motivations of human actions.

No, science never tires of climbing from one peak to the next. The most difficult thing is to realise consciousness. Never did science face a problem more complex in that it had to totally overcome human subjectivity and naive anthropomorphism.

That is why psychic riddles are solved only by overcoming obstacle after obstacle, overcoming customary views and straining the mind to the limit. It is a difficult abstraction to conclude that there must have been an intermediate link—now part of human rational psychic activity—between the higher nervous activity of the apes and the rational thinking of the contemporary man.

This link stems from the specifics of the higher nervous activity of the creature known as hominid or Neanderthal man

170

(Palaeoanthropus), whom philogeny places between the ape and the modern man.

On the evidence of fossil crania, the structure of their brain lacks slightly what are specifically human regions of the cortex. Whether this "slightly" is what affords the possibility of higher mental functions by the human brain is still a vital question. It is contrary to reason to believe that these small formations in Homo sapiens are a luxury. They are neither an appendix nor an unessential growth. Their removal or destruction causes disastrous failures. Not so for Neanderthal men, however, for their behavioral machinery was designed along fundamentally different lines.

The criticism of Freudism in Soviet psychological literature, including ethnopsychological literature, may have been more effective if this philogenetic approach were applied to the above phenomena. Investigations by psychoanalysts would have led to different interpretations had they been transplanted in the following tentative evolutionary setting: inclinations suppressed by human psychics or the highly developed sexual instinct is a survival of what was biological norm in our ancestor, the Palaeoanthropus (the Neanderthal man in the broader sense of the word), without which, in his specific environment, he ran the risk of leaving no progeny. Natural selection has not destroyed all the Palaeoanthropus' heritage due to the rapidity of his transformation into modern man. If we took this assumption, the necessity for superseding and sublimating the Neanderthal man's heritage in each individual psychics would appear far more rational and historically justified.

Thus, real human psychics comprises older and fresher strata, much as the earth's crust, the difference being that they are not merely superimposed layers but layers in complex interaction. Then the "unconscious", too, could be interpreted as a layer corresponding to the psychic level of the Palaeoanthropus.

Freudians call the sluice connecting the unconscious and conscious pre-conscious. That should be reappraised rather than rejected. The sluice is the seat of "symbolic" thinking: substitution, identification of various objects, their imaginary transformation into each other. One cannot fail to recognise here the oldest phase of Wallon's "pairs", the phase of binomial combinations, the farthest from realistic content. Possibly, it is this phase which should be compared to the initial steps in the psychic development of our genus, the Homo sapiens.

Wallon had every reason to ask: if a "pair" is an elementary form of thought corresponding to its primitive stages, should it not be found in thinking and speech of the most retarded human civilisations? What Wallon implied was definitely not the fossil Cro-Magnon men as he only quotes ethnography. In particular, he cites Leenhardt's observations of New Caledonia natives. These are of great value to our subject and the fundamental problems of social psychology, for Leenhardt discovered in the language and thinking of the New Caledonians many survivals both of "dual notions" and of grammatical forms reflecting, in his view, the so-called dual organisation of society.

It will be recalled that Soviet ethnography arrived at the idea of dual organisation, i.e., of a tribe composed of two phratries or opposing groups, as the most ancient stage of the primitive communal system, a view comprehensively and conclusively formulated in his fundamental investigation by A. M. Zolotarev.[1]

Dual organisation may well be regarded as the simplest, the most illustrative and the most ancient sociological model of what we generically define as "they" and "we".

Investigation of the most ancient layers of human psychics, as we see, reveals the presence of this initial category of social psychology.

Wallon, though only groping blindly for a historical and socio-psychological interpretation of this phenomenon of child thinking, advanced precisely in this direction. "These undifferentiated notions," he wrote, "where two terms coexist, being simultaneously confusable and distinguishable, these units-pairs, as well as prevalence of the binary system of numeration (in primitive peoples—Author), remind one of the pairs which fetter child thought till it becomes capable of formulating a definite interrelation of terms. Are they not suggestive of the tendency to use binary structures, an initial manifestation of child thought, the initial step away from the general confusion towards distinction and perception of interrelations? It will suffice to just mention this similarity until anthropologists and linguists interpret the pairs discoverable in various manifestations of collective thinking."[2]

What has Wallon given us for penetrating the nature of collective thinking? His most important discovery, that child thought

[1] A. M. Zolotarev, *Rodovoi stroi i pervobytnaya mifologiya* (Tribal System and Primitive Mythology), Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1964.
[2] H. Wallon, op. cit., pp. 104-05.

is initially subordinated to the law of "pairs" or binomial combinations, was described in the preceding chapter (Section 2). "Though lacking plasticity in relation to reality," Wallon writes, "mental actions through pairs are highly active in children, though often they may confuse them. . . ."[1]

Binomial combinations in adult underdeveloped or diseased thinking are due either to a consonance of words or to some semantic (likeness or contrast) characteristic. Wallon substantiates his investigations with psychiatric case histories. "If a pair is the primitive structure of child thinking, which undoubtedly still plays a part in adult thinking (though in so subordinate a role that it may pass unnoticed)," he wrote, "there is reason to expect that it will reappear in some of the functional regressions or dissociations. Mental patients seem to amuse themselves sometimes by answering with a word which, though it is not entirely irrelevant, makes their speech abstruse, odd and absurd."[2] Whether or not they do so deliberately in opposition, Wallon says, this is an explicable mechanism, for it is similar to that of child thinking.

Wallon conducted his investigations chiefly with children six and seven years old. Mental actions through binomial combinations begin earlier. It is reasonable to believe that the deeper the phase of a) a child's psychic development, b) regression of the psychics of a mental patient, c) evolution of thinking in primitive man, the greater is the play of binomial combinations, i.e., the less they are subordinate to phonetic or semantic associations. In the extreme, they may be seen as the least dependent on various associations. Yet this phenomenon, be it as thin as film, is retained in the psychics of the civilised man. In some persons it is quite manifest. André Gide wrote: "What can be more annoying than the mania of some writers who, as soon as they see an object, cannot resist thinking of another one."

The subject of binomial combinations may cover not only words and thoughts, but also actions, including illustrative ones: motions and shaping real objects on imaginary patterns.

If binomial combinations are discussed in this wider context, it will be found that they lie at the root of imagination and creative activity. So long as objects are not linked rigidly in

[1] Ibid., p. 88.
[2] Ibid., pp. 100-01.

generalised notions, classified systems and series, a binomial com bination allows for their unlimited use: linking in a pair what is really unlinked or splitting what in fact is one whole. The earlier the stage in the development of thinking the less con trolled as compared to our time is the pairing of visual and mental images. The farther back we go, the fewer binomial com binations we find that faithfully reflect reality, and this chiefly by accident, while the rest belong to the realm of the imagi nation.

Here are some of the typical instruments of the imagination: mental (or graphic) association of the characteristics of different objects; duplicating objects by imagining or creating artificial models; establishing (mentally or through actions) non-existent relations between objects; converting (mentally or graphically) some of the traits of objects into independent objects.

Psychology distinguishes between the individual imagination, i.e., fleeting, transient or fixed in individual creations and acts of the imagination that are neither individual nor free, but cus tomary, repetitive and recurring in the given social environment: ethnologists call them "collective notions".

And so, whenever one touches on the subject of pre-logical thinking, one touches unfailingly on the mechanism of binomial combinations and thereby on that of the imagination. The imagi nation is absolutely absent in animals, that is, absent in the higher nervous activity at the level of the first signal system. With the growth of civilisation and the historical development of thinking, the uncontrolled and impetuous imagination is channeled into narrow, permissible limits. But precisely for this reason it becomes creative and constructive.

That is why study of the history of the clash between the pre-logical imagination and logical thinking is also related to technical problems. Cyberneticians aver that the operation prin ciple of the "thinking" machine is selection. Development of the laws of logical thinking followed the same path: selection of a few out of the host of binomial combinations. Cybernetics, it seems, has reached the point when it needs a deeper knowl edge of the structure and nature of the rock yielding the pre cious ore of truth, the structure and nature of the mistakes the sieving of which yields the grains of correct judgement.

There is still a stratum between binomial combinations–the most ancient and most elementary phenomena of the conscious ness that distinguish man from animals–and the formation of

general notions. This involves two mental operations which are at once opposite and supplementary, called seriation (formation of series of similar objects, e.g., a set of counting sticks) and classification. Both are obtained directly from the mental operation that forms pairs in simpler phenomena.

Indeed, in the extreme case, a pair may be composed of two very similar manifestations. At least, some aspect of them may be so similar as to be identical and permit mutual substitution. That is the initial step in constructing a series. In primitive and child thinking seriation manifests itself through repetition of an illustrative sign, action, gesture, sound. Rhythm and ornament both grow on this sublogical ground. In the case of some failures of the frontal lobes of the adult brain, the same operation is pathological: we witness involuntary multiple repetition of one and the same drawing, word, etc. But in normal thinking, seriation only underlies the subsequent stage-formation of general notions or generalisations.

However, a general notion does not crystallise on this basis only. It requires yet another operation, that known as classification, which in the elementary form consists of "this" and "not this", of "yes" and "no". It is easily seen that this act, too, originates from a limit "pair" case, but one of opposite character to the one mentioned earlier, for the two phenomena are entirely different. At least, they are unlike and unrelated. This is the starting point of a mental operation called dichotomy, i.e., division into two, which even as it develops is opposite to a binomial combination. This classificatory activity of the mind surfaces in the earliest stages of maturity. Child consciousness readily accepts and develops the division of all surrounding things into good and evil. Ethnographers report that some tribes divide natural phenomena between two phratries. Primitive classifications are not realistic in character, as evidenced in the survival in many modern languages of the irrational classification of nouns into masculine and feminine. In short, the initial type of classification is not yet, strictly speaking, a logical operation; it merely paves the way along with seriation for the higher stage: logical thinking through general notions.

What intrigues the social psychologist most is that these two sublogical operations are surprisingly suggestive of the tribal system and somehow deeply related to the emotional sphere. All members of a family bear the same name and form a series or group of similar phenomena. The tribal system teaches them

175

to resemble each other in customs and utensils used, and they are, in a way, all interchangeable. Need we note that their mental act of seriation has something in common with the socio-psychological "we" category.

Likewise, we cannot help noting that in the initial classification there is the same opposition as in the socio-psychological "we–they" relationship. The higher the evaluative activity of the mind (dividing phenomena and deeds into positive and negative, good and evil), the more real is its content in such cultural fields as aesthetics and ethics, and in distinguishing the positive from the negative from the standpoint of practical benefit and purpose.

That is where we come back to the fact that division of human sensations, feelings and emotions into positive and negative stems not from the physiology of animals and humans (where no grounds exist for seeking the divisibility of processes into two opposite groups only), but from social and, particularly, socio-psychological laws.

In moral and aesthetic matters the negative evaluation is, perhaps, the most ancient stratum. Investigations of the theory of aesthetics and ethics have somehow overlooked the question of what was considered bad taste and bad manners in the various periods of history. The fact remains that the criterion of beauty and morality always implies invisible censure and negation of the tasteless, ugly, amoral. The latter is not a negative notion, for all too often it is more palpable than the former: dirt, ugliness, bloodshed, elements which are identified with the "aliens", with the "they".

"We" groups take form through the negation of "they" groups. Hatred and love reflect the same duality of "alien" and "own", though these feelings should probably be related to the intermediate, derivative category "thou" (or "you"). Yet they came into being at a much earlier phase in man's evolution than the machinery of logical thinking by means of general notions.

Now for the conclusion. The vast history of the human race also amounts to "we" and "they". The end of history opposite to us, the most distant state, is "they". Historical progress from the pre-historic to the communist epoch has been moulding in our consciousness the antithesis between our civilisation and their savageness, between our highly human and their pre-human states. No "they" more pronounced exists than these animal-like ancestors of ours, drawing away from whom we became humans.

176

All that stirs our disgust and loathing most, if we look closely, are properties of those ape-like creatures from whom we originated, and from whom we moved away through the millennia. World history and human progress, therefore, may be regarded as a dynamic opposition of "we" and "they". Our thinking is a negation of and a contrast to the psychic activity of those remote creatures whose descendants we are.

Chapter V

WORLD HISTORY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

1. SLAVERY AND EMANCIPATION

All that has been written about the past and all that science has learned about world history, serves the purpose of foreseeing the future.

Does knowledge of the past yield a substantiated and objective idea of the direction (vector) and velocity of man's progress in history?

Most bourgeois historians hold that this notion of progress is obsolete. What they tacitly imply is that the future is uncognisable. Their stock argument is that cultures and civilisations are multiform, described in increasingly greater detail by historians, archeologists and ethnographers. A. Toynbee and other exponents of the theory of cycles admit of only relative progress in each individual civilisation and a relative superiority of West European civilisation. However, they reject the idea of man's absolute progress from ancient times to our day. They consider this idea outdated, a relapse to Hegel's teaching of history as progress in consciousness of freedom. All of us regretfully recall, too, that Hegel assigned no place for the future, seeing the crowning act–the self-awareness of the absolute idea and universal freedom–in his contemporary Prussian state.

Any theory of progress is, indeed, stillborn if it declares the present or the near future as the ultimate. But Western historians are troubled not only by past failures of the various theories of progress. They are aware of the trend in science that possesses effective criteria of the objective and absolute world-wide historical progress: the historical materialism of Marx-Engels-Lenin. That is why the bourgeois philosophy of history shifts the accent on fighting fatalism, the alleged bearer of all historical and scientific prognostication. Hence their desperate clinging to existentialism, which holds the premise of salvation in offering the idea of the alternative: the future is always an

object of choice, we can always go one way or another; therefore, the past is the only object of scientific study.

In fact, however, this idea of the alternative, that man can choose between diverse variants, which gained currency among Western intellectuals with some good reason, does not affect in any way the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the objective laws of social development.

In capitalist society the individual may go from one extreme to another (and sometimes really does), choosing between the most fervent champions of the capitalist system and its most revolutionary antagonists; he may opt one way or another, because those ways are possible in that society. In the absence of capitalist society, however, other alternatives arise and the individual may without a trace of fatalism choose between different positions and ways of thinking—but only out of those that are objectively possible in the given socio-economic formation in the given historical epoch. He may join any existing or potentially possible community, share this or that public sentiment, but cannot, say, choose to speak French if he lives in a country where nobody knows that language, or if he had lived at a time when French did not yet exist.

No matter what principles the historian uses in defining the periods, he will see that they keep growing shorter. The neolithic period is much shorter than that of the upper palaeolith, medieval history shorter than ancient history, etc. That is a clear hint of the universal law of acceleration.

The materialist idea of progress traces some features typical of the process as a whole.

One feature of absolute progress is the rise in the productivity of labour. True, it is traceable only if whole periods are compared. However, it is beyond doubt that labour was more efficient in the ancient eastern and antique societies than in the preceding primitive communal and barbarian societies; archeology has ascertained this point quite conclusively. Efficiency in general increased in the Middle Ages as compared to Antiquity and in modern times as against the medieval. Each succeeding socio-economic formation has a higher productivity of labour than the preceding one.

There are two sides to the question of efficiency: improvement of the means of production and the closely related changes in the psychics and behaviour of the workers. The relation of these two aspects is neither negligible nor simple. In the final

analysis, a more complex production process implies a greater rational will, not attainable unless the worker is interested in the end result of his effort.

In the primitive communal times generation followed generation without any visible change in the productive forces. Slavery altered the routine of production: torn away from their tribes and families, forcibly relieved of the necessity of feeding their disabled kinsmen, separated from tribal rites and religions, the barbarians, builders of dolmens and cromlechs, became builders of pyramids, shrines, circuses, aqueducts, roads and towns. However, the slave had a greater stake in destroying his implements than in improving them. In medieval times, peasants and artisans, notwithstanding vassalage and coercion, had the incentive of working their own plots; they cared for their tools, introduced minor improvements, which, accumulating over the centuries, accounted for a gradual technical advance. In capitalist times, workers are interested in earning the maximum wage, and, therefore, in the quantity and quality of their product, in improving their skills, in bettering techniques with the lathe or some other machine. In sum, this is the starting point for new machine designs. Workers in the modern socialist countries have immeasurably greater material, ideological and psychological incentives to heighten labour productivity.

In other words, growth of output is historically related to growth of incentives and, therefore, to changes in the workers' social status. A medieval serf or feudal peasant was more free than the antique slave, and the hired worker under capitalism is still more free, this prompting the historian who focusses his attention on the working masses, not the higher but the lower strata, to infer that history's progress was paralleled by a gradual emancipation (though economically deceptive) of the people. The tempo of emancipation was, indeed, quickening. That is what made it possible and necessary to negate all preceding changes by the first genuine emancipation of the workers through transition to socialism.

Here the historian discovers the second feature observable in world-wide progress, a feature linked with the first one, a second criterion inseparable from the first: elements of emancipation were not bestowed on the people by sovereigns or lords; they were won in open or underground struggle. Each level of achievement paved the way for somewhat greater activity and effec-

tiveness, and the impact of the popular effort increased as history advanced.

Indicative of progress was the growing strength, unity, organisation and determination of the masses in the fight against those who oppressed and exploited them. The progress of freedom is progress in the effectiveness of the liberation struggle. In primitive societies anyone who dared to oppose the invincible force of custom was doomed to exile or death. Slaves were given no opportunity to oppose the back-breaking toil, though cases are on record when they struck fear into their lords. A feudal peasant delimited his relationship with the landlord in a contract, threatening departure, drew on the legal rights of his community, resorted to arson, murder and mutiny. The hired worker fights the capitalist far more effectively by means of strikes, emigration, and participation in mass revolutionary movements.

In the primitive communal society a "rebel", if any existed, could give vent to his discontent only, perhaps, by settling apart from his kinsmen. In the ancient eastern and antique societies, oppression was opposed by stock communities, by the then still rudimentary mutual aid bodies, and even by associations of imported slaves. The feudal world saw many varieties of community and organisation set up by oppressed villagers and townsmen to defend themselves and fight the oppressors. Finally, workers in the capitalist world formed trade unions and parties, which are a highly effective social force.

Accordingly, the political influence of the fighters for emancipation increased in the course of history, turning gradually from opposition to authority into a struggle for power. This was paralleled by the workers' developing ability to create elements of ideology and culture to counter the ideological and cultural monopoly of the ruling classes.

By and large, however, this increasing pressure of the lower strata did not mean that they were gradually becoming masters of the situation. The historical impact was indirect: pressure forced the economically powerful classes and the dominant policy, ideology and culture that reflected their interests, to reorganise. Whenever the pressure changed, the deterring ideas changed also. The history of the restless lower strata made the upper classes keep step. As Hegel put it, and as Marx ironically repeated, the "bad lot" of society, i.e., the mass of uneducated commoners, created movement by their restlessness without which there would have been no history.

The most powerful onslaught of the exploited masses was when the exploiting classes were overthrown in a number of European and Asian countries between 1917 to 1945. This set the stage for another tremendous acceleration of the tempo of history.

All the above may be summarised as follows: preceding history was a continuous effort by the lords to halt the march of history.

History of the upper strata, i.e., the history that for some still seems to be the history proper, is no more than the history of those who endeavoured to delay history. Whenever they made changes, they were forced to do so, making the minimum retreat, never more than the minimum.

Oscar Wilde quipped that indocility, from the point of view of anyone who knows history, was the chief human virtue. Progress became possible through indocility coupled with rebellion. This sounds strange coming from Oscar Wilde, but contains a glimmer of truth, at least for anyone who really knows history.

Western social psychology tried to reduce the quintessence of all socio-psychic phenomena to the two most fundamental acts, namely, coercion and imitation. Thus Dürkheim saw the social aspect proper of psychics in coercion, Tarde in imitation, some others in a combination of both.

Soviet scientific social psychology does not ignore these really very important and deep-rooted mechanisms. But it probes deeper. It holds that to a historian indocility and insubordination are more important acts than coercion and imitation. They are the psychic mainspring that realises objective economic laws of progress in a human society. In each subsequent socio-economic formation, the function of this mainspring became greater.

It is common knowledge that for thousands of years human society was non-antagonistic, i.e., not based on the principle of exploiting the direct producers of material values by the owners of the means of production. The split of society into antagonistic classes took place with the advent of slavery.

In this sense, past existence of a classless system stresses the historically transient character of class antagonisms, which is cogent argument of dialectical logic in favour of scientific communism.

However, when considering the historical progress of man, one should emphasise the high degree to which this dialectical triad is abstracted and note the absence of attractive traits in the

primitive past. For the Soviet people, the builders of communism, there is nothing concrete to imitate or learn from in the benightedness and "idiocy" of primitive life. A formerly popular expression "primitive communism" now grates on the ears and has fallen into disuse. So long as capitalism ruled supremacy more or less idealistic reminders of the primitive communes acted as accusations against the bourgeoisie. Now, when socialism is a reality, that is no longer necessary.

The scientific theory of progress is posited on the fact that in some respects—primarily socio-psychologically—freedom was more curtailed in the primitive communes than under slavery. All tales of freedom, of the independence of the individual, in the pre-class society are contrary to fact. Spiritual life then was as wretched as their conditions of life. Savages are imposing in the accounts of romantic travellers only, who endow them with the features of their own social ideal.

In reality, everything was different from what we look forward to in the age of communism. Man was steeped in misery, and his experience was wretchedly small.

In the pit of the primitive commune, man was in certain respects more enslaved than the slave of a later day. He was independent and freedom-loving only in respect to external enemies. In the tribe and the family subordination and imitation were the rule, with indocility and insubordination a rare exception. Engels, who in his time paid tribute to things primitive, described the true status and condition of the primitive man in the following curt words: "The tribe remained the boundary for man, strangers and to oneself in relation to himself as well as to outsiders: the tribe, the gens and their institutions were sacred and inviolable, a superior power, instituted by nature, to which the individual remained absolutely subject in feeling, thought and deed. Impressive as the people of this epoch may appear to us, they differ in no way one from another, they are still bound, as Marx says, to the umbilical cord of the primordial community."[1]

The roots of what we call servitude appeared far in advance of slavery. Not coercive, it was voluntary subordination without the slightest hint of protest.

The inner enslavement long before slavery has been described by many thoughtful observers of primitive tribes. Thomas Streh-

[1] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 255.

low, who lived for many years among the Australian Aranda tribe and studied their native rites and myths, arrived at the conclusion that religious tradition and the "tyranny" of its custodians, the elders, frustrated all creative impulses and the imagination. This resulted in a general apathy and mental somnolence. Sacred myths were probably transmitted word for word from generation to generation. No new myths were created, the rites remained unchanged. The mental scope of the tribe did not widen.[1]

We say sometimes that fear and uneasiness in the presence of authority is symptomatic of a slave psychology. It is more proper to assume, however, that "voluntary servitude" (an expression coined by La Boëtie, a French 16th-century writer), i.e., docility accepted as something natural and therefore as something the individual is unaware of, lies still deeper. That was the starting point of world-wide historical progress viewed as a process of man's emancipation; it was, so to speak, the absolute zero that lasted for a very long time.

When slavery results from fear, i.e., suppression of the will to resist (be it fear of a flogging or of a mysterious spirit), that is a step along the road of progress. Up to that point voluntary servitude permeated the life of communes, tribes, peoples, beginning with the formation and ending with the decay of the primitive pre-class system. It is still an obstacle in the fight against colonialism and imperialism by the contemporary peoples still retaining the vestiges of the old patriarchal way of life. Colonialists and slave-traders take advantage of this docility, and not without reason they extolled the sentimental image of the faithful slave, "Uncle Tom".

On the one hand, the march of history was obstructed by all who had power and authority, while on the other, it was hindered by the spiritual slaves, the serfs to docility.

Na'Coyatté, a public figure in Guinea, told the following story: "All my ancestors were slaves. And I well remember the slavish fear my parents always felt. I always thought that the hardest thing in life was to overcome this fear. I thought if they did this, the people would feel strong."[2] This utterance contains two points of significance to the psychologist. Fear is a step forward, for it is symptomatic of latent struggle between

---

[1] T. G. H. Strehlow, *Aranda Traditions*, Melbourne, 1947, pp. 5-6.
[2] *Moscow News*, April 15, 1961, p. 13.

master and slave, symptomatic of the decline of the habit of
subservience and the willingness to obey; victory over slavish
fear is a farther stage showing that people are becoming aware
of their strength.

Reverting to the socio-psychological category of the "we",
we can say that docile acceptance of the tyranny of customs is
an expression of the most primitive initial "we", which then
changes into servile loyalty or slavish fear, becoming its own
opposite, i.e., renunciation of a "we" and subordination to some
foreign authority. This is seen in the alienation of material
wealth. In a primitive family or territorial group, men voluntarily
gave up their wealth, and tradition turned this into a sacred
act—sacrifice. As time progressed, members of communes grad-
ually became slaves of the rite of sacrifice. Forced alienation
of products existed long before slavery and exploitation. Aliena-
tion was not always a mutually agreed action; often it was
unilateral.[1] Predatory conquests, levying of tributes and slavery
do not appear until people refuse to give freely either of the
fruits of their labour or their labour as such. It is then that
they are coerced by means of fear and the law.

Accordingly, the emergence in antique times of slave-owning
states is now viewed from a different angle. Psychologically, the
initial slaves were those who resisted the then customary bond-
age, for they had to be legally made slaves, chained and forced
to work. However paradoxical this may sound, the slaves were
initially mutineers and rebels. The slave system did not appear
until people began fighting for their rights. That was when they
had to be forced to their knees. Intimidation was the usual way
of obtaining obedience. The slaves of ancient Rome were satu-
rated with fear, but the masters, too, were afraid of their slaves.
To cope with the situation, the ruling classes issued laws, forged
weapons, invented gods and commandments. In short, the
slave systems appeared when people attempted to resist slavery.

Once we grasp this, we see the world-wide historical pro-
gress more clearly from the viewpoint of the mass psychology.
The psychological analysis of progress, therefore, is not a mere
repetition of truisms from political economy, although it does
not contradict them. In Engels's *Origin of the Family, Private
Property and the State* we find a popular expression rendered

---

[1] M. Mauss, "Essai sur le don, forme et raison de l'échange dans les
sociétés archaïques", *Année sociologique*, nouvelle série, t. I (1923-1924),
Paris, 1925.

in earlier translations as "three forms of slavery", connoting antique slavery, medieval feudalism and capitalist hired labour; in later translations this is rendered as "three forms of enslavement", which is less expressive. All the "three forms of slavery" were progressive stages in the struggle against slavery, marked not only by changes in the mode of production and other objective conditions of social life, but also by the inner awakening of man.

Since we have here touched on the relationship between the fundamental tenets of political economy and the observations of social psychology, it may be pertinent to note the error an economist may commit if he operates with a historically and psychologically immutable atom–Homo oeconomicus–i.e., man running his affairs along the same elementary principles or, to be more specific, along the one elementary principle of misappropriation and money-grubbing. Political economy studies the objective relations between people in social production. Only the vulgar mind or some pre-scientific school could identify this as a science of making money. That is a narrow bourgeois view. Objective economic relations, particularly in the earlier pre-capitalist times, were based among the majority of people–and in early antiquity among all people–on alienation and waste rather than on appropriation and greed. It is ridiculous to confuse historical materialism with the view that all men pursue material benefits only. The psychology of purposive greed was subsequent to that of lavish alienation and scrupulous balance. The political economy of a primitive communal formation rested on gratuitous donations. But subsequent antagonistic formations appeared, reversing this psychology: labour, its products and all wealth were expropriated forcibly. Medieval documents bear testimony of laws and edicts, odd from the contemporary point of view, limiting the right to donate, i.e., spontaneously give away property. It will be remembered that Russian industrialists and merchants squandered their easily acquired wealth freely, and perhaps because generations of ancestors had not developed the psychology of thrift. What are primitive donations and dissipation? Both are expressive of the attitude that all surrounding people are "ours", belonging to the "we". By contrast, alienation in return for compensation, and doubly so egoistic accumulation, correspond to a "they" attitude towards all other people. Even under capitalism there still remains a small community–the family–that continues by and large to be pervaded by the "we" economic

186

psychology, i.e., gratuitous alienation of wealth and care; however, this small "we" group is rapidly breaking up, economic considerations intruding to a point where children are paid by parents for performing household chores. The more a personality becomes an all-calculating Homo oeconomicus the less is its capacity for good.

Marx's *Capital* lays bare the concealed relations of plunder, expropriation and slavery underlying those of compensation and equity. Marx explained to hired workers that they remain slaves in the most profound economic sense; they felt this prior to the appearance of Marxism, but were unable to define it with the effect that vast masses of semi-proletarians, peasants and economically underdeveloped peoples were not aware of their slavery.

In our time man is conscious of these survivals of slavery that he did not perceive or feel and hence accepted voluntarily by the promptings of his inherited primitive psychology. Imperialism and colonialism and the falsehoods of politics and religion, etc., are no longer as powerful, are losing strength. Their grip on the awakening man is loosening. That is why history is accelerating its pace.

Man throws off undisguised slavery, he throws off slavery clothed in capitalist freedoms. He overcomes external slavery and the inner survivals of the slave psychology. Three great forces, clearly interrelated, unite and organise the effort: the camp of socialist countries, the national liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples, and the working-class and communist movements in the capitalist countries.

But let us return to what we said at the beginning: the study of universal history helps predict the future. How can we extrapolate this trend?

Here is a view of Robert Oppenheimer, one of the most prominent men of 20th century science: "In the most primitive societies, if one believes the anthropologists, the principal function of ritual, religion, of culture is, in fact, almost to stop change. It is to provide for the social organism what life provides in such a magic way for living organisms, a kind of homeostasis, an ability to remain intact, to respond only very little to the obvious convulsions and alterations in the world around. Today culture and tradition have assumed a very different intellectual and social purpose. The principal function of the most vital and living traditions today is precisely to provide the instruments of rapid change. There are many things

187

which go together to bring about this alteration in man's life; but probably the decisive one is science itself."[1]

Let us put this into the terms of social psychology. History will never slow down; on the contrary, it will continue gaining momentum. The means of coercion will drop away one by one. Scientific proof will be the sole instrument binding people. Nothing can be done about that. And with time this proof will have to be stricter and more absolute.

As said earlier, world history is a gigantic opposition of pre-historic pre-humans ("they") and the modern man, or rather the rapidly emerging human world. For thousands of years man has been refusing to be what he was earlier. In this progress the boundaries between the different human communities grow less distinct, become more labile and penetrable, while people as such, all people, become more distinctly the chief "we" in opposition to the past, overcome over and over again by rational human activity.

2. HISTORY AND HISTORIES

Mankind is a community we have yet to consider.

It is a border category or a limit idea in all sociological thinking. No outline of social psychology will be complete if it does not deal with this largest of all communities. People are prone to consider their "we" as a constituent of a vast whole, of mankind of the totality of men living on earth. Internationalism stems from an awareness of the bonds tying the working-class, national liberation and socialist movements of a country to the corresponding world-wide movements, coupled with belief that interchange and mutual aid on a world scale is necessary.

The concept of mankind as one whole exercises a strong influence on political, moral and ethical, as well as scientific and logical ideas and related sentiment.

The idea of universality has been part of political thinking since ancient times. All attempts at establishing world empires failed. Many tribes and peoples remained out of the reach of even such conquerors as Alexander the Great. But already the stoics, not to mention political figures, ideologists and utopians,

---

[1] From R. Oppenheimer's article "Science and Culture" written for *Nauka i Chelovechestvo* (Science and Humanity), Moscow, 1964, p. 52.

medieval and modern, yearned for unity or unification of mankind.

Ethics, being part of philosophy, potentially implies "man in general", not a member of some "we" group opposing some "they". We might say, in fact, that the philosophical notion of ethics owes its existence to the idea of mankind. When dissociated from that idea, its sense is reduced to mere customs.

The idea of mankind is patently present in the reality of science, in every demonstration and act of logic. Truths unchallenged since Descartes underlie the deepest movements of scientific thought-demonstrability, acknowledgement of logical necessity and obligation imply "a man", i.e., anyone except small children and the mentally sick. No science is conceivable without the postulate of the common nature of intellect in all peoples and individuals irrespective of the difference in cultural and historical features. Once this is overlooked, truth ceases to be truth, it becomes a mere convention not binding to all and, therefore, no longer universal. Thus, the concept of mankind as one whole is a precondition of science; more, the concept of science, too, requires of the human mind to consider the concept of mankind.

On the other hand, though by virtue of some of the principal aspect of our essence we refer ourselves to this vast community, this giant "we", we cannot say whether it existed or exists in reality, for all history has been a sum of the histories of countries, peoples and civilisations. The word "history" is used in the singular but conceived in the plural. The World Histories supplied us now and then are essentially not a history but many histories, histories that like threads now interweave, now run parallel.

Conventionally, the historian's goal is to explore the history of a country. To be sure, he may write the history of a more particular subject down to the history of an individual. But all agree that in these instances the subject of investigation is determined by the environment. By contrast, an individual country is considered an "elementary particle" of the historical process. The word "country" implies now an economic community, now a people or a nation, i.e., an ethnic community, but more often some state or territory limited by boundaries in the spirit of the German state-historical school. Moreover, the country's contemporary territory is projected against the background of remote historical epochs when the country did not

189

exist either in the class or in the administrative sense and its territory was occupied by principalities (whose territories did not necessarily correspond to the boundaries discussed), by tribes that lived there or by migrant hordes.

In sum, the problem of world history brings us back to "we" and "they" group relations that are its very tissue.

Every stage in the development of mankind had its own predominant means of universal interchange.

But only the epoch of capitalism developed direct world-embracing connections such as the world market, the universal economic ties and relationships, global transport, information and communication networks. However, it also gave rise to world antagonisms. The workers of the world are at one vis-à-vis the world bourgeoisie. The capitalist era, from the day it emerged, produced antagonism between a few capitalist countries and the non-capitalist world, most of which was converted into colonies. Capitalism also gave rise to world clashes not only for the division but also the redivision of the planet among capitalist states. Capitalism is the cause of world wars. Its inner contradictions exploded in a world antagonism between the two socio-economic systems. It will be recalled that when Lenin wrote in his article, "On the Slogan for a United State of Europe", that socialism could win first in a few or even one separate capitalist state, he implied not isolation of that one state, but its antagonism to the world capitalist system. "After expropriating the capitalists and organising their own socialist production," he wrote, "the victorious proletariat of that country will arise *against* the rest of the world–the capitalist world–attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries..."[1] That is completely valid and applicable to the time when a whole socialist system–not one country–opposes the world system of monopoly capitalism.

International relations in pre-capitalist times were not as conflicting as capitalism then rapidly made them. This does not mean, however, that the notion of world history is not applicable to pre-capitalistic epochs, but it in a much different sense. Typical of ancient and medieval history were chain relations, i.e., a direct bond between a country and a few neighbouring ones, which in turn, had ties with others. There one could hardly see the world-wide nature of history. It existed objectively, for no

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 342.

country, not even the smallest and most isolated people were left outside this chain relationship.

Finally, in even earlier times world-wide historical relations imply not a positive interpenetration or interaction with neighbours, be it economical, demographic, political, cultural, but a negative relationship, that is, repulsion and isolation.

We might say that mankind at first appeared as a fine weave, the threads of which, i.e., the boundaries and the contacts, carried mostly a negative charge, which, in effect, did not rule out some diffusion and intermixing. At a later stage, regional interaction gradually gained ground, but was, in the final analysis, only part of a universal chain system of which its contemporaries were unaware. Isolation was a prominent factor, but was now a political isolation and, for this reason, assumed the form of armed threats to and defence from neighbours. In the later times, world relations carry a positive charge; they pervade separatism, isolation and stagnation, transforming history into visibly universal history, and also produce world contradictions and antagonisms.

Those are some of the dialectical traits in the development of the socio-historical objective and subjective phenomenon we postulated as the basis of the science of social psychology and defined as the "we and they" formula. The history of man has not yet become a history of one "we" opposed to no one, in which the "they" phenomenon is reduced to mere competition as an expression not of isolation or enmity, but of mutual aid. That is our view of the communist future of mankind, though today this aspiration towards a universal "we" is impeded by the forces of anticommunism.

History was always more than a mere sum of many histories. Today, historiology is still wanting of an approach to studying not only histories, but history, in the search of which an important place goes to social psychology.

3. PROSPECTS

The two preceding sections of this chapter are a summary of two historiological problems which probably hold the greatest promise. The advancement of historical science is tied to the extension of our knowledge of the laws governing the historical actions of the masses, including "rebellion of the masses"—the hub of history—which aroused the ire of such bourgeois sociolog-

ists as Ortega y Gasset. Likewise, history will become more scientific as it overcomes the barriers dividing mankind into opposite parts. Many unknown difficulties will still arise. New laws will be discovered. But historical science is finally bound to become a genuine science about the masses and mankind.

In both these orientations, history dealt with the pervasive notion of "enemies" and "enemy". That notion differed from epoch to epoch, and will go on changing. In the remote past the "enemy" was the palaeoanthropus, the animal which humans avoided; later the "enemy" was the stranger, the non-kinsman, the foreigner; in a class society the "enemies" are the oppressors and enslavers (or, conversely, the "rabble"), as well as foreigners, conquerors, peoples speaking other languages, and, finally, outsiders, heretics and pagans. Yet we can now look forward to the time when enmity will give place to a war of arguments and proofs, this being the equivalent of mutual aid rather than enmity. Thus enemies, the "they" groups, may be described as an essential category of social psychology no less than its opposite: "one's own" and "we".

A process somewhat contrary to enmity and its historical role is the consolidation of people for shouldering fundamental historical tasks. The tasks expand and small communities, even communities that seemed large enough only yesterday, are no longer adequate. The solidarity and the number of people in these historical "we" groups will go on rising. Therefore, the most promising task of social psychology is to probe deeper in the mechanisms, patterns and rules underlying the formation of vast human communities. How to mould a gigantic composite will out of a great number of individual ones? How to obtain a great creative composite mind, one free from contradictions and cracks, out of many minds?

Go back to the Leninist science of revolution. Its ultimate purpose is to unite the droplets into rivulets, rivulets into a vast current, to unite hundreds of thousands into tens of millions pushing forward in the same direction, i.e., charged with like-oriented energy. Lenin wrote: "We are replacing the old drill-sergeant methods practised in bourgeois society against the will of the majority, with the class-conscious discipline of the workers and peasants, who combine hatred of the old society with a determination, ability and readiness to unite and organise their forces for this struggle so as to forge the wills of millions and hundreds of millions of people–disunited, and scattered

192

over the territory of a huge country—into a single will, without which defeat is inevitable."[1] That is the significance of the "we and they" complex today; and for the times to come that significance will be still greater. "The minds of tens of millions of those who are doing things," Lenin wrote, "create something infinitely loftier than the greatest genius can foresee."[2]

The size and solidarity of the masses were, in Lenin's eyes, the crucial criteria when embarking on tasks of world significance. In particular, this idea permeates his programme of uniting peoples and republics in the Soviet Union and ensuring a community of interests and joint action by the working class and peasantry. At times, however, priority should be given to the community of ideas of the classes and nations rather than to rapidity of progress. In 1922 Lenin's view was to "link up with the peasant masses, with the rank-and-file working peasants, and begin to move forward immeasurably, infinitely more slowly than we expected, but in such a way that the entire mass will actually move forward with us."[3]

Lenin warned, however, that this genuine unity of the great history-making "we" may be undermined internally by reserve and lack of sincerity and truth in politics, propaganda and agitation.

The capitalist world is saturated with suspicion and falsehood. Capitalist propaganda, and in some respects also the socio-economic practice, are at pains to create a sense of common interests and tasks in owners and workers alike. But these constructs are foiled by the facts, for at the core we see much more than mere economic antagonism. Typical in this respect was the strike in the General Motors shops in the U.S.A. in September 1964, when the demands were more of a socio-psychologic than economic nature: workers insisted on owners stopping to spy, eavesdrop and transgress on human dignity. What an apology of a friendly "we" group of workers and owners! Spying on fellow citizens, shadowing and eavesdropping are like a cancer dealing death and destruction on "we" group and community feeling.

Lenin posited the strength of the Party and Soviet government on integrity: "Our propaganda and agitation must be open and

    [1] V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 288.
    [2] Ibid., Vol. 26, p. 474.
    [3] Ibid., Vol. 33, pp. 271-72.

above-board."[1] He insisted that people should get complete and truthful information, that neither difficulties nor shortcomings should be withheld from the public. Then the people will link their destiny inseparably with the Party and Soviet government in genuine unity. "The fact that the Soviet Government is not afraid and openly admits this," Lenin wrote, "attracts more millions of workers to its side."[2]

In the absence of unity, the people and the government are divided in the eyes of the masses as "we" and "they". And where the people and the government are united in one "we", the government can channel the energy and sentiment of the people in a direction most beneficial to the general movement at any given moment. Here is what Lenin wrote in 1919 at the height of the Civil War and the economic dislocation: "Our victories were due to the direct appeal made by our Party and by the Soviet Government to the working masses, with every new difficulty and problem pointed out as it arose; to our ability to explain to the masses why it was necessary to devote all energies first to one, then to another, aspect of Soviet work at a given moment; to our ability to arouse the energy, heroism and enthusiasm of the masses and to concentrate every ounce of revolutionary effort on the most important task of the hour."[3]

If that was the case at the beginning of the transition from capitalism to socialism, the following allowance should be made today to avoid error: communism is not tranquility but unslackening acceleration. It is not stationary, but dynamic, implying advance and growth at an ever increasing rate, unimpeded by any social barriers. All of man's history in terms of the rate of development, followed an exponential curve corresponding to a geometric progression. Recent centuries already showed a sharp acceleration of growth, and it is this acceleration that has brought mankind close to communism as to that part of the curve where the acceleration becomes unrestrained, unlimited and continuously ascendent. If the prospect of social psychology is viewed from this angle, it is safe to predict that historical dynamics will impose fundamental demands on the psychics; firstly, upon the solidarity of mankind in resolving tasks, sec-

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 215.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 28, p. 161.
[3] Ibid., Vol. 30, p. 139.

ondly, on the mobility in transition from a given set of conditions to a new one.

It is safe to assume that phenomena of social psychology covered by notions of stable mental make-up and habits will wane. Human psychics in the communist society is to be visualised as more mobile than that of today. That will stem from the objective dynamics of life.